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Mass Arbitration
J. Maria Glover*
Abstract. For decades, the class action has been in the crosshairs of defense-side
procedural warfare. Repeated attacks on the class action by the defense bar, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and other defense-side interest groups have been overwhelmingly
successful. None proved more successful than the arbitration revolution, a forty-year
campaign to eliminate class actions through forced arbitration provisions in private
contracts. The effects of this revolution on civil justice have been profound. Scores of
claims vanished from the civil justice landscape—claims concerning civil rights, wage
theft, sexual harassment, and consumer fraud. The effects on social justice, racial justice,
gender justice, and economic justice have been especially profound, as the legal claims of
minorities, women, wage-and-hour workers, and the working poor were systematically
and disproportionately foreclosed.
Yet now, just when one would expect the defense bar to be taking a victory lap, prominent
defendants are abandoning the hard-fought right to disable the class action through
arbitration and instead seeking refuge in class-action suits. Why the about-face? A
surprising counteroffensive designed to use individual arbitration to the plaintiff’s
advantage: mass arbitration. This Article presents a foundational analysis of the subject.
The Article develops the first and only case study of mass arbitration and provides a
taxonomy of the results. What emerges is not a variation on old themes, but instead a new
and distinct model of dispute resolution. The investigation reveals significant ways in
which the mass-arbitration model challenges conventional wisdom about the economics
of individual claims; uncovers important differences between the mass-arbitration model
and existing forms of aggregate dispute resolution; recasts long-standing debates in
litigation theory and jurisprudence; and provides new perspective on the relationships
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among private procedural ordering, public procedural reform, and civil justice. Mass
arbitration, in other words, is a phenomenon in its own right. More importantly, mass
arbitration offers a window into the future of civil justice.
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Introduction*
In 2018, the minimum wage in Massachusetts and California was $11.00.1
In Illinois, $8.25.2 In New Jersey it was $8.60, up from $8.44 the previous year.3
And in New York it was $10.40, up from a previous $9.70.4 Drivers in these
states for the rideshare service Uber, however, alleged that they had routinely
been paid less than those minimum wages—often far less.5 The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 6 seemed like a good candidate to combat what
appeared to be fairly blatant wage theft. Indeed, Congress included a collectiveaction provision in the FLSA because most wage-theft claims by wage-andhour workers are not economically viable on an individual basis.7 According to
their employment agreements with Uber, however, drivers were required to
arbitrate any claims individually. Putative FLSA collective-action claims by
many Uber drivers were therefore stayed pending arbitration.8
* This Article is current as of March 2022. Unless otherwise stated, subsequent changes

in the mass-arbitration landscape are not addressed.
1. Office of Commc’ns, Wage & Hour Div., Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-farm

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2021, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://perma.cc/VU6S-KSJW (last updated Jan. 2022).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Petition for Order Compelling Arbitration ¶¶ 2, 8, Abadilla v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. 18-cv-07343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Abadilla Petition for
Arbitration] (providing a general summary of the arbitration demands of Uber drivers
from California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, all of whom
brought claims against Uber under the Fair Labor Standards Act and relevant state
labor laws).
Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see, e.g., Calvillo v. Bull Rogers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1310
(D.N.M. 2017) (“The purpose of collective action under the FLSA is to give ‘plaintiffs
the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources,’
and to benefit the judicial system ‘by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common
issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged . . . activity.’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989))).
See, e.g., Olivares v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-06062, 2017 WL 3008278, at *1, *4 (N.D.
Ill. July 14, 2017) (granting Uber’s motion to compel arbitration for a class of drivers
subject to Uber’s arbitration agreement, which prohibited class actions); Singh v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 3d 345, 347-52, 365-67 (D.N.J. 2021) (same), appeal filed, No. 213234 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2021). Claims under analogous state laws met the same result. See,
e.g., Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507, 518-20, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(granting Uber’s motion to compel arbitration for those claimants who had not opted
out of their arbitration agreements); Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919,
922-24, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (doing the same, in a case transferred pursuant to a forumselection clause, for Massachusetts drivers who had not opted out of their agreements
with Uber), aff ’d, 7 F.4th 854 (9th Cir. 2021); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d
footnote continued on next page
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To any individual driver—and, just as importantly, to any individual
driver’s lawyer—pursuing an individual claim in arbitration appeared to be a
nonstarter. Under the applicable fee schedule for Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services (JAMS), the nonrefundable filing fee for arbitration was
$1,500 per demand.9 Given the value of a single driver’s claim for unpaid or
underpaid wages, the up-front investment to advance this filing fee10 would
not be an economically rational proposition for either individual claimants or
their attorneys.11 In effect, then, the arbitration agreement eliminated drivers’
1087, 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing the district court’s denial of Uber’s motions
to compel arbitration for three putative driver classes).
9. See, e.g., Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶ 21; Andrew Wallender,
Corporate Arbitration Tactic Backfires as Claims Flood In, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 11, 2019,
3:06 AM), https://perma.cc/XT8Y-TW2S. Although Uber’s arbitration agreement
provided that Uber would pay at least some of the $1,500, it refused to pay any portion
of the fees in the face of multiple arbitration demands (that is, mass arbitration). See
Declaration of Michael Colman in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration & to Dismiss the Action at 56, Olivares, 2017 WL 3008278 (No. 16-cv-06062),
ECF No. 14-1 (providing for equal sharing of fees unless otherwise required by law);
Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶ 21 (“JAMS has repeatedly advised Uber
that JAMS is ‘missing the . . . filing fee of $1,500 for each demand, made payable to
JAMS.’ ” (quoting a JAMS notice to Uber)). On costs in arbitration generally, see
Arbitration in America: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019)
[hereinafter Senate Arbitration Hearing] (statement of Myriam Gilles, Professor,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law), https://perma.cc/93RQ-6PW2 (“Under these
class-banning arbitration clauses, any claimant must bear 100% of the costs of
proceeding in arbitration by herself; her claim cannot be joined with those of any other
arbitral claimant as a way of distributing costs and risks.”).
10. The portion of the filing fee for which claimants bear responsibility may be capped by
the applicable arbitral forum’s fee schedule at the time of filing. See, e.g., Arbitration
Schedule of Fees and Costs, JAMS, https://perma.cc/U8F6-TZKK (archived May 9, 2022)
(“For matters based on a clause or agreement that is required as a condition of
employment, the employee is only required to pay $400.”). The relevant arbitration
agreement may also provide that the employer will pay a portion of the claimant’s
filing fees. See supra note 9. Faced with mounting fees from arbitration demands, Uber
settled with almost 60,000 of its drivers in 2019 for more than $146 million. See Chris
Isidore, Uber Settles Disputes with Thousands of Drivers Ahead of Its IPO, CNN (May 9,
2019, 8:10 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/PTM3-36T6. Other companies faced with mass
arbitration have responded similarly, leading California to enact a law penalizing any
company that refuses to pay arbitration fees. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.97 (West
2022); see also Postmates Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783, 2021 WL 540155, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021) (denying Postmates’ attempt to strike down the California
law); Alison Frankel, Calif. Judge Upholds State Law Penalizing Companies for Stalling on
Arbitration Fees, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2021, 4:49 PM), https://perma.cc/P9V7-MUWE
(describing Postmates’ efforts to avoid arbitration as “unrelenting”).
11. Cf., e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the
Concepcions . . . for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”); Senate
Arbitration Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Myriam Gilles, Professor, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law) (“Most [consumers] cannot find lawyers to represent them in
arbitration . . . .”).
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FLSA claims, just as similar agreements had done to hundreds of thousands of
legal claims for decades. But then a funny thing—an improbable, nearimpossible thing—happened. In a series of filings, the Uber drivers served more
than 12,500 individual arbitration demands on Uber.12 And their lawyers
demanded that Uber reimburse the filing fees—$18.75 million in total—just as
Uber had agreed to do in its arbitration agreement.13 This was not a collective
action, or a class action, or even class arbitration. This was mass arbitration.
By mass arbitration14 I mean the following. Some enterprising and (highly)
capitalized attorneys file arbitration demands on behalf of individual claimants
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. The claims are brought against
the same defendant for the same course of conduct. The attorneys then do this
again. And again. And again. Mass arbitration is a new model of claiming that is
at once entirely individualized (one-on-one arbitration) and aggregate. The
individual claims that make up the multifarious one-on-one arbitrations are
brought against a single defendant, arising out of similar alleged misconduct.
Mass arbitration is both a response to and a product of a decades-long,
wildly successful campaign by defense-side interests to dismantle the
infrastructure for enforcing substantive rights.15 This campaign, waged by the
defense bar, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, multiple Republican presidential
administrations, and various defense-side interest groups, involved a series of
procedural offensives in the Supreme Court and before Congress.16 Many
12. Alison Frankel, Uber Tells Its Side of the Story in Mass Arbitration Fight with 12,500 Drivers,

REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2019, 12:03 PM), https://perma.cc/4VQT-FHHM.
13. Id.
14. The term “mass arbitration” has been used by one scholar to describe the ubiquity of

arbitration agreements in the post–arbitration revolution landscape. David Horton,
Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 476-79 (2014)
(reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)). What the author meant in that book review, though,
was a massive number of actual agreements. That is not mass arbitration as described
in this Article; indeed, it is almost the opposite, given that those agreements tend to
result in almost no arbitration. See infra Part I.C.
15. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the Trump
Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 37, 59 (2018) (explaining how rights-creating statutes
enacted during the 1960s and 1970s brought about a procedural counterrevolution
against federal litigation); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2012) (detailing the
dismantling of private enforcement mechanisms in litigation and noting the United
States’ unique reliance on private litigation to regulate wrongdoing).
16. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 655-56
(2016) (describing how the Supreme Court adopted the position of the Chamber of
Commerce and other business amici in recent class-action suits); Stephen B. Burbank &
Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1495, 1524-25 (2017) (characterizing Republican anti–class-action bills in the
early 1990s and the Chamber of Commerce’s increased amicus activity since 1995 as
footnote continued on next page
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decades and scores of victories after its inception, the campaign achieved wide
deregulation across the American legal landscape.17
In the crosshairs of the campaign: the class-action device. At the urging of
conservative administration officials, President Ronald Reagan’s judicial
appointees received careful vetting as to their views on the class action.18
President George W. Bush pushed Congress to examine litigation practices and
the perceived explosion of “junk” litigation in nearly every State of the Union
address.19 A group of Fortune 100 corporate lawyers helped draft the Class
“part of a wider and concerted campaign of litigation retrenchment”); Brianne J. Gorod,
The First Decade of the Roberts Court: Good For Business Interests, Bad for Legal
Accountability, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (2017) (“[T]he Chamber of
Commerce . . . appears to have been more successful before the Roberts Court than it
was before either of the two Courts that preceded it.”); see also Joanne Doroshow,
Federal Legislative Attacks on Class Actions, 31 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 22, 30-36 (2018)
(recounting the history of attacks on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by corporate
lobbying groups and Republican legislators).
17. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
Glover, supra note 15, at 1150-51) (explaining how private litigation is critical to the
regulation of wrongdoing in the United States).
18. See Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 371, 378-83 (noting that “[t]he President personally met every judicial
nominee to ensure their . . . fidelity to his vision,” which included a “[s]pecial ire”
toward class-action impact litigation).
19. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
Administration Goals (Feb. 27, 2001), https://perma.cc/GK57-GS2L (discussing the
need to avoid “frivolous lawsuits” against medical providers); President George W.
Bush, 2003 State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), https://perma.cc/E9AJ-GXLJ
(discussing the need for medical liability reform); President George W. Bush, 2004 State
of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), https://perma.cc/5HA3-PLSM (calling for the
elimination of “wasteful and frivolous medical lawsuits”); President George W. Bush,
2005 State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), https://perma.cc/4XAL-FL5Z (“Justice is
distorted and our economy is held back by irresponsible class actions . . . .”); President
George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), https://perma.cc/
5AYL-TQGZ (“I ask . . . Congress to pass medical liability reform this year.”); President
George W. Bush, 2007 State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007), https://perma.cc/
ZZ8Z-NU6Q (calling for legislation against “junk lawsuits”); President George W.
Bush, 2008 State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), https://perma.cc/S25K-BDFZ
(calling on Congress to address an “epidemic of junk medical lawsuits”); see also Gilles,
supra note 18, at 387. Whether the perceived “litigation explosion” reflects reality is not
so obvious. For instance, the number of civil cases filed in state courts decreased by 7.7%
between 2008 and 2012. CT. STAT. PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2012 STATE TRIAL COURT CASELOADS 4
(2014), https://perma.cc/K9G3-8NDL. The picture in federal courts is more nuanced:
Federal civil appeals decreased by 11% between 2009 and 2018, but civil filings in U.S.
district courts rose 7.1% during the same period (although they declined by 5.2%
between 2017 and 2018). Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/L5ST-JV9K (archived May 13, 2022). Civil filings rose a further 3.4%
between 2018 and 2019, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/9SDL-WXPE (archived May 13, 2022), and 16.2% between 2019 and
footnote continued on next page
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Action Fairness Act (CAFA)—which aimed to reduce the overall number of
class certifications in the litigation landscape20—and spent somewhere between
$50 to $200 million in support of the bill.21 Meanwhile, the defense bar secured
Supreme Court victories in case after class-action case. The Court (often, but
not always, in 5–4 decisions) ratcheted up class-certification standards under
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;22 effectively removed the
class action from the products liability landscape;23 made civil rights claims
more difficult to pursue on a class-wide basis;24 and embraced the defense
coalition’s conception of the class action as procedural pariah.25
The campaign’s focus on the class action was grounded in conventional
wisdom regarding claiming economics. This wisdom holds—and empirical
research tends to support26—that for an individual with a low-value but

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.
25.

26.

2020, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/W89J-F74F
(archived May 13, 2022).
See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4-5, 13-14, 22-23, 53-54 (2005) (expressing concern with the
“dramatic explosion of class actions in state courts” and describing how CAFA makes
removal to federal courts—which are less likely to grant certification—easier).
See David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1288 (2007). Despite CAFA’s success,
more dramatic legislative efforts by class-action opponents met with resistance. See
Gilles, supra note 18, at 396-97 (describing one bill that would have limited contingency
fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys).
E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (holding that “undiluted,
even heightened, attention” is required for settlement-only class certification under
Rule 23); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50 (2011) (adopting Richard
Nagareda’s heightened “predominance” standard for purposes of Rule 23(a)
commonality and stating that the only questions relevant for commonality are those
that generate “answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009))); see also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 729, 764 (2013) (arguing that courts have “inject[ed] confusion over what is
required to satisfy each element of Rule 23(a)” by applying the rule’s requirements to
class definitions).
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609-11 (discussing the impediments to class certification
presented by an asbestos products liability suit); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
853 (1999) (noting that having “enough assets to pay all projected claims” would
preclude the “certification of any mandatory class on a limited fund rationale”).
See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 372-78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (describing class
actions as imposing in terrorem settlement pressure and stating that “class arbitration
would be no different”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 68687 (2010) (stating that the “stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of
class-action litigation” and holding that class arbitration may not be compelled absent
explicit agreement); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-98 (7th
Cir. 1995) (emphasizing the potential for class actions to impose “intense” settlement
pressure and refusing to certify an issue class based on this pressure).
See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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potentially meritorious claim, the costs of pursuing an individual case are
typically too high for individual claiming to be a rational proposition.27 The
class-action device changes that calculus by allowing cost spreading among
claimants, thereby enabling claiming.28 Destroy the class action, the logic
went, destroy the claims.
And indeed, the defense coalition came to bury the class action, not restrict
it. None of the coalition’s efforts went so far as to eliminate the class action
altogether: Doing so would have required upending long-standing precedent or
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, the coalition waged a
forty-year campaign to gain the ability to contract the class action out of
existence. Its focus? Mandatory arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers in take-it-or-leave-it consumer and employee contracts.
Defendants played the long game.29 They convinced the Supreme Court to
bless arbitration provisions prohibiting class action for state-law claims,30 for
federal claims,31 and finally for claims under statutes like the FLSA that
explicitly provide a right to collective action.32 The result was a roadmap for
corporations to engineer, as a practical matter, contractual immunity against a
vast array of claims. The result was also nothing short of a revolution: an
arbitration revolution.33
Yet less than a decade later, some of the very entities that waged and
seemingly won the war are abandoning the whole project. Corporations that
engineered the arbitration revolution are now “scared to death” of
arbitration.34 So scared, in fact, that some are retreating to the device they
spent decades trying to eliminate: the class action. In May 2021, one of the

27. See Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 245 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
28. See Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

LITIG. 231, 236-38 (1991).
See, e.g., Aaron Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on Unconscionability, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5,
2011, 9:40 AM), https://perma.cc/DY38-XECL (speculating that counsel for AT&T had,
for over a decade, been crafting a strategy for creating, testing, and ultimately bringing
a “consumer-friendly” arbitration agreement with a class waiver to the Supreme
Court).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337-38, 352.
It. Colors, 570 U.S. at 231-32, 238-39.
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619-20, 1626 (2018).
See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After the
Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457-60 (2016).
Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Scared to Death” by Arbitration: Companies
Drowning in Their Own System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020) (quoting an internal DoorDash
document), https://perma.cc/T34V-PJ9X.
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biggest corporations of all—Amazon—dropped the arbitration requirement
from its terms of service entirely. “Fine,” it essentially declared, “sue us.”35
How could this total victory transform into a massive retreat not even a
decade later? The answer lies in an unforeseen (and largely unforeseeable)
counteroffensive by a small subset of the plaintiffs’ bar—a counteroffensive
that I term mass arbitration. This Article presents a foundational analysis of
the subject.
Part I traces the backdrop against which mass arbitration emerged. It first
provides a short history of the arbitration revolution (in which the Supreme
Court allowed for mandatory arbitration agreements in virtually all take-itor-leave-it contracts) and the concomitant class-action counterrevolution (in
which the Supreme Court not only made class certification more difficult but
also permitted the use of class-action waivers in mandatory arbitration
agreements).36 It then details the profound consequences of the arbitration
revolution for the civil justice landscape. Today, virtually all Americans are
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements with class-action waivers. And a
broad swath of claims—for consumer fraud, racial discrimination, gender
discrimination, wage theft, and workplace sexual harassment—have been all
but eliminated.
Decades of attempts at public procedural reform have largely failed.
Nonetheless, the analysis of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence in
Part II shows that the arbitration revolution left (narrow) room for private
procedural counteroffensives. To be sure, the Supreme Court has made quite
clear that neither unconscionability nor the effective-vindication doctrine is
sufficient to salvage a representative procedure—the class action—that the
Court itself disfavors. But what could happen if defendants “didn’t have the

35. Sara Randazzo, Amazon Faced 75,000 Arbitration Demands. Now It Says: Fine, Sue Us,

WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2021, 7:30 AM ET) (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/R5JQJ26V; Amanda Robert, Amazon Drops Arbitration Requirement After Facing over 75,000
Demands, ABA J. (June 2, 2021, 11:45 AM CDT), https://perma.cc/TYG3-GMDU
(“Many companies require their employees and customers to resolve disputes through
arbitration rather than in the courtroom. Now, Amazon is no longer one of them.”).
36. Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang characterize efforts to retrench the class-action
device as a counterrevolution against federal litigation. See Burbank & Farhang, supra
note 16, at 1496-98. In the context of the arbitration revolution, those same efforts
constitute a counterrevolution against the class action itself—and against civil
litigation generally. For additional literature discussing the retrenchment of rights
through procedural warfare, see generally Glover, supra note 15, at 1162-70; LAURENCE
TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 291-93 (2014); STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN P. FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); and
J. Maria Glover, All Balls and No Strikes: The Roberts Court’s Anti-worker Activism, 2019 J.
DISP. RESOL., no. 1, at 129.
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class action to kick around anymore”?37 What did happen—improbably,
unexpectedly—was mass arbitration.
The best way to understand mass arbitration is to observe it in a realworld context. Parts III, IV, and V of this Article accordingly provide and
analyze a foundational mass-arbitration case study. One scholar has aptly
referred to private arbitration as a “black hole.”38 To see beyond the event
horizon, I drew from an extensive set of materials, some not publicly available,
to create a broad study dataset. These materials included all available claim data
from the American Arbitration Association (AAA), JAMS, and the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR); all relevant
judicial filings, opinions, and orders; and all relevant corporate financial
disclosures.39 I also interviewed the principal architects of mass arbitration,40
leading plaintiffs’ attorneys,41 and a number of leading defense attorneys,
including some of the architects of the defense coalition’s arbitration
revolution.42
The study in Part III first uncovers the origin story of mass arbitration—a
story about how a few entrepreneurial attorneys marshaled an unlikely
combination of experience, capital, innovation, and appetite for risk in an
effort to call corporate defendants’ arbitration bluff by, well, arbitrating. They
demanded the same thing those defendants had sought before the Supreme
37. To quote Richard Nixon, speaking before reporters at the Beverly Hilton Hotel in

38.
39.
40.

41.

42.

1962: “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore, because gentlemen, this is my
last press conference . . . .” Jason Schwartz, 55 Years Ago—“The Last Press Conference,”
RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/DQ45-B2BN.
Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 682 (2018).
See infra Part III.A.2.
Interview with Travis Lenkner, Managing Partner, Keller Lenkner LLC & Warren
Postman, Partner, Keller Lenkner LLC, in Queenstown, Md. (Jan. 14, 2021); Interview
with Warren Postman, Partner, Keller Lenkner LLC, in Wash., D.C. (July 23, 2021);
Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, Principal Att’y, Z Law, LLC, in Wash., D.C. (July 22,
2021); Interview with Matthew C. Helland, Managing Partner, Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
in Kennebunk, Me. (Sept. 2, 2021). All transcripts and notes are on file with the Author.
Interview with Anonymous No. 5 in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 8, 2021); Interview with
Jonathan D. Selbin, Partner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, in Wash., D.C.
(July 26, 2021); Interview with Anonymous No. 2 in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 13, 2020);
Interview with Adam T. Klein, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden LLC, in Wash.,
D.C. (Aug. 10, 2021); Interview with Nancy Erika Smith, Att’y, Smith Mullin, P.C., in
Kennebunk, Me. (Aug. 24, 2021). All transcripts and notes are on file with the Author.
Interview with Anonymous No. 4 in Wash., D.C. (July 29, 2021); Interviews with
Anonymous No. 3 in Wash., D.C. (Apr. & June 2021); Interview with Anonymous No. 1
in Nashville, Tenn. (Jan. 2006). Additionally, I interviewed leading defense attorneys or
former defense attorneys who had experience with mass arbitration. Interview with
Jonathan E. Paikin, Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, in Wash., D.C.
(Nov. 9, 2021); Interview with Anonymous No. 5, supra note 41. All transcripts and
notes are on file with the Author.
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Court: the enforcement of arbitration agreements “according to their terms.”43
And they did so repeatedly.
The study in Part III also reveals that mass arbitration is a new and distinct
form of aggregate dispute resolution. Part III explains the mass-arbitration
model’s distinctive features, strategic elements, risks, and benefits. In so doing,
it reveals the counterintuitive ways in which mass arbitration challenges—
indeed, inverts—the conventional wisdom regarding the economics of
claiming. Mass arbitration harnesses individual claiming and eschews class
claiming in order to extract settlements for claimants.
Part IV provides a window into the future of mass arbitration by
uncovering a series of challenges to the mass-arbitration model. Part V then
taxonomizes the case study’s findings and compares the mass-arbitration
model to more familiar and established models of aggregate dispute
resolution—namely, class actions and multidistrict litigation (MDL)
consolidations.
As Part VI details, the impact of mass arbitration on the civil justice
landscape will be profound. First, mass arbitration recasts long-standing
debates in civil justice, particularly those at the intersection of claim
facilitation and settlement pressure. Second, because defendants will have to
contend with the mass-arbitration model in dispute-resolution contexts they
cannot unilaterally change by contract, mass arbitration illuminates the
possibilities and pitfalls of informal aggregate dispute resolution in the civil
justice landscape. Third, mass arbitration suggests a larger critique of the U.S.
civil justice system: It is at best agnostic to many of the systemic injustices it
perpetuates, and it increasingly shirks its countermajoritarian commitments as
it outsources resolutions to moneyed corporate interests.
The counter-counterrevolution is upon us. Mass arbitration has already
driven some corporate defendants into the arms of their longtime nemesis, the
class action. But we have only begun to glimpse the enormous change that
mass arbitration portends.
I.

The Arbitration Revolution and the Class-Action
Counterrevolution

The defense coalition tried to kill the class action by shifting dispute
resolution from public litigation to private arbitration. This involved a
significant sleight of hand. As this Part explains, what the defense coalition
really wanted was to eliminate—or at least drastically reduce—plaintiffs’ ability
43. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (explaining that

requiring class-wide arbitration interferes with the Federal Arbitration Act’s aim of
enforcing arbitration agreements “according to their terms”).
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to assert claims anywhere. Arbitration emerged as an important fig leaf in that
effort.
Though disfavored in early American jurisprudence,44 private procedural
ordering is now widely accepted by American courts.45 Public rules of
procedure are increasingly treated as default rules subject to waiver.46 Judicial
endorsement of private procedural ordering paved the way for the expansion
of “alternative dispute resolution,” namely arbitration. Arbitration agreements
in private contracts, in turn, provided the vehicle by which the defense bar
achieved the “near-total demise” of the class action.47 This one-two punch of
mandatory arbitration agreements and class-action waivers has now touched
virtually all Americans, and it has all but eliminated a wide range of consumer,
employee, and civil rights claims.
This Part traces the above developments in three stages. First, it describes
the birth of forced arbitration agreements in take-it-or-leave-it contracts—the
arbitration revolution. Second, it details the near-total death of class actions—
the class-action counterrevolution. Third, it examines the aftermath of the
revolution and the counterrevolution, both for American citizens and for
scores of claims across the legal landscape.
A. The Arbitration Revolution
The history of binding arbitration agreements begins in the first part of
the twentieth century. Following a period of perceived hostility toward
arbitration in federal courts,48 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) in 1925.49 The FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”50 During debates about the FAA’s
44. See Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial

Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128, 134 (2018).
45. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 734-38

(2011).
46. See H. Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating

Procedure Through Contract, 95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 788-91 (2017).
47. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the

Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375-79 (2005) (predicting the “near-total
demise of the modern class action” due to the “rise of contractual class action waivers”
that “work[] in tandem with standard arbitration provisions”).
48. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). For an alternative
historical account regarding early treatment of arbitration agreements, see Bruce L.
Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of
Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 480-81 (1995).
49. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 114).
50. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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potential passage, one senator expressed concern that contracts with
arbitration clauses might be offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees. The bill’s supporters responded that the FAA was
intended to facilitate the enforcement of freely and fully negotiated
agreements between merchants of equal bargaining power.51 For decades, the
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence aligned with this view of the FAA
and disallowed ex ante arbitration agreements when bargaining power was
unequal.52
The story does not pick up in any meaningful way until the 1980s. After
the election of President Ronald Reagan, the defense bar, corporate entities,
and related interest groups launched what would become a decades-long
campaign to expand the universe of permissible contexts for mandatory
arbitration agreements. In a series of cases decided in the 1980s and 1990s, the
defense coalition persuaded the Supreme Court to approve the use of forced
arbitration for claims under federal antitrust laws,53 securities laws,54 and
antidiscrimination statutes.55 Lower courts, meanwhile, enforced arbitration
agreements found in mail inserts,56 in shrink-wrap licenses,57 and even in
“add-ons” to contracts already entered into by consumers.58 By 2012, the
arbitration revolution for legal claims was largely complete: The Court held

51. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

1939, 1948 & n.42, 2007 & n.321 (2014) (citing Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 8-11 (1923)); see also Pamela
S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, Disarming the Private Attorney General,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 204 (noting that Congress may have intended to exclude
employment contracts from the FAA); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 38 (asserting that the FAA was not intended to cover
contracts of adhesion).
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985).
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-81, 484-85.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-24, 29, 35 (1991).
Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, No. 07-cv-00918, 2008 WL 150479, at *1-3, *12
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008).
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
For a recent example, see Miracle-Pond v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 19-cv-04722, 2020 WL
2513099, at *1-2, *6 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2020) (permitting the addition of an arbitration
clause to existing consumer contracts without notice of modification). But see, e.g.,
Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 495 F.3d 1062, 1065-67 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (requiring
notice in order to enforce an add-on arbitration clause).
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that all federal statutory claims are arbitrable unless Congress expressly
provides otherwise.59
After these successes, the scope of the defense coalition’s goals expanded. If
arbitration agreements could be used to move legal claims out of court and into
private dispute resolution, perhaps they could be used to remove them
altogether. Aware that directly retrenching substantive rights was politically
impractical,60 the coalition sought to eliminate rights indirectly by targeting
the principal mechanism for their enforcement—the class action. And so, as the
next Subpart traces, the coalition also waged a class-action counterrevolution.
B. The Class-Action Counterrevolution
In the 1980s, in response to a perceived “litigation explosion” and an
increase in Rule 23(b)(3) suits (which tended to extract large settlements from
corporate defendants61), business leaders and conservative politicians launched
a series of public attacks on the class action.62 According to these individuals,
class actions allowed “radical” lawyers to use litigation to subvert “the
democratic will as expressed through legislatures or executive action.”63
President Reagan’s judicial appointees were vetted on the class-action issue to
confirm that they would help effectuate the Reagan Administration’s antilitigation agenda.64 Conservative groups, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s,
engaged in numerous efforts to retrench class actions through congressional
action.65
The defense coalition had even more success before the federal judiciary,
where its lawyers contested the interpretation of nearly every element of
Rule 23. Conservative judges, many of them skeptical of mass-harm claims,
59. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 103-05 (2012) (“Because the [Credit

60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Repair Organizations Act] is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an
arbitral forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to
its terms.”).
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 15, at 43.
See Gilles, supra note 18, at 376 (“Beginning in the 1980s, class actions racked up many
billions of dollars in settlements, spread across an ever-expanding range of subject
areas and industries . . . . By the 2000s, as multimillion dollar range settlements became
almost commonplace, the power of class cases to coerce lucrative settlements was not
much in dispute.” (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 378-81, 395-96.
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 301 (1988).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16, at 1508-10, 1509 tbl.1 (finding that the bulk of
anti–class-action bill activity occurred between 1991 and 2014, and detecting a
statistically significant party effect in favor of anti–class-action measures as
congressional power shifted from Democrats to Republicans).
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were increasingly amenable to these broadsides.66 The defense coalition’s
challenges ultimately reached a receptive Supreme Court, which ratcheted up
certification standards for 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class actions.67 The Court’s
restrictive interpretation of Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement went a long
way toward eliminating nationwide employment-discrimination classes.68 Its
decisions in two asbestos class-action suits made class certification for most
mass-tort claims impossible.69 Choice-of-law issues prevented the certification
of nationwide class actions involving state-law claims.70 Consumer classes ran

66. See Gilles, supra note 18, at 397.
67. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (explaining that 23(a)(2)

commonality requires generating “common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 22, at 132)); Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (holding that a class action could not be certified
absent evidence that damages were common to the class); J. Maria Glover, The Supreme
Court’s “Non-transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2017) (noting
that in Dukes and Comcast, the Supreme Court “increas[ed] the cost and difficulty of
obtaining [class] certification”).
68. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 357; Scott A. Budow, How the Roberts Court Has Changed Labor and
Employment Law, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 281, 285 (describing the reduction in
employment class actions after Dukes and noting that the decision was “undeniably
favorable to employers”); Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite From the
Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971, 992 (2017) (“[S]everal circuits have held that employment
class actions involving decentralized decision making cannot go forward under Dukes
because of a lack of commonality.”); Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment
Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 829-30
(2015) (observing that Dukes led plaintiffs “to file smaller regional class actions” rather
than nationwide suits); Terrence Reed, Jacqueline Harding & William Kelly, Employee
Class Actions Four Years After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 82 DEF. COUNSEL J. 255, 255-56 (2015)
(observing that Dukes was a victory for employers and made employmentdiscrimination class actions smaller and more regional, even if it did not end all such
class actions); Nina Martin, The Impact and Echoes of the Wal-Mart Discrimination Case,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:53 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/5Z56-4LY6 (noting a
steep drop-off in the filing of employment-discrimination class actions in the two
years after Dukes).
69. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 622-28 (1997); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16, at 1522
(noting that “Amchem and Ortiz effectively ended mass tort class actions”); David
Marcus, The Short Life and the Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1565, 1588 (2017) (“[The Amchem Court] hammered the penultimate nail in the
mass tort class action’s coffin.”); see also Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793-99 (2010) (tracing the “increasing importance of MDL
aggregation” for mass-tort claims following Amchem and Ortiz).
70. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799, 814-823 (1985); In re Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a nationwide class based in part
on differences in negligence law across jurisdictions).
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up against judicially created certification requirements.71 Although a number
of legal justifications were offered for these shifts,72 judges’ motivations were
clear to those paying attention: “[I]t is a judicial empathy for the complaint of
corporate defendants that large class actions present a great deal of pressure to
settle cases.”73
But the coalition’s goals became more ambitious. Also beginning in the
1980s, the coalition launched a broad initiative to harness private procedural
ordering,74 and specifically private contracts for forced arbitration, to all but
eliminate the class action.75 During the campaign, the coalition became more
explicit about its normative view that class actions had no place in the
regulatory landscape. In its 2000 brief in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph,76 for instance, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued for the
validity of an arbitration agreement in connection with the Truth in Lending
Act because class actions were not critical to the Act’s enforcement regime.77
Ten years later, in its amicus brief in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Chamber
was far less measured: “[W]hether through litigation or arbitration,” it argued,
“class actions . . . [do] not discourage unlawful behavior.”78 The Concepcion
Court agreed, holding in 2011 that the FAA preempted any state law
“conditioning the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability
of classwide arbitration procedures.”79 Critically, this included state
71. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-94 (3d Cir. 2012) (joining

72.
73.

74.

75.

76.
77.

78.

79.

other circuits by introducing an ascertainability requirement into the classcertification inquiry).
Cf., e.g., Gilles, supra note 47, at 388-89 (describing the “plausible but shaky” doctrinal
underpinnings of the decertification cases).
Id. at 389; see, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that class certification would put the defendants under “intense pressure to
settle”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (noting that class
action and class arbitration can both produce in terrorem settlement effects).
The term “procedural private ordering” was first used in the scholarly literature by
Jaime Dodge to refer to the modification or elimination of procedure through private
contract. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 724-26.
See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 47, at 393-96; J. Maria Glover, Feature: Arbitration,
Transparency, and Privatization, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3064-68 (2015); Judith Resnik, Feature: Arbitration, Transparency,
and Privatization, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2872-74 (2015).
531 U.S. 79 (2000).
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1-4, Green Tree Fin. Corp, 531 U.S. 79 (No. 99-1235), 2000 WL
744157.
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 3, Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3167313
[hereinafter Concepcion Chamber of Commerce Brief].
563 U.S. at 336-38, 344, 352.
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unconscionability doctrines. Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”80 Unconscionability is, of course, one such
ground for contract revocation.
Prior to its watershed decision in Concepcion, the Supreme Court had
already been moving in the defense bar’s direction regarding arbitration and
the class action. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,81 decided
one year before Concepcion, the Court held that “[a]n implicit agreement to
authorize class-action arbitration . . . is not a term that the arbitrator may infer
solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”82 This is an
astonishing statement. The agreement at issue in Stolt-Nielsen specified that
arbitrators would determine whether the claimants could proceed as a class.83
Yet the Court took it upon itself to impose its own crabbed understanding of
what arbitration entails.
Moreover, the Court’s determination in Stolt-Nielsen that “arbitration”
under the FAA meant “bilateral arbitration,” not class arbitration, flowed
directly from an all-but-explicit judgment that class arbitrations were
normatively undesirable.84 The Court made this judgment fully explicit in
Concepcion:
[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . [W]hen damages
allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and
decided at once, the risk of an error will often become unacceptable. Faced with
even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into
settling questionable claims.85

Arbitration lacks the “multilayered review” of judicial proceedings,
particularly those involving class certification,86 so it is conceivable that the
Court could have limited its disdain for class actions to those that occur in
arbitration. But it did not. The Court instead made clear that its negative view
of class actions was far broader: “[C]ourts have noted the risk of ‘in terrorem’

80. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
81. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id. at 668-69 (“The parties entered into a supplemental agreement providing for the

question of class arbitration to be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators . . . .”).
84. See id. at 685-87 (“[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a

degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
submit their disputes to an arbitrator. . . . And the commercial stakes of class-action
arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, even though the scope of
judicial review is much more limited.” (citations omitted)).
85. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011).
86. See id.
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settlements that class actions entail, and class arbitration would be no
different.”87
Together, the opinions in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion achieved a bit of a
statutory-interpretation sleight of hand. The Court defined arbitration as
“bilateral arbitration”—based on its own normative judgment about the in
terrorem settlement effects of class actions—and injected that new definition
into the meaning of “arbitration” in the FAA. This maneuver was of profound
consequence: The notion that the FAA defines “arbitration” as bilateral, nonclass, private dispute resolution was the cornerstone of the defense coalition’s
revolution and counterrevolution strategy.
The coalition’s movement reached its apex when the Supreme Court
decided American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 88 in 2013. The Court in
Italian Colors made clear that the statutory term “arbitration”—explicitly
defined as both bilateral and anti–class action—applied regardless of whether
arbitration would eliminate claims.89 Before Italian Colors, the Supreme Court
had strongly suggested, and courts of appeals had held, that contractual
provisions foreclosing the “effective vindication” of federal statutory claims
could not be enforced.90 Italian Colors came to the Court with a factual record
demonstrating that it would be wholly uneconomical for most American
Express–accepting merchants to assert their federal antitrust claims on an
individual basis (as required by their contract).91 Nonetheless, the Court
rejected the effective-vindication principle,92 holding that the FAA required
courts to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their
terms.”93 If enforcement of the agreement eliminated statutory claims, that was
“[t]oo darn bad.”94 The Court’s decisions in Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion and Italian
Colors represent the culmination of the defense bar’s near-total victory in the
arbitration revolution and class-action counterrevolution.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
89. See id. at 231-32, 235-38.
90. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273-74 (2009); Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,

91.
92.
93.
94.

446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 214, 219
(2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. It. Colors, 570 U.S. 228; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000) (stating that arbitration agreements are enforceable
so long as “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum” (alteration in original) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991))).
It. Colors, 570 U.S. at 231-32.
See id. at 235-38.
Id. at 233 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 236 (majority opinion) (“[T]he fact that it is not
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).

1302

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

The Court has only reinforced and expanded the scope of its arbitration
jurisprudence since deciding Italian Colors. Notably, in 2018, a 5–4 majority
held in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis that employment contracts could require
employees to pursue their claims individually in arbitration despite a federally
guaranteed right to collective action under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).95 The holding in Epic Systems was a stinging blow to American
workers. But in broader context, it merely confirmed what was largely
understood in the civil justice landscape after Concepcion and Italian Colors:
Corporate entities could use private procedural ordering to avoid civil liability
for wrongdoing.
Of course, that was always the gambit.
C. The Aftermath
Today, virtually all Americans are subject to forced arbitration agreements
with class-action waivers.96 They are ubiquitous: in employee handbooks,
nursing home admissions forms, credit card bills, cell phone statements,
insurance contracts, housing leases, job applications, and countless other
contracts.97
Indeed, the changes in the legal landscape brought about by the arbitration
revolution have been staggering. In the early 1990s, only 2% of nonunionized
employee contracts contained arbitration clauses.98 As of 2019, more than half
of such contracts included them.99 According to a 2017 study, some 40% of

95. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). Epic Systems grew out of a decision by the National Labor

96.
97.

98.
99.

Relations Board (NLRB) that class-action waivers in mandatory arbitration
agreements violated the NLRA’s collective-action guarantee. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357
N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012). Circuits split as to whether the NLRB decision was correct.
Compare D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with
the NLRB), with Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1154-57 (7th Cir. 2016)
(agreeing with the NLRB), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612.
See Senate Arbitration Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Myriam Gilles, Professor,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015).
See Mary Martin, Note, When Flexibility Sacrifices Security: An Analysis of Amazon’s Flex
Program, 54 NEW ENG. L. REV. 131, 144 (2019).
Id.; see also ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/TB4G-952Z (noting that 53.9% of
nonunion private-sector employers have mandatory arbitration procedures).
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 10.8% of American wage and salary
workers (14.3 million individuals) were members of unions as of 2020. Less than 7% of
private-sector workers were union members as of that year. Press Release, U.S. Bureau
footnote continued on next page
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private-sector employers with mandatory arbitration clauses had adopted
them in the previous five years.100 A more recent study showed that seventyeight companies in the Fortune 100 use arbitration agreements with classaction waivers.101 Analysts predict that by 2024, more than 80% of privatesector nonunion workers will be subject to such agreements.102
From 2011 to 2019, the number of businesses that used arbitration
agreements with class-action waivers in their consumer contracts tripled.103
Today, as many as 76.9% of consumer contracts include pre-dispute arbitration
clauses;104 virtually all of these include class-action waivers.105 The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) found mandatory arbitration agreements
in 53% of credit card contracts, 98.5% of storefront payday-loan contracts, and
99.9% of mobile-wireless contracts,106 and it noted that these agreements
“generally extinguish the consumer’s ability to participate in class lawsuits.”107
In 2020, Consumer Reports found that over two-thirds of the most popular
products on its website came with mandatory arbitration clauses.108
The widespread use of forced arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers has enabled corporations to reduce costs by eliminating aggregate

100.
101.
102.

103.

104.

105.
106.
107.
108.

of Lab. Stat., Union Membership (Annual) News Release (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Y789-VFYG.
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Piper Lecture, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3, 8, 10-11 (2019).
Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s Top
Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 234 (2019).
KATE HAMAJI, RACHEL DEUTSCH, ELIZABETH NICOLAS, CELINE MCNICHOLAS, HEIDI
SHIERHOLZ & MARGARET POYDOCK, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & ECON. POL’Y INST.,
UNCHECKED CORPORATE POWER: FORCED ARBITRATION, THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS, AND
HOW WORKERS ARE FIGHTING BACK 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/Q4UB-6VZZ.
Ryan Miller, Current Development 2018-2019, Next-Gen Arbitration: An Empirical Study
of How Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Form Contracts Have Changed After
Concepcion and American Express, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 793, 795, 806, 824-25 (2019).
This finding is consistent with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2015
finding that arbitration agreements typically preclude consumer class actions. CFPB,
ARBITRATION STUDY § 3.4.3, at 24, § 4.8, at 20-21 (2015).
See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 883 tbl.2 (2008).
Id. at 884 tbl.3.
CFPB, supra note 103, § 2.3, at 8 tbl.1.
Id. § 3.4.3, at 24.
Scott Medintz, Forced Arbitration: A Clause for Concern, CONSUMER REPS. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/D5QE-W7KR.
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claims altogether.109 Accordingly, the defense bar routinely and publicly
advises clients to “avoid [the] risk” of class actions by requiring arbitration
agreements.110 Indeed, for businesses not yet using them, the question is:
“Shouldn’t you be using arbitration agreements to reduce . . . the risk of class
action claims?”111
And no wonder: Eliminating aggregate claims also tends to eliminate
claims generally. Studies have found that almost no one pursues individual
arbitration.112 Although there were about 826,537,000 consumer arbitration
provisions in effect in 2018, the AAA and JAMs recorded only 6,000 consumer
arbitrations that year.113 Without mandatory arbitration, consumers likely
would have brought many more claims.114 One 2018 study found that, if
employees filed arbitration claims at the same rate they filed claims in court,
some 320,000 to 727,000 employment arbitration claims would be filed
annually—around 60 to 140 times the current rate.115 That means forced
arbitration has eliminated more than 98% of employment claims.116 A recent
study by the Economic Policy Institute reinforces these findings: Of workers
with potentially meritorious claims subject to forced arbitration, virtually
none pursue those claims. Indeed, only 1 in 10,400 employees subject to forced
arbitration files a claim each year.117
Individuals tend to fare poorly even when they do arbitrate,118 a fact many
attribute to the repeat-player advantages that corporate entities enjoy in
109. Cf. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE

110.
111.

112.
113.

114.

115.
116.
117.
118.

L.J. 141, 141-42 (1997) (urging franchisors to use arbitration to prevent “catastrophic”
class actions by franchisees).
See, e.g., Robert Fojo, 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements, LEGAL.IO,
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/U5NK-HLA9.
Jay N. Varon & Jennifer M. Keas, Shouldn’t You Be Using Arbitration Agreements to Reduce
the Costs of Litigation and the Risk of Class Action Claims?, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
(May 10, 2017) (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/X6AX-YCD3.
See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 100, at 17-18 (“Mandatory arbitration has a tendency to
suppress claims.”); see also Dunham, supra note 109 at 141.
See Justice Restored: Ending Forced Arbitration and Protecting Fundamental Rights: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., & Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th
Cong. (2021) [hereinafter House Arbitration Hearing] (statement of Myriam Gilles,
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law), https://perma.cc/V4YS-YZ2K; see also
Szalai, supra note 101, at 238.
See CFPB, supra note 103, § 1.4.3, at 11, § 1.4.7, at 16 (noting that less than 2,000
consumer arbitration claims were filed with the AAA between 2010 and 2012, while
comparable class actions from 2008 to 2012 involved hundreds of millions of claims).
Estlund, supra note 38, at 696-97.
Id. at 696.
COLVIN, supra note 99, at 11.
See Estlund, supra note 38, at 688. But see Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us
About Labor Arbitration of Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
footnote continued on next page
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arbitration.119 Indeed, the CFPB found that businesses won 93% of businessinitiated arbitrations and recovered ninety-one cents per dollar claimed,
whereas consumers prevailed in about 20% of consumer-initiated arbitrations
and recovered twelve cents per dollar claimed.120 Similarly, a recent study
found that employees win only 19% of AAA arbitrations,121 as opposed to
29.7% of federal employment-discrimination cases.122 Sexual-harassment
claimants also tend to fare worse in arbitration than they do in litigation,
particularly with regard to remedies.123 One study found that, over thirty
years and across ninety-seven industry arbitrations, only seventeen women on
Wall Street explicitly won their sexual-harassment claims.124
Critics of the above studies argue that the CFPB and others overstate the
extent to which the judicial system is a “realistic means for obtaining

119.

120.
121.
122.

123.

124.

789, 858 (2013) (finding that some low-wage workers were able to use arbitration to
vindicate their claims).
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 32-33, 38-39 (1999)
(noting that “representatives of consumers, patients, employees, and other individual
claimants” believe arbitration “redound[s] to the benefit of repeat players,” including
corporations); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98 (1974) (explaining that, among other
advantages, the prototypical repeat player “anticipates repeated litigation,” “has low
stakes in the outcome of any one case,” and “has the resources to pursue its . . .
interests”); see also Interview with Nancy Erika Smith, supra note 41 (observing that
arbitrators are often former defense lawyers and that businesses enjoy important
advantages in arbitration); Letter from Nancy Erika Smith, Att’y, Smith Mullin, P.C.,
to Laura E. VanEtten, Supervisor, Am. Arb. Ass’n & Linda S. Hendrickson, Case
Manager, Am. Arb. Ass’n 2-3 (Jan. 14, 2011) (on file with author) (seeking to strike
defense attorneys and litigation adversaries from a list of possible arbitrators).
CFPB, supra note 103, § 5.6.6, at 41-42, § 5.6.7, at 43-45.
Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the
United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. 1019, 1028 tbl.1 (2015).
Estlund, supra note 38, at 688. Earlier studies reached similar findings. See, e.g.,
Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 tbl.1 (2011) (reporting a 21.4% employee win
rate in AAA employment arbitration); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration
and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov.
2003/Jan. 2004, at 44, 48 tbl.1 (finding a 36.4% employee win rate in federal
employment-discrimination cases and a 56.6% employee win rate in state non–civil
rights employment cases).
See Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma
for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 2-6 (1999) (describing “inadequate . . . arbitration
remedies for sexual harassment” and noting that victims’ remedies can be limited by
arbitration agreements themselves).
See Susan Antilla, FINRA’s Black Hole, TYPE INVESTIGATIONS (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/HTC5-6AWN.
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redress,”125 an assertion consistent with the findings of key legal scholars.126
Critics also challenge the empirical findings of the CFPB and academic
commentators as incomplete, inasmuch as those findings do not take into
account the number of claims that are resolved by pre-dispute settlements
secured before the filing of formal arbitral demands.127 Given the significant
filing fees in arbitration, critics are likely correct that corporations have
incentives to settle claims via pre-dispute resolution.
It is not arbitration alone, however, that eliminates most claims. Instead, it
is the combination of forced arbitration and class-action waivers in contracts
of adhesion. The types of claims that tend to arise from these contracts—civil
rights claims, wage-theft claims, workplace sexual-harassment claims, and
consumer-fraud claims—are those that tend to gain viability from
aggregation.128 Most discrimination suits, for instance, depend on aggregation
in order to be feasible, as the Advisory Committee explicitly recognized when
promulgating Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.129 The
same is true for wage-and-hour claims under the FLSA, and the FLSA
explicitly enables collective action for that reason.130
At least to the extent that the arbitration revolution eliminates classable
claims, the implications are troubling: Elimination of those claims would tend
to be due to the economics of claiming,131 not due to their underlying merits.
Again, individually unmarketable does not mean meritless; individually
marketable does not mean meritorious. Settlement pressure is perfectly
desirable when produced by the merits of claims.132 It is only undesirable—or
125. The CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration “Study” 1 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/A4RF-3NFW.
126. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 122, at 53 (“In the majority of court actions the cases

127.
128.

129.

130.

131.
132.

likely were brought by highly paid employees, while in the arbitrations, high-pay
employees represented only a minority of the claimants.”).
The CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration “Study,” supra note 125, at 11.
See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 24142 (2012); Brittany Cangelosi, Note, Wage War: Arbitration and Class Action Waivers at
the Expense of Wage and Hour Claims, 48 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 488 (2019).
See Interview by Samuel Issacharoff with Arthur R. Miller, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of L., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Dec. 3, 2016), reprinted in N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L. CTR. ON CIV. JUST.,
RULE 23 @ 50: THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF RULE 23, at 1, 5 (Peter Zimroth, Arthur R.
Miller, Samuel Issacharoff & David Siffert eds., 2016).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 13TH ANNUAL
WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 20 (2017), https://perma.cc/JT3H4ZRZ (“Virtually all FLSA lawsuits are filed as collective actions . . . .”).
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 84-85 (2014).
See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1750-78
(2012) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be recalibrated to align
settlement values with the merits of underlying claims); Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and
footnote continued on next page
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in terrorem—when it derives in whole or substantial part from factors
unrelated to the merits of claims.133 The fact that a claim’s value is less than the
cost of pursuing that claim says nothing of the claim’s worth. It may say
something about the high cost of litigation.134 It may also reveal something
about the type of claim, the type of claimant, or both—for instance, that the
claim is for wage theft by a minimum-wage worker. All of that is orthogonal
to whether the claims have legal merit.135
Many claims eliminated by forced arbitration and class-action waivers,
then, are not so much low merit as they are low value. For a majority of the
Supreme Court, though, those two may as well be the same thing. In essence,
the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence deems a broad range of legal
entitlements the wrong types of claims, and by extension, effectively deems a
broad swath of Americans—and in particular, racial minorities, women, and
the working poor136—the wrong types of claimants.
Mandatory arbitration clauses appear more frequently in contracts for
frontline jobs like education and healthcare.137 They are also more common in
“low-wage workplaces” and industries that are “disproportionately composed

133.
134.

135.

136.
137.

CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1894 (2006) (“What one should make of the
amplification effect [of aggregation] in normative terms depends crucially on what
explanation one embraces for the underlying probability of plaintiff success that
aggregation would amplify.”).
See Glover, supra note 132, at 1727-44 (tracing the numerous ways that non-merits
“distortions” can affect settlement values).
See Samuel Estreicher, Dwight D. Opperman Professorship Inaugural Lecture, Beyond
Cadillacs and Rickshaws: Towards a Culture of Citizen Service, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 323, 32930 (2005) (describing the “[m]ushrooming” costs of litigation); see also Robert Bovarnick,
When Is Litigation Worth the Hassle?, FORBES (July 21, 2010, 6:40 PM EDT),
https://perma.cc/RG3B-MN4T (noting that the hardest decision for a claimant is
whether litigation is worth the high cost, and that in many cases it is more
economically rational to settle).
In fact, research shows that the filing of meritless claims to extract shakedown
settlements is rare. See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2003) (“[T]he risks of . . . blackmail settlements
have been overstated.” (alterations in original) (quoting Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
“Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000))); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215, 225-26 (1983) (stating that, if anything, certain class actions settle too cheaply);
Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal
Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297, 298 (2002) (“[T]he hostility to ‘long-shot’ class actions
is . . . unsupported on any basis currently articulated in judicial opinions or legal
scholarship.”).
A Profile of the Working Poor, 2019, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.: BLS REPS. (May 2021),
https://perma.cc/2MVM-966N.
COLVIN, supra note 99, at 8.
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of women . . . [and] African American workers.”138 Indeed, 59.1% of African
American workers—7.5 million individuals—are subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements that tend to eliminate claims.139
Along similar lines, 57.6% of women in the workforce are subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements.140 These agreements suppress a host of
claims, from wage theft to gender discrimination to sexual harassment.
Notably, forced arbitration agreements tend to prevent sexual-assault and
sexual-harassment survivors from speaking up about their experiences.141
This is true even (and perhaps especially) when well-known, well-capitalized
claimants are involved. Famously, Donald Trump used a mandatory
arbitration clause to help fend off a lawsuit by Stormy Daniels.142 And Fox
News used forced arbitration to silence scores of women who were sexually
harassed by Roger Ailes.143 Although forced arbitration has come under
scrutiny following its use in a range of cases involving sexual harassment
allegedly perpetrated by famous men,144 companies have only recently started
to move away from forced arbitration, and even then only in response to
sustained public outcry.145
Publicly, corporations #MeToo their websites and don “Time’s Up”
ribbons. Privately, many corporations continue to subject their employees to
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 9. By comparison, only 55.6% of white, non-Hispanic workers are subject to

mandatory arbitration agreements. Id.
140. Id. at 8-9. By comparison, only 53.5% of men in the workforce are subject to mandatory

arbitration agreements. Id. at 9.
141. See Rachel M. Schiff, Note, Not So Arbitrary: Putting an End to the Calculated Use of Forced

142.
143.
144.

145.

Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2693, 2709-14 (2020);
Gretchen Carlson, Opinion, After Bill Cosby and Fox News, Something Good Is Going to
Come of This, USA TODAY (updated July 6, 2021, 4:21 PM ET), https://perma.cc/3ZNKHWBA (describing how forced arbitration “can cover up, and allow for, repeated ugly
behavior from harassers in every industry”).
See Jeremy Stahl, Donald Trump Basically Just Said He Should Lose the Litigation with
Stormy Daniels, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2018, 9:54 PM), https://perma.cc/MM63-C35P.
See Emily Martin, Keeping Sexual Assault Under Wraps, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 28, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/VV93-D3FD.
See id.; Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/C6V5-SF85; cf. Carlson, supra note 141
(noting that highly publicized sexual-harassment scandals can draw greater societal
attention to the forced arbitration of workplace harassment claims). But cf. Inez
Feltscher Stepman, Once Again, #MeToo Becomes Political Tool to Line Lawyer Pockets,
INDEP. WOMEN’S F. (Sept. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/V8U2-ZK7D (arguing that “the
issue of sexual assault has been politically weaponized” to harm arbitration, which the
author states may be good for employees).
See Jena McGregor, New Database Aims to Expose Companies that Make Employees
Arbitrate Sexual Harassment Claims, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/5GTF42P7.
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forced arbitration and class-action waivers.146 Some states have taken steps to
limit forced arbitration for sexual-harassment claims.147 At the federal level,
Representatives Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Cheri Bustos (D-IL), and Morgan
Griffith (R-VA), and Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Lindsey Graham (RSC), and Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Harassment Act in July 2021.148 That bill has since passed both Houses
of Congress,149 but work to ameliorate forced arbitration’s disproportionate
impact on women remains.
The arbitration revolution has also disproportionately impacted the
working poor, many of whom are racial minorities and women. One 2021
study found that forced arbitration helped employers pocket $9.2 billion from
workers in low-paid jobs in 2019 alone.150 Arbitration is almost always too
expensive for typical wage-and-hour employees to pursue, and employees are
routinely dismayed to learn that no attorney can afford to represent them in
light of forced arbitration agreements and class-action waivers.151 And the
conclusion that the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence effectively
deems the working poor the “wrong type of claimant” is hard to avoid when
comparing it to the Court’s class-action–friendly jurisprudence for securities
fraud.152
146. Some corporations (for example, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Uber) have

147.

148.

149.
150.

151.

152.

responded to public pressure by rolling back forced arbitration, particularly for claims
of sexual harassment. Abha Bhattarai, As Closed-Door Arbitrations Soared Last Year,
Workers Won Cases Against Employers Just 1.6 Percent of the Time, WASH. POST (Oct. 27,
2021, 7:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/YY95-U7BD. Many others, however, have
“doubled down” on the practice. Id.; see AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., FORCED ARBITRATION
DURING A PANDEMIC: CORPORATIONS DOUBLE DOWN 4, 6 (2021), https://perma.cc/3JFTW9VM.
See Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims:
#MeToo- and Time’s Up–Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2653, 2677-83 (2019).
Press Release, Rep. Pramila Jayapal, Jayapal Helps Reintroduce Bipartisan Ending
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (July 14, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4UFG-TDL6.
Emily Peck & Sophia Cai, Congress Passes Landmark #MeToo Bill, AXIOS (updated Feb. 10,
2022), https://perma.cc/SVF3-Y4C3.
See HUGH BARAN & ELISABETH CAMPBELL, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, FORCED ARBITRATION
HELPED EMPLOYERS WHO COMMITTED WAGE THEFT POCKET $9.2 BILLION IN 2019 FROM
WORKERS IN LOW-PAID JOBS 1 (rev. 2021), https://perma.cc/LB8K-S3QZ.
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 38, at 700-02; Interview with Nancy Erika Smith, supra
note 41 (“Minimum-wage workers get screwed by arbitration. . . . [An arbitration
agreement with a] class-action waiver is the first thing lawyers look for.”); Interview
with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40 (observing that lawyers screen out consumer cases
with arbitration agreements).
See Glover, supra note 67, at 1628-33 (describing the Supreme Court’s tendency toward
“pro–class action” opinions in the securities-fraud context); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The
footnote continued on next page
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All told, the defense coalition’s decades-long effort to retrench aggregate
dispute resolution through arbitration agreements and class-action waivers
resulted in a resounding victory for corporate interests. But that victory was a
tremendous loss for consumers and employees, particularly those who were
already vulnerable based on race, gender, and class.
II. Can’t Stop The Revolution: Public-Reform Pitfalls, PrivateReform Possibilities
As the prior Part detailed, the arbitration revolution and class-action
counterrevolution had sweeping effects on the civil justice landscape. For over
a decade, legal commentators, legislators, policymakers, interest-group
advocates, the plaintiffs’ bar, and others have called for reform, largely from
Congress. As Subpart A below details, however, few public procedural-reform
efforts have succeeded, and none have provided a meaningful response to the
arbitration revolution. Given public procedural ordering’s inability to stem the
arbitration revolution’s tide, the general perception has been that arbitration
agreements with class-action waivers are (and will remain) near-bulletproof
claim eliminators.153
My analysis of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence in
Subpart B, however, challenges this view. I do not think reform by way of
public procedural ordering is particularly likely to occur, at least not on any
broad scale. Instead, it is my long-held view that the Court’s FAA
jurisprudence—broad as it may be—left narrow room for a private procedural
response to the arbitration revolution. It left room for a procedural offensive
like mass arbitration.
A. The Failure of Public Procedural-Ordering Efforts
In one of her very last dissents, the late Justice Ginsburg recognized that
the Court’s reading of the FAA154 had reached, in the words of one
End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 181 (2015) (noting that securities fraud is the
one “exception” to the arbitration revolution’s elimination of claims).
153. See, e.g., Effron, supra note 44, at 136 (explaining that although certain substantive
rights may exist in theory, they are eliminated in practice through class-action
waivers); Fitzpatrick, supra note 152, at 162-63 (concluding that, given Concepcion,
“businesses will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all class actions that are
brought against them”); Resnik, supra note 75, at 2836-40 (describing certain waivers as
erasing substantive rights); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 97, at 628 (questioning
whether any grounds remain for finding class-action waivers unenforceable).
154. For criticisms of the Court’s reading, see, for example, Anthony J. Sebok, The Unwritten
Federal Arbitration Act, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 687, 688, 720 (2016) (arguing that the FAA
supports “a substantive theory of arbitration” and suggesting that states “can
experiment with different interpretations of the FAA’s theory”); and Aragaki, supra
footnote continued on next page
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commentator, a “critical tipping point.”155 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg
“urgently” pled for “‘[c]ongressional correction of the Court’s elevation of the
FAA over’ the rights of employees and consumers ‘to act in concert.’”156 Justice
Ginsburg no doubt knew that her plea to Congress was a long shot. For
decades, Congress has been presented with opportunity upon opportunity to
reform arbitration through “arbitration-fairness” bills. Almost all have died in
committee.157 And though Congress in 2010 passed the Dodd–Frank Act and
created the CFPB, which it directed to study mandatory arbitration
agreements,158 hope for reform was short-lived. The CFPB formulated a rule
that restricted the use of class-action waivers,159 but the Senate rejected it
51–50 under the Congressional Review Act. Then–Vice President Mike Pence,
himself no stranger to the business community,160 cast the tiebreaking vote.161
While the narrow Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act,
which had rare bipartisan support, finally passed in February 2022,162 the
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, a sweeping arbitration-reform
bill, remains in the Senate Judiciary Committee.163 The defense coalition is
actively fighting the FAIR Act; the Chamber of Commerce has even offered to

155.
156.
157.

158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.

note 51, at 1946-53 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the FAA is
based on “isolated snippets” of legislative history that do not correctly capture the
history and purpose of the law). But see Amalia D. Kessler, Feature: Arbitration,
Transparency, and Privatization, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of
Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2943-44, 2991 (2015) (noting that, in
part because of the FAA’s progressive history, efforts to determine whether the Act
was intended to enable access to justice or empower corporate elites are “bound to
disappoint”).
House Arbitration Hearing, supra note 113 (statement of Myriam Gilles, Professor,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1332-33,
app. (cataloging 139 arbitration bills introduced between 1995 and 2010, most of which
did not make it past the committee stage). “[T]he few [bills] that ultimately passed” from
1995 to 2010 “applied only to relatively narrow categories of disputes.” Id. at 1333.
See CFPB, supra note 103, § 1, at 1.
Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using Arbitration
Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court (July 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/
VG92-9Q9Q.
See Jane Mayer, The Danger of President Pence, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 2017)
https://perma.cc/Q4GV-TYZC.
Zachary Warmbrodt, Pence Breaks Tie in Senate Vote to Ax Arbitration Rule, POLITICO
(updated Oct. 24, 2017, 11:25 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/72KR-9ZQ3.
See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
See S.505—Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://perma.cc/L9R58ECG (archived June 26, 2022).

1312

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

pay attorneys if their clients sign op-eds opposing the bill.164 And although
there have been rumblings of congressional action after forced arbitration
provisions appeared in payments made under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act,165 the passage of broad arbitration reform
remains unlikely.166
Congress has introduced more targeted bills on the issue of forced
arbitration with varying success. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act was one such successful bill. But compare this Act to the
Nursing Home Improvement and Accountability Act of 2021, which would
prohibit forced arbitration clauses in contracts between nursing home facilities
and their patients.167 Congress has tried to end the use of forced arbitration in
nursing homes for over a decade; the Nursing Home Improvement and
Accountability Act, a Charlie Brown football of a bill, is simply the latest
version of that effort.168 It is unclear, then, whether Congress will be able to
enact even targeted reforms going forward.
There have been a few modest arbitration-reform successes at the state
level, but none have had a particularly meaningful impact on the post–
arbitration revolution landscape. Some scholars had hoped that suits brought
under the parens patriae doctrine (which provides a state with third-party
standing to bring a case on behalf of its citizens for their well-being) would
help fill the void created by the elimination of class actions.169 But these suits
164. See Amelia Pollard, Corporate Lobbyists Seek “Grassroots” Support for Forced Arbitration,

165.
166.

167.
168.

169.

AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/SUF6-MYUG (reporting that the
Chamber of Commerce offered an attorney $2,000 in exchange for a client willing to
sign a prewritten op-ed opposing the FAIR Act); Karl Bode, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Paying People $2,000 to Pretend Binding Arbitration Is Good, TECHDIRT (Aug. 13, 2021,
6:14 AM), https://perma.cc/3932-BXYE (same).
See David Dayen, Unsanitized: Stimulus Debit Cards Come with a Forced Arbitration Clause,
AM. PROSPECT (June 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/H976-4EYY.
See Glover, supra note 75, at 3083-91; David L. Noll & Zachary D. Clopton, An
Arbitration Agenda for the Biden Administration, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 104, 105-06;
Mike LaSusa, Dems’ Bid to Ban Workplace Arbitration Faces Uphill Fight, LAW360 (Aug. 5,
2021, 7:09 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/4MPH-3449 (to locate, select “View the live
page”).
See H.R. 5169, 117th Cong. § 105 (2021); S. 2694, 117th Cong. § 105 (2021).
See, e.g., Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008, H.R. 6126, 110th Cong.
(2008); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 2838, 110th Cong. (2008); Fairness
in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in
Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act of 2012, H.R. 6351, 112th Cong. (2012); Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act, H.R. 5326, 116th Cong. (2019); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration
Act, H.R. 2812, 117th Cong. (2021); see also Glover, supra note 75, at 3090-91 (detailing
the failed legislative efforts to end forced arbitration in various contexts, including in
nursing home contracts, that began in 2008).
See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 97, at 629-30, 661.
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are limited by political and resource constraints.170 As an alternative, private–
attorneys general acts (PAGAs) can circumvent the problems that hinder
parens patriae suits by allowing citizens to take on the mantle of the state and
bring suit, in a representative capacity, against a defendant with whom they
would otherwise be required to arbitrate. California currently has an
employment-litigation PAGA.171 A number of other states have been
considering similar legislation, but some bills have struggled to gain passage
and the future of PAGA-like laws is uncertain.172 In addition, the Supreme
170. See, e.g., Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1857-58 (2000)

(describing how the “political motivations” behind parens patriae decisions can create
“intractable conflicts” between states and individuals); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 97,
at 668 n.205 (“[Industry groups] know that public officials don’t have the resources to
finance complicated law suits [sic] that often take years to work their way through the
courts.” (alterations in original) (quoting Ohio Att’y Gen. Marc Dann, Address to the
City Club of Cleveland 5 (June 29, 2007), https://perma.cc/4X3L-RLBU)); Margaret H.
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126
HARV. L. REV. 486, 523 n.154 (2012) (noting “instances where states were outgunned by
large corporations [and] there was substantial pressure to settle on terms that were not
desirable and not in the public interest” (alteration in original) (quoting remarks made
by Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller at a 2003 Columbia Law School symposium)).
171. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699, 2699.3 (West 2022).
172. At least nine states were actively considering PAGA-like bills by the 2019-2020
legislative session. Charles Thompson, Anthony Guzman & Linda Ricci, Employers
Must Brace for PAGA-Like Bills Across US, LAW360 (June 18, 2021, 3:25 PM EDT),
https://perma.cc/CKQ8-M26H (to locate, select “View the live page”) (noting that
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
and Washington were considering bills with the same basic structure as California’s
law). In Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, these
bills are still pending as of this writing. See H.R. 5245, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess.
(Conn. 2022) (allowing plaintiffs to sue for labor law violations on behalf of the state
even “after having waived their personal rights to sue by signing forced arbitration
agreements”); H.R. 1959, 192d Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2021) (creating a “public enforcement
action” for whistleblowers or “representative organization[s]” to sue employers for
wage theft); S. 362, 220th Leg. (N.J. 2022) (permitting an employee or representative to
bring the same action as state officials against an employer for unlawful workscheduling practices); S. 12, 244th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (creating “a means of
empowering citizens as private attorneys general to enforce” labor laws through “a
public enforcement action to collect civil penalties”); H.R. 1076, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2021) (creating a “qui tam action” for whistleblowers or “representative
organization[s]” to sue for violations of workplace laws). PAGA-like bills in Oregon
and Vermont have died. See H.R. 2205, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021) (creating a “public
enforcement action” for an individual or “representative organization” to seek “civil
penalties” for violation of state laws); S. 139, 2019 Leg. (Vt. 2019) (allowing “an
aggrieved employee, representative organization, or whistleblower” to bring a “public
enforcement action” for labor law violations). Maine’s PAGA-like bill passed both
houses but was vetoed by the governor. See S. 525, 130th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2021)
(providing a “private enforcement action” for a “whistleblower” or “representative
organization” to enforce employment law violations); Letter from Maine Governor
Janet T. Mills to the 130th Legislature of the State of Maine 1-2 (July 12, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3CSD-WRAS.
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Court dealt a recent blow to PAGAs by holding that an individual PAGA claim
can be severed from a representative PAGA claim—the former of which can be
compelled to arbitration, leaving the individual without standing to pursue the
representative claim in court.173 And new, controversial uses of the private
attorney general (most notably S.B. 8, Texas’s “heartbeat” abortion ban) could
generate reticence around private–attorneys general enforcement
frameworks.174
B. The Possibility of Private Procedural Counteroffensives
With government entities unwilling or unable to engage in meaningful
reform, the focus returns to the private sphere. Private procedural warfare,
after all, created the current landscape; perhaps it could reverse it. The defense
coalition, however, has long sought to anticipate and block any potential
counteroffensive by the plaintiffs’ bar. This Subpart analyzes how the defense
coalition and the Court left little room—but not no room—for private
procedural innovations to reverse the revolution.
Every year since the Supreme Court decided Italian Colors, I have told my
complex-litigation students about a lucrative dispute-resolution opportunity
lurking in arbitration agreements themselves. That opportunity, I warned,
would be high-risk. It would be costly (perhaps prohibitively so). It would be
legally uncertain. If it worked, though, it might well stop the arbitration
revolution in its tracks. That opportunity was mass arbitration.
How could any plaintiffs’ attorney, enterprising or otherwise, get away
with mass arbitration—especially given the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence? I believed that something like mass arbitration could happen
for three main reasons. One, nature abhors a vacuum. The elimination of a
mechanism for aggregating claims does not eliminate mass harm or the mass of
individuals affected by such harm.175
Two, the terms of arbitration agreements made something like mass
arbitration tempting, at least for plaintiffs’ attorneys with the resources and
173. See Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1915-17, 1924-25 (2022). In her

concurrence, however, Justice Sotomayor noted that state legislatures are “free to
modify the scope of statutory standing under [their PAGAs] within state and federal
constitutional limits.” Id. at 1925-26 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
174. See generally, e.g., Jon D. Michaels and David L. Noll, Vigilante Federalism, 108 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2023), https://perma.cc/RB6P-5JC2; Aziz Huq, What Texas’s
Abortion Law Has in Common with the Fugitive Slave Act, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2021,
10:42 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/5WLP-JH6N.
175. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004)
(challenging the perception of American litigation as typically individualized and
tracing the importance of repeat-play agents for tort claimants).
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risk tolerance to attempt it. As I have traced in prior work, arbitration
agreements in the early 2000s tended to get struck down on unconscionability
and effective-vindication grounds.176 To avoid such rulings, corporations
removed some of their more draconian arbitration-related clauses and added
provisions that they described as “friendly” to consumers and employees:
provisions requiring them to reimburse some or all of a claimant’s arbitration
fees, or even to pay bonuses to prevailing claimants.177 Effectively,
corporations injected fee shifting into any arbitral proceedings pursuant to
their contracts.
The not-so-secret secret behind these “friendly” fee-shifting provisions
was that none of them were intended to have any real effect. That is because
these provisions existed alongside the one provision businesses would not
remove from their agreements: the class-action waiver. More than that, the
“friendly” fee-shifting provisions existed to facilitate the enforcement of classaction waivers. While dodging unconscionability rulings might have been a
short-term benefit to corporations, the long-term (and far more ambitious)
strategy of the “friendly” provisions was to tee up for the Supreme Court an
arbitration agreement that contained a class-action waiver, but which
otherwise seemed to bend over backwards to facilitate individual claiming—
thus creating a plausible basis to deny that upholding the class waiver would
abrogate the substantive claim.178
The calculus by corporations here was as obvious as it was rational. Even
with the fee-shifting provisions in arbitration agreements, individual
arbitration would not frequently be economically feasible for an ordinary
claimant or her lawyer.179 From the corporate perspective, far better to foot
the bill associated with “friendly” fee-shifting provisions in a small handful of
176. See J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory

Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1751-55, 1767-69 (2006).
177. See Miller, supra note 103, at 799-800.
178. See Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4-7,
T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 2319, at *5-9 (encouraging the Court to deny certiorari and suggesting that TMobile’s arbitration clause did not look “friendly” enough to be a vehicle for evaluating
the legality of class-action waivers); see also Interview with Anonymous No. 1, supra
note 42 (stating that AT&T wanted its arbitration clause in front of the Supreme
Court, believing it to be the best vehicle for obtaining a favorable ruling on class-action
waivers); Bruhl, supra note 29 (speculating that AT&T filed briefs opposing certiorari
in cases involving other companies’ arbitration clauses because it “had developed a
brand new arbitration clause that was so amazingly consumer-friendly that if any
court struck it down, such a ruling would [in AT&T’s view] have to be preempted
because it would represent a per se bar against class waivers even when consumers
could profitably pursue individual arbitration,” a move that made AT&T’s attorneys
“very unpopular at cocktail parties for a while”).
179. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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individual arbitrations than to bear the expense of litigating class actions that
purported to resolve the claims of all customers or employees. The gambit
worked.
The opportunity for mass arbitration, then, lurked in the unlikely but
devastating possibility that a significant number of individual arbitration
claims would be filed all at once.
Given this possibility, remote as it may have been, why did corporations
keep “friendly” arbitration provisions in their contracts? One likely reason is
that the “friendly” provisions did a fair amount of work for Justice Scalia in
Concepcion. Justice Scalia recounted these provisions in some detail in his
opinion for the Court, and he essentially offered them up as a template for
corporations to use in their contracts with consumers and employees going
forward.180 Another likely reason is that post-Concepcion, businesses believed
they had arrived at a “more or less optimal form of blocking consumer
disputes.”181 Even after the Court cast doubt on the necessity of “friendly”
provisions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements in Italian Colors,182
corporations generally did not remove pro-consumer terms or add probusiness ones.183 The class-action waiver was all that mattered. The Court’s
full-throated embrace of class-action waivers directed the pressure generated
by mass harm away from private enforcement; mass arbitration, which
required both arbitration and aggregation, seemed conceptually incoherent
(and thus a dead letter).
Yet my third reason for thinking that something like mass arbitration
could happen, at least theoretically, was that the Supreme Court’s class
arbitration jurisprudence did not give defendants a strong basis to foreclose
mass arbitration. To be sure, the Court’s arbitration opinions, particularly
Italian Colors, read broadly. And cases like Italian Colors likely leave room—
perhaps substantial room—for less “friendly” arbitration contracts under the
FAA.184 Expressing this concern, Justice Kagan criticized the Italian Colors
majority for essentially limiting its effective-vindication jurisprudence to
“baldly exculpatory provisions.”185 But Justice Kagan may have overstated the
point.
180. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-38, 351-52 (2011); see also

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Miller, supra note 103, at 800-01 (describing how Concepcion “ensur[ed] companies that
[contracts like AT&T’s] were undoubtedly safe”).
Miller, supra note 103, at 824.
See Glover, supra note 75, at 3057.
Miller, supra note 103, at 826.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240-43, 247-48, 253 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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One can conceive of other provisions, not quite baldly exculpatory, that
would seem to ask too much of the FAA. Consider a provision requiring an
individual claimant to pay the defendant a $100,000 up-front fee to pursue
statutory claims. Or a provision specifying that all disputes will be arbitrated
by someone on the board of directors of the defendant company. Surely the
preemptive scope of the FAA is not so broad as to prohibit legislatures (or
courts) from deeming “pay-defendant-to-play” or “adjudication-by-defendant”
provisions void as against public policy.186 Surely those provisions interfere
impermissibly with the effective vindication of rights.
Along similar lines, the logic of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence does
not easily extend to individual claims—even a substantial number of them—as
opposed to claims brought on a representative basis. In representative
litigation, one individual can litigate on behalf of 999 others who do not have
to participate at all.187 The class-waiver cases hinge on the fact that
representative devices like the class action create a form of dispute resolution
that (at least according to the Court) is fundamentally inconsistent with the
FAA’s preference for bilateral arbitration.188 But having established bilateral
arbitration as the paradigm the FAA was intended to protect, it would be a
stretch, even for a defense-minded Court, to disapprove of any quantity of
bilateral arbitration proceedings.
Of course, the Court has not addressed mass arbitration. In my mind,
however, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence cannot go so far as to prohibit a
parade of proverbial fools and fanatics from pursuing negative-value claims on
an individual basis.189 Imagine that 1,000 similarly situated individuals filed
individual arbitration claims. There is no doubt that a judge—at least one who
views aggregation as a mechanism for imposing in terrorem settlement
pressure—would find the settlement pressure generated by these 1,000 claims
normatively undesirable. But it is doubtful that the same judge could use StoltNielsen, Concepcion, Italian Colors, Epic Systems, or any other arbitration case to
prevent those 1,000 claimants from pursuing their 1,000 individual cases.
186. Some courts have said as much. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916,

926-27 (9th Cir. 2013) (“If state law could not require some level of fairness in an
arbitration agreement, there would be nothing to stop an employer from imposing an
arbitration clause that, for example, made its own president the arbitratior of all claims
brought by its employees.”).
187. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
188. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Stolt-Nielsen Court indicated
that the “shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” would cause
“fundamental” (and presumably undesirable) changes. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2010) (expressing concern that, among
other things, the arbitrator’s award would “adjudicate[] the rights of absent parties”).
189. Cf. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nly a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
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Indeed, during oral argument in Italian Colors, Chief Justice Roberts all but
stated as much.190
For decades, the defense coalition proceeded on the assumption that a
campaign targeting the class-action device, but not underlying substantive
rights, would achieve the holy grail of defense-side goals: avoiding legal
liability.191 Defendants’ extended honeymoon with the class action, however,
may have obscured the ways in which the aggregate unit itself was the true
source of their discontent. The potential for low-value cases to generate
significant settlement pressure comes from a mass of claims, which can exist
independently of any specific aggregate device.192 But the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has targeted the class action, not the aggregate unit generally.
Individual claims are the boundary—and a mass of individual claims now the
price—of the arbitration revolution’s legal immortality.193
III. Mass-Arbitration Case Study
Consistent with the analysis in Part I.C above, the opportunity for mass
arbitration arose from two consequences of the arbitration revolution. First,
the revolution produced orphaned aggregate claim units—groups of classable
claims deprived of any civil justice home, but which still had potential legal
merit. Second, the revolution produced millions of “friendly” arbitration
agreements. If corporations were forced to comply with the “friendly”
contractual terms they had drafted, orphaned aggregate claim units could
increase the settlement pressure stemming from their claims. As it turns out,
enforcement of those terms is not only expressly permitted but explicitly

190. The full exchange was as follows:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS. Well, again, that doesn’t seem too difficult. You either have your
trade association or you have a big meeting of all [the plaintiffs] and say we need to pay for
this expert report and once we’ve got it, you know, I’m going to represent each of you
individually in individual arbitrations and I’m going to win the first one, and then the others
are going to fall into place and they’ll get a settlement from American Express that’s going
to . . . satisfy their concerns.
MR. KELLOGG. Absolutely right.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS. Okay. And you have no problem with that.
MR. KELLOGG. I have no problem with that.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, It. Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (No. 12-133).
191. See generally Gilles, supra note 47.
192. Cf. Nagareda, supra note 132, at 1882-85 (“Aggregation operates harmoniously with

remedial design by making feasible private litigation . . . to enforce strictures against
misconduct that otherwise would not give rise to marketable claims . . . .”).
193. Cf. INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE, at 01:54:16 (Steven Spielberg dir., 1989) (“But
the [Holy] Grail cannot pass beyond the great seal. That is the boundary, and the price,
of immortality.”).
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required: After all, the FAA says that “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’
arbitration agreements according to their terms.”194
To say that an opportunity for mass arbitration existed, however, is not to
say that mass arbitration was likely to occur. As this Part demonstrates, mass
arbitration’s path from theoretical opportunity to viable model of dispute
resolution was economically prohibitive, legally uncertain, and, in the view of
most attorneys who considered it, intolerably risky.195 And yet, mass
arbitration emerged.
Parts III, IV, and V now present the first and only case study of mass
arbitration. Part III investigates the origins of and obstacles to mass arbitration
and describes mass arbitration’s key features. Part IV uncovers and analyzes a
number of contemporaneous developments to which mass arbitration must
adapt. What emerges from this investigation is a new and distinct model of
aggregate dispute resolution, which Part V.A taxonomizes and compares to
taxonomies I developed for two other firmly established models of aggregate
dispute resolution (class actions and MDL consolidations). Part V.B discusses
some limitations of this Article’s case study and highlights important open
questions that those limitations reveal.
The case-study method “explores a real-life, contemporary bounded
system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time.”196 As such, it is
the most effective way to understand a real-life phenomenon like mass
arbitration. The case study begins with a brief background section, followed by
a discussion section that investigates two questions. One, what were the
principal obstacles to the development of viable mass arbitration, and how
were they overcome? Two, what are the key features of the mass-arbitration
model? The case study continues by asking a third question: What are the
current challenges to mass arbitration, and what do they reveal about its
future? After investigating these questions, the case study presents the
taxonomy described above.
A quick note on taxonomy: I chose to compare mass arbitration to class
actions and MDL consolidations for two reasons. First, class action and MDL
consolidation are the most established mechanisms for aggregate claiming in
litigation.197 As such, they serve as important reference points against which
194. It. Colors, 570 U.S. at 233 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221

(1985)).
195. See, e.g., Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
196. JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY & RESEARCH DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG

FIVE APPROACHES 97 (3d ed. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
197. See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First

Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 499-504 (2016) (describing the “golden age” of classaction suits); Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 833 (2017) (“With the Supreme Court and lower courts
footnote continued on next page
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other forms of formal or informal aggregate dispute resolution can be
compared. Second, mass arbitration is fundamentally a reactionary
phenomenon. It is almost impossible to imagine the development of a massarbitration model without the existence of some external driving force.
Corporations created such a force not only through their resistance to the class
action, but also through their resistance to MDL consolidation.198 Contractual
avoidance of MDL consolidation has received relatively little discussion, but it
is not insignificant: Like class actions, MDL consolidations allow cost
spreading among claimants,199 thereby facilitating claiming and imposing
significant settlement pressure on defendants.200

cutting back the viability of the class action . . . MDL has become the leading
mechanism for resolving mass torts.”).
198. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing for the transfer of related cases “to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”). The most recent and highprofile attempt by a corporation to avoid MDL consolidation involved Johnson &
Johnson, which tried to channel consolidated mass-tort claims through a new legal
entity, LTL Management LLC, in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Informational
Brief of LTL Management LLC at 1, In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, No. 21-30589 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2021), ECF No. 3; Motion of the Official Committee of Talc
Claimants to Dismiss Debtor’s Chapter 11 Case ¶¶ 1-3, In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 637 B.R.
396 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) (No. 21-30589), ECF No. 632-1; Memorandum of Law of Amici
Curiae by Certain Complex Litigation Law Professors in Support of Motion of the
Official Committee of Talc Claimants to Dismiss Debtor’s Chapter 11 Case ¶¶ 4-6, In re
LTL Mgmt., 637 B.R. 396 (No. 21-30589), ECF No. 1410 (describing, in a brief submitted
by the Author, the MDL process as an alternative to such a novel bankruptcy plan);
Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae by Erwin Chemerinsky in Support of Motion
of the Official Committee of Talc Claimants to Dismiss Debtor’s Chapter 11 Case ¶ 4, In
re LTL Mgmt., 637 B.R. 396 (No. 21-30589), ECF No. 1396 (warning that the “bankruptcy
petition stretches the Bankruptcy Code beyond the breaking point”). Despite the
arguments of complex-litigation, constitutional law, and bankruptcy professors, Judge
Michael Kaplan of the Bankruptcy Court of the District of New Jersey denied the tort
claimants’ motions to dismiss. In re LTL Mgmt., 637 B.R. at 399-400. In his sweeping
opinion, Judge Kaplan stated that LTL’s Chapter 11 filing “was not undertaken to
secure a tactical advantage” and that, to the extent such a tactic would open the
floodgates to the use of bankruptcy proceedings to terminate and resolve legal claims,
“maybe the gates . . . should be opened.” Id. at 421, 428 (capitalization altered).
199. Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation,
64 EMORY L.J. 329, 347-48 (2014).
200. Id. at 345-46 (“[T]he cost-spreading MDL enables counsel to pursue many meritorious
cases that would have been negative-value claims outside of an aggregative context.”);
John M. Majoras, Steven N. Geise, Christopher R.J. Pace, Sharyl A. Reisman & Leon F.
DeJulius, Jr., Settlement Strategy in MDL, in 2 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN
FEDERAL COURTS § 19:52 (Robert L. Haig ed., West 2021) (describing how MDL
consolidation can encourage settlement).
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A. Background
1.

Definitions

There are two distinct models of dispute resolution that one might hear
referred to as “mass arbitration.” The first model, which has existed for many
years, was developed principally by a subset of labor and employment firms,
which would arbitrate the relatively small number of claims by employeeclients against their employers.201 After proceeding through arbitration on
those test cases, the firms would attempt to leverage successful individual
results as de facto bellwethers to obtain settlements for unfiled claims.202 This
model might sound a bit familiar: It closely resembles Chief Justice Roberts’s
observations about arbitration during oral argument in Italian Colors. As a
claimant, Chief Justice Roberts noted, you could “have your trade
association . . . represent each of you individually in individual arbitrations
and . . . win the first one, and then the others are going to fall into place and
[you’ll] get a settlement.”203 This “test-case” model is not what this Article
terms mass arbitration.
In the second model—what this Article refers to as mass arbitration—firms
amass thousands of clients who have allegedly suffered a common harm by a
common defendant.204 Rather than file a handful of claims in arbitration for
potential use as bellwethers or test cases,205 the firms then file hundreds or
thousands of individual arbitration demands. And they do so with the stated
intent of arbitrating each individual case until a satisfactory aggregate
settlement is reached.
The first example of this second model occurred, largely unnoticed, in
2011. That year a California firm, Bursor & Fisher, filed over 1,000 identical
arbitral demands seeking to enjoin a proposed merger between AT&T and T-

201. Interview with Travis Lenkner & Warren Postman, supra note 40.
202. Id.
203. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228

(2013) (No. 12-133); see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
204. Between 2010 and 2018, some employment firms filed what might be called “mini mass

arbitrations” in the employment context. These arbitrations generally consisted of 100
or 200 claims. See, e.g., Aguilera v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, No. 13-cv-05070, 2013 WL
4779179, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013) (describing how 188 plaintiffs who signed
arbitration agreements with the defendant company filed individual demands against
the company through the AAA and JAMS).
205. This model closely tracks that of a large MDL. See, e.g., Richard J. Arsenault & J.R.
Whaley, Practice Tip, Multidistrict Litigation and Bellwether Trials: Leading Litigants to
Resolution in Complex Litigation, BRIEF, Fall 2009, at 60, 60-62 (discussing the MDL
bellwether model).
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Mobile.206 AT&T responded with eight separate lawsuits arguing that the
demands, which arose under the Clayton Act, fell outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement with its customers.207 Courts agreed with AT&T in at
least five of these cases;208 several stated that the demands bore “all the
hallmarks of ‘class arbitration’ laid out in Concepcion.”209 Nothing about this
attempted mass arbitration seems to have been written since.210
A few other small-scale mass arbitrations popped up in the mid-2010s.
Small-scale mass arbitrations share some of the same features as large-scale
mass arbitrations, and they may have laid some of the groundwork for the
mass-arbitration model. Accordingly, this Article includes them in its study.211
But small-scale mass arbitrations did not provide a meaningful substitute for
the class actions eliminated by the arbitration revolution, in large part because
of their size. As such, they did not capture much attention, much less affect the
arbitration revolution generally.
Mass arbitration on a significant scale did not materialize until around
2018, when (seemingly out of nowhere) a group of plaintiffs’ firms and
attorneys—a startup named Keller Lenkner LLC, a small Maryland consumer
firm called Z Law Group, and a Minnesota lawyer named Kent Williams—
began filing thousands of arbitration demands against some of the biggest
corporations in the United States. In 2018: Uber. Lyft. Chipotle. In 2019:
206. See Daniel Fisher, AT&T’s Arbitration Victory Breeds Swarm Of Antitrust Cases, FORBES

207.

208.

209.

210.

211.

(Aug. 18, 2011, 4:36 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/Y6TX-M4H4 (noting that Bursor &
Fisher attracted “more than 1,000 people who agreed to file arbitration complaints
against AT&T seeking to block the merger”); Letter from Kevin Ranlett to the Hon.
Dennis M. Cavanaugh at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Keller, No. 11-cv-04671 (D.N.J.
Oct. 28, 2011), ECF No. 34 [hereinafter Ranlett Letter] (describing the arbitral demands
as identical).
Ranlett Letter, supra note 206, at 1 (describing the relevant case as “one of eight
lawsuits”); see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, No. 11-cv-02245, 2011 WL 5169349,
at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2011) (describing AT&T’s contention that “the Clayton Act claim
brought in the demand for arbitration exceeds the scope of the Arbitration
Agreement.”).
Fisher, 2011 WL 5169349, at *7; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bernardi, Nos. 11-cv-03992 &
11-cv-04412, 2011 WL 5079549, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Smith, No. 11-cv-05157, 2011 WL 5924460, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 11-cv-05636, 2011 WL 4716617, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bushman, No. 11-cv-80922, 2011 WL 5924666, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 23, 2011).
Smith, 2011 WL 5924460, at *7; see also, e.g., Bernardi, 2011 WL 5079549, at *7. The
remaining arbitral demands likely disappeared in light of judicial skepticism.
Interview with Daniel Fisher, Senior Ed., Forbes, in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 5, 2021).
That said, the attorneys pursuing these types of claims were later referred to as
“arbitration entrepreneurs.” David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the
Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 & n.38 (2015).
See infra Appendix.
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CenturyLink. DoorDash. Family Dollar. Peloton. Intuit. In 2020: Chegg.
Amazon. In 2021: DoorDash, again (different claimants; different claims). Uber,
again (different claimants; different claims). These corporate defendants are
represented by some of the most well-known firms in “big law”: Gibson Dunn,
Morrison & Foerster, and Mayer Brown.
2.

Methodology

“When a study includes more than one single case, a multiple case study is
needed.”212 This case study draws from multiple cases and therefore uses the
“multiple-case study” method.213 A multiple-case study enables the researcher
to understand key similarities and differences and allows her to analyze data
both within and across cases.214 The multiple-case study method calls for
“detailed . . . data collection involving multiple sources of information.”215
Accordingly, for this study, I collected case-related materials from multiple
sources to form the underlying dataset. Those materials included (1) all
publicly available data on arbitral claims in the AAA, JAMS, and CPR
databases;216 (2) publicly available filings, judicial opinions, and orders from a
broad and representative sample of mass-arbitration cases; (3) publicly
available financial disclosures relevant to certain companies’ mass-arbitration
liability; (4) interviews I conducted with the principal architects of mass
212. Johanna Gustafsson, Single Case Studies vs. Multiple Case Studies: A Comparative

Study 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/2XD7-GUSC.
213. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 46-47 (3d ed. 2003)

(comparing single-case and multiple-case study designs); see also, e.g., Mark Gil A. Vega,
Investigating the Learning Action Cell (LAC) Experiences of Science Teachers in Secondary
Schools: A Multiple Case Study, IOER INT’L MULTIDISCIPLINARY RSCH. J., Mar. 2020, at 20,
20-22 (evaluating an educational program in the Philippines via “multiple case studies
that utilized . . . survey questionnaires, individual interviews, focus group discussions,
and . . . observations”).
214. See YIN, supra note 213, at 47-48.
215. See CRESWELL, supra note 196, at 97 (emphasis omitted).
216. See Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://perma.cc/
J6R8-GRHC (archived May 14, 2022) (to locate, select “View the live page,” and then
select the first link under “AAA Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics”)
(listing AAA consumer cases closed within the last five years); JAMS Consumer Case
Information Spreadsheet, JAMS, https://perma.cc/7V8J-MFCX (archived May 14, 2022)
(to locate, select “View the live page,” and then select “JAMS Consumer Case
Information spreadsheet”) (listing consumer arbitrations administered by JAMS and
completed in the last five years); CPR Consumer Case Information, INT’L INST. FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., https://perma.cc/GV8C-PCH6 (archived May 14,
2022) (to locate, select “View the live page,” and then select “CPR Consumer Case
Information”) (providing information on CPR consumer matters closed within the last
five years); see also Colvin, supra note 122, at 21 (describing the AAA’s records as a “bestcase example” of arbitration).
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arbitration217 and with other leading plaintiffs’ attorneys;218 (5) interviews I
conducted with the principal architects and leaders of the defense coalition’s
arbitration revolution;219 and (6) public media reports on mass arbitration.
Given that mass arbitration did not emerge until around 2018, I established
the following criteria to ensure a sufficiently developed and representative case
sample for the study’s dataset. These criteria ensured that the dataset was
representative across time (criteria 1 and 2), claim size and number (criteria 3,
4, and 5), substantive legal context (criteria 6 and 7), and procedural origin
(criteria 8 and 9).
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

First-mover cases220 (necessary to investigate how mass arbitration
emerged);
Second-mover cases221 (necessary to investigate the evolution and future
of mass arbitration);
At least one case with claims that are claim-marketability failures in
arbitration222 (necessary to investigate the claim-value threshold223 of the
mass-arbitration model in the abstract and in comparison with other
aggregate dispute resolution mechanisms);
Cases of diverse scale, as measured by number of claimants (necessary to
investigate the mass-arbitration model’s scaling capabilities);
Cases involving (relatively) high-value individual claims and (relatively)
low-value individual claims (necessary to investigate claim-value ranges
for the mass-arbitration model’s economic viability);
Cases arising out of employment contracts;
Cases arising out of consumer contracts;
Cases that began as class actions; and
Cases that were initiated in arbitration.

217. See supra note 40.
218. See supra note 41.
219. See supra note 42.
220. I classify first-mover cases as those mass arbitrations where claim filing began in 2018.
221. I classify second-mover cases as those mass arbitrations where claim filing began in

2019 or later.
222. For purposes of this study, I define a claim that is a “claim-marketability failure” in

arbitration as one that would have been economically viable in litigation (via a class
action or other aggregate claiming mechanism) but is not economically viable in
arbitration, as the costs of arbitration relative to the value of the claim make it
economically irrational to pursue.
223. By “claim-value threshold,” I mean the following: the value of individual claims that
mass-arbitration attorneys have found to be the minimum—the threshold—for such
claims to be economically viable in the mass-arbitration model.
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Once a sufficient number of mass arbitrations emerged and developed to
satisfy these criteria, I compiled them into a dataset for study here.224 The
overall dataset spans the mass-arbitration landscape (including some mass
arbitrations that never appear publicly), enabling thorough investigation of
the mass-arbitration model as it exists today.
B. Overcoming the Principal Obstacles to Mass Arbitration
The path to a viable model of mass arbitration was a narrow one.
Corporate defendants and their attorneys were experienced, sophisticated,
well-capitalized, and steadfastly devoted to preserving the bounty of the
arbitration revolution.225 The win–loss and recovery rates for consumers and
employees in arbitration were too discouraging for even optimistic attorneys
to ignore.226 The startup costs of mass arbitration were likely too high for
most attorneys, particularly those with the experience needed to go toe-to-toe
with the defense bar.
How, then, did mass arbitration ever come to be? Who could do it? Who
would do it?
1.

Competing with the defense bar

Any path to mass arbitration had to go through the defense bar—the same
defense bar that engineered the arbitration revolution and the class-action
counterrevolution. While the proverbial “enterprising young attorney” might
224. The full dataset is on file with the Author. A subset of the data is reproduced in the

Appendix below.
225. Indeed, in many ways they still are. In a 2021 study, the American Association for
Justice (AAJ) noted that “[c]onsumer and employee win rates decreased” and “consumer
and employment forced arbitrations increased during the pandemic.” AM. ASS’N FOR
JUST., supra note 146, at 2. Many of the cases studied by the AAJ, however, involved
claims in the mass arbitrations analyzed in this Article. See id. at 4 (listing the top ten
corporate defendants for employment arbitration in 2020, including Family Dollar,
Dollar Tree, and Chipotle); infra Appendix. The increase in arbitration between 2018
and 2021 is thus partly attributable (if not highly attributable) to the emergence of mass
arbitration. Accordingly, any analysis of the AAJ’s study must consider the distinction
between an increase in arbitration cases and an increase in mandatory arbitration
agreements. Cf., e.g., Bhattarai, supra note 146 (using the fact that Family Dollar closed
1,135 arbitration cases in 2020, as opposed to three cases in 2019, to show that “U.S.
companies are increasingly relying [on] . . . arbitration . . . during the pandemic,” a
conclusion that conflates an increase in cases with an increase in arbitration
agreements). For any given defendant, and in particular Family Dollar, the increase in
2020 cases would seem largely (if not exclusively) due to mass arbitration. Indeed, the
fact that Family Dollar closed three arbitration cases in 2019 likely reflects the general
tendency of mandatory arbitration agreements to suppress case filings, not facilitate
them. See supra Part I.C.
226. See Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
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be willing to devote countless hours to individualized claim management and
pursuit, that young attorney would be no match for the defense bar. And an
attorney with the skill and experience necessary to challenge the defense bar
would almost certainly lack the willingness to abandon a well-established and
lucrative practice for a risky and unfamiliar endeavor.227
Unsurprisingly, then, first-mover firms in mass arbitration were unique
among plaintiffs’ firms. Keller Lenkner, the firm behind the Uber, Lyft,
Postmates, DoorDash, Intuit, Amazon, and FanDuel mass arbitrations, is
uniquely well capitalized for a startup firm, especially one founded just three
years ago. Two years before starting Keller Lenkner, Adam Gerchen, Ashley
Keller, and Travis Lenkner sold Gerchen Keller Capital—a litigation-funding
firm Gerchen and Keller had founded in 2013—to Burford Capital for $160
million.228 Keller Lenkner is also unusual among plaintiffs’ firms in that its
attorneys were “trained at leading defense firms and commercial litigation
boutiques.”229 Indeed, Keller Lenkner’s ranks include Warren Postman, the
former vice president and chief counsel for appellate litigation at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.230 Other attorneys come from shops like Kirkland &
Ellis, Williams & Connolly, and Kellogg Hansen.231 The marketing
implication is obvious: “Keller Lenkner’s lawyers can match the best lawyers
on the other side because they’ve been there.”232
Cory Zajdel, whose firm, Z Law Group, is behind both the Chegg and
DoorDash (consumer) mass arbitrations, is also unique among plaintiffs’
attorneys. Zajdel invested his life savings into mass arbitration.233 His
reasoning? The arbitration revolution left consumers, including many of his
227. Even now, well-capitalized plaintiff-side powerhouses are hesitant about the risk–

benefit calculus. Interview with Jonathan D. Selbin, supra note 41.
228. Press Release, Burford Cap., Burford Capital Adds Scale and Significant Private Capital

229.

230.

231.
232.
233.

Management Business Through Acquisition of Gerchen Keller Capital (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://perma.cc/V8PU-M3BJ; Press Release, Gerchen Keller Cap., LLC, Gerchen
Keller Capital, LLC Launches New $250 Million Commercial Litigation Finance Fund
(Jan. 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/9YNP-LP5H.
About Us, KELLER POSTMAN LLC, https://perma.cc/U574-WY4X (archived July 12,
2022). Keller Lenkner changed its name to Keller Postman after the departure of Travis
Lenkner in April 2022. Andrew Strickler, “Mass Action” Firm Keller Lenkner Becomes
Keller Postman, LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2022, 4:54 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/9RWD-YRN5
(to locate, select “View the live page”). I refer to the firm as Keller Lenkner throughout
the Article.
Our Team, KELLER POSTMAN LLC, https://perma.cc/R3WZ-TBHD (archived May 14,
2022). Lenkner himself worked as an attorney at Gibson Dunn. Press Release, Burford
Cap., supra note 228.
See Our Team, supra note 230.
Alison Frankel, DQ from Facebook Class Action Shows Risk of Keller Lenkner’s Model,
REUTERS (July 21, 2021, 1:34 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/32JS-NFTW.
Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
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clients, with virtually no access to justice. Zajdel knew that attorneys across
the country would routinely screen out cases where an arbitration clause was
present.234 Because of this, he was concerned that no consumers subject to
arbitration agreements would be able to secure representation for their
claims.235 If Zajdel didn’t do it, who would?236
Other plaintiffs’ firms that have gotten involved in mass arbitration are
well established and well capitalized. Quinn Emanuel joined Keller Lenkner in
the DoorDash (employment) mass arbitration,237 and it is on record as counsel
in the Ticketmaster mass arbitration.238 Lieff Cabraser, class council against
Fitbit,239 is considering dipping its toes into the mass-arbitration waters in the
context of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claims against
DirecTV.240 Firms like Lieff Cabraser and Quinn Emanuel are large enough to
handle the volume of individual cases—and the attendant ethical obligations to
clients—generated by mass arbitration.
2.

Overcoming substantial startup costs

The economic barriers to initiating a mass arbitration are substantial.
Creating the “mass” is a particularly expensive endeavor, both in the abstract
and relative to class actions and MDL consolidations. The filing of even a
single arbitration demand requires the claimant to pay a filing fee. (That is
generally true even if that filing fee is reimbursable under the terms of the
relevant arbitration agreement.)
The thousands of arbitration demands in this study were subject to a web
of multifarious, frequently amended fee schedules. Initial filing fees for
individual arbitration claims during the study period often fell somewhere

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Alison Frankel, DoorDash Accused of Changing Driver Rules to Block Mass Arbitration

Campaign, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://perma.cc/EFW9-7SW7.
238. Complaint, Heckman v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., No. 22-cv-00047 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2022),

ECF No. 1 (listing Keller Lenkner and Quinn Emanuel as counsel for the plaintiffs).
239. See infra notes 384-88 and accompanying text.
240. Interview with Jonathan D. Selbin, supra note 41 (noting that privacy claims stemming

from a TCPA class action had been sent to arbitration and that Lieff Cabraser was
seeking individual names in order to help claimants arbitrate). The underlying case is
Cordoba v. DirectTV, LLC, No. 15-cv-03755 (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 27, 2015).

1328

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

between $200 and $400,241 although under some schedules and some
agreements they could have been much higher.242
In many cases, just the filing fee for the arbitration demand can exceed the
value of any individual claim. Indeed, the initial filing fee is the reason that
most individual consumer and employment demands, at least if unconnected
to a mass arbitration, are never brought. As an example: To a couple earning
$32,877 a year, $200 owed by Intuit is a significant amount of money.243 But
pursuant to the couple’s arbitration agreement, the filing fee to recover that
$200 would have been $200.244 This made the claim economically irrational for
the couple (and their counsel) to pursue.
In order to launch a mass arbitration, then, a law firm typically must
advance the filing fees owed by its clients.245 Given the number of individual
demands that mass arbitration entails, this is a substantial (and potentially
risky) up-front investment. In the Intuit mass arbitration, Keller Lenkner
invested more than $8 million dollars of its own capital to advance filing fees
for the first wave of individual arbitration demands.246 In the DoorDash
241. See Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Rules: Costs of Arbitration 1 (2016),

242.

243.

244.

245.

246.

https://perma.cc/TQ3J-H22N (setting out a default filing fee of $200 for consumers);
Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs, JAMS, https://perma.cc/L7US-MB6T (archived
May 19, 2022) (setting default fees of $250 for consumers and $400 for employees).
These fees can generally be altered via contract. At least prior to mass arbitration,
agreements that amended filing fees tended to lower the claimant’s fee or provide that
the defendant would reimburse the claimant’s fee. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011).
See, e.g., Rule 13900. Fees Due When a Claim Is Filed, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH.,
https://perma.cc/C9BD-GGPJ (archived May 19, 2022) (setting up a sliding scale where
filing fees vary based on the amount in controversy).
[Proposed] Brief of Amici Curiae the Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney & the
Office [sic] the County Counsel, County of Santa Clara Opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Approval at 40, Arena v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-02546, 2021 WL 834253
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021), ECF No. 176-1.
See Motion to Intervene & in Opposition to Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 5, Intuit, 2021 WL 834253 (No. 19-cv-02546), ECF No. 177 [hereinafter
Intuit Motion to Intervene]. The AAA changed its fee schedule in November 2020 to
adjust for mass arbitration, reducing the required outlay for similarly situated
claimants to as low as $50. Mark Levin, New AAA Consumer Fee Schedule Addresses Mass
Arbitration Costs, JD SUPRA (Mar. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/6YR9-C9EB; Am. Arb.
Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Rules: Costs of Arbitration 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/
K43E-URXP.
This is not always the case. For instance, the AAA waives filing fees when a California
consumer-claimant establishes a condition of “poverty” via affidavit. See Am. Arb.
Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Affidavit for Waiver of Fees Notice 1 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/AJW2-45FM.
Defendant Intuit Inc.’s Opposition to Motion to Intervene & Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amici Curiae at 7, Intuit, 2021 WL 834253 (No. 19-cv-02546), ECF No. 189
[hereinafter Intuit Opposition to Motion].
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(employment) mass arbitration, filing the first wave of claims for wage theft
cost counsel around $1.2 million.247 By May 2020, Keller Lenkner had fronted
more than $10 million in filing fees for its clients.248 In the Chegg mass
arbitration, Cory Zajdel put up his “life savings” to front the filing fees for
more than 15,000 arbitration demands.249 There is no analogue to this up-front
capital outlay in a class action. In a class action in court, there is typically only
one filing for which a fee could be assessed—the class complaint.
Before a firm can even reach this expensive filing stage, it must expend
significant time and resources in order to amass claims to file. The “mass” in a
mass arbitration is the sum of hundreds or thousands of individual claimants,
all of whom the firm must identify, notify, contact, and ultimately retain.
Creating the “mass” requires firms to develop (internally) or hire (externally)
an advertising and marketing team capable of designing and implementing an
expansive, but also targeted, multimedia campaign. That campaign must not
only identify and reach a diffuse set of potential claimants; it must also
persuade those individuals to reach out to the firm so that the firm can file
claims on their behalf.250
The outlay of resources required to create the “mass” in a mass arbitration
substantially exceeds that required in a typical class-action proceeding. First, in
a class action, the relevant “mass” (a class) is created through the relatively
inexpensive process of crafting a class definition in the complaint. Second,
notifying individuals of their inclusion in the class is typically done via a
formal court-ordered and court-supervised notice campaign.251 And while
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires plaintiffs to bear the costs of notice, at least at the
outset, a judge can order reimbursement of those costs by the defendant at the
247. See Susan Antilla, Arbitration Storm at DoorDash, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 27, 2020)

https://perma.cc/AWE3-C6P4.
248. Declaration of Warren Postman in Opposition to CenturyLink’s Motion to Disqualify

Counsel & Require Corrective Notice ¶ 6, In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec. Litig.,
No. 17-md-02795, 2020 WL 3513547 (D. Minn. June 29, 2020), ECF No. 715 [hereinafter
CenturyLink Postman Declaration].
249. Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40; Alison Frankel, Mass Consumer Arbitration
is On! Ed Tech Company Hit with 15,000 Data Breach Claims, REUTERS (May 12, 2020,
1:51 PM), https://perma.cc/68TS-KCMH.
250. One example of such a campaign is Labaton Sucharow’s outreach via Facebook to
individuals who might have claims against MoneyLion for charging excessive interest
rates. The MoneyLion advertisement did not appear on Labaton Sucharow’s main
Facebook feed. Instead, the ad appeared on a targeted subset of Facebook users’ feeds. A
copy of the ad is on file with the Author. For more on advertising campaigns, see
generally Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40 (discussing the need for a
marketing budget and a targeted advertising plan); and Interview with Warren
Postman, supra note 40 (listing as a mass-arbitration startup requirement an intake
process to target and find clients).
251. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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end of the case.252 Reimbursement can also occur through the negotiated terms
of a settlement agreement.253
Finally, unlike mass-arbitration counsel, class counsel does not need to
individually retain the members of a class. At most, a court might require
counsel to produce a class list for purposes of satisfying the class-action
ascertainability requirement.254
The outlay of resources required to create the “mass” in a mass arbitration
likely also exceeds that required in an MDL consolidation. In contrast with
MDL proceedings, which are public and often widely publicized,255 arbitration
proceedings are private and less publicized (if publicized at all).256 Potential
MDL claimants are thus more likely to know about the case against the
relevant defendant(s) and more likely to self-identify their claims. One might
252. See, e.g., Irving Tr. Co. v. Nationwide Leisure Corp., 93 F.R.D. 102, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

253.

254.

255.

256.

(“Notice must be financed by the class claimants. However, class claimants may apply
to this court for an order shifting the costs of some class member identification
procedures . . . . And, of course, if the class claimants prevail, an application to garner
costs and fees from the recovery fund can be made.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Brief in Support of Unopposed Motion for Certification of Settlement Class,
Preliminary Approval of Settlement, & Approval of Class Notice at 25, In re
Caterpillar, Inc., C13 & C15 Engine Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-cv-03722 (D.N.J. Apr. 11,
2016), ECF No. 211-1 (“The costs of [class] notice will be paid out of the Settlement
Fund.”).
Compare, e.g., Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[A]
proposed class is ascertainable if it is adequately defined such that its membership is
capable of determination.” (emphasis added)), and Seeligson v. Devon Energy Prod. Co.,
761 F. App’x 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the idea that a class must be currently
ascertainable), with Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-94 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding that “[a] class must be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective
criteria” and noting that class-member identification must be administratively
feasible). Although it insisted it was not changing circuit precedent, the Third Circuit
recently issued an opinion that seemed to weaken its heightened ascertainability
standard. Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, 974 F.3d 467, 477-81 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding the
district court “too exacting” in its demand that the plaintiffs “identify the class
members at the certification stage”); see James Bogan III, Third Circuit Weakens
Ascertainability Requirement by Lowering Evidentiary Bar, JD SUPRA (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3VGY-Z5UW.
See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://perma.cc/RDF3-Y6G3 (covering the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s
transfer of opioid cases to Northern District of Ohio Judge Dan Polster for MDL
consolidation); Alyse Shorland, Johnson & Johnson Lawsuits Raise Fears Over Baby Powder,
N.Y. TIMES: THE WKLY. (updated Dec. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/S3AM-7G37 (to locate,
select “View the live page”) (covering the Johnson & Johnson asbestos-in-baby-powder
products liability MDL); see also Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40 (noting
that aggregate proceedings in court tend to generate more publicity than arbitration
proceedings, even those related to mass arbitration).
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Norman Shachoy Lecture, Courts: In and out of Sight, Site, and
Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 799-810 (2008) (advocating for more “sunshine” in arbitration
and other private dispute-resolution arrangements).
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think of it this way: In mass arbitration, attorneys must find the would-be
claimants, typically by way of costly and proprietary targeted advertising
systems. In an MDL consolidation, would-be claimants can and often do find
the attorneys. Relatedly, the public (and publicized) nature of an MDL allows
plaintiff leadership to rely on a nationwide network of firms to amass and
refer claims.257 Referral networks like those seen in MDL consolidations are
less conceivable in mass arbitration. Without some form of publicity or an
expensive advertising apparatus, claim-collection websites by potential massarbitration referral firms would be largely invisible.
Along these lines—and perhaps unsurprisingly—all of the first-mover
mass arbitrations and most of the second-mover mass arbitrations occurred
after or alongside the stay (or dismissal) of a class or collective action258 on a
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.259 This procedural posture makes
257. See generally, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM

L. REV. 2175, 2190 (2017) (“The network of client solicitation and referral arrangements
that exists on the plaintiffs’ side in mass litigation tends to consolidate groups of
claimants in the hands of major aggregators.”).
258. Note that the FLSA provides for class-wide proceedings by way of an opt-in collective
action. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
259. For example: (1) Uber (employment): First arbitration claims filed in August 2018 after
Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing the
denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration regarding certain labor law claims), and
alongside O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2018) (doing
the same, and reversing class certification, for cases involving wage-theft claims by
Uber drivers); (2) Lyft: First arbitration claims filed in October 2018 after Bekele v. Lyft,
Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 288 (D. Mass. 2016) (granting Lyft’s motion to compel
arbitration and dismissing the putative labor class action), aff ’d, 918 F.3d 181 (1st Cir.
2019); (3) Postmates: First wave of arbitration demands filed in March 2019 after Lee v.
Postmates Inc., No. 18-cv-03421, 2018 WL 6605659, at *1-3, *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018)
(granting Postmates’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissing the plaintiffs’ wagetheft claims) and alongside Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1248, 1255-56
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (staying wage-theft claims pending arbitration), aff ’d, 823 F. App’x 535
(9th Cir. 2020); (3) DoorDash (employment): First arbitration demands filed in August
2019 after Magana v. DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 895-96, 901-02 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(same); (4) Chipotle: First arbitration claims filed in August 2018 after Turner v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 14-cv-02612, 2018 WL 11314701, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2018)
(dismissing plaintiffs bound by Chipotle’s arbitration agreement from the wage-theft
action); (5) Intuit: First arbitration claims filed in October 2019 alongside Arena v. Intuit
Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1088 (N.D. Cal.) (denying Intuit’s motion to compel
arbitration regarding deceptive consumer practices), rev’d sub nom. Dohrmann v. Intuit,
Inc., 823 F. App’x 482 (9th Cir. 2020); (6) Fitbit: Named plaintiff filed arbitration demand
following McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 16-cv-00036, 2017 WL 4551484, at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 11, 2017) (granting, for those plaintiffs who did not opt out of arbitration, Fitbit’s
motion to compel arbitration regarding deceptive consumer practices);
(7) FanDuel/DraftKings: First arbitration claims filed in October 2019 alongside In re
Daily Fantasy Sports Litigation, No. 16-md-02677, 2019 WL 6337762, at *1-5, *13 (D.
Mass. Nov. 27, 2019) (granting the defendants’ motions to compel arbitration for
certain classes of plaintiffs); (8) Chegg: First arbitration claims filed in April 2020 just
footnote continued on next page
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sense for two reasons. One, the contractual right to arbitration is generally
waivable. Plaintiffs’ firms may well file class actions (or in the FLSA context,
collective actions) as a matter of strategy to see whether defendants will
exercise their right to compel arbitration via motion.260 Two, the filing of a
class or collective action often leads to the formation and release of a class list
(that is, a list of claimants), and many mass arbitrations need something like a
class list to get started. According to Kent Williams, one of the lead attorneys
in the Chipotle mass arbitration: “Had the claimants not already been in a
collective action, the mass arbitration strategy likely wouldn’t have been
possible . . . .”261
Investigation shows, however, that a class list is not necessary in all cases.
In some instances, the amassing of wage-and-hour claims against a defendant
can grow organically—at least when employees are connected and vocally
disgruntled about wage theft.262 Family Dollar, for example, started and ended
as a mass arbitration.263 In other instances, and in an ironic procedural
reversal, mass arbitrations can spawn class actions preferred by defendants
who refuse to arbitrate individual demands.264 But both of these scenarios still
require spending on advertising, marketing, and outreach.265
Nonetheless, in many cases the class list (or a similar data source) is
necessary for a mass arbitration to begin. This is especially true in cases where
claimants are disconnected or otherwise diffuse. In the potential Arise mass

260.
261.
262.
263.

264.

265.

after Lyles v. Chegg, Inc., No. 19-cv-03235, 2020 WL 1985043, at *1, *4 (D. Md. Apr. 27,
2020) (granting Chegg’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration regarding databreach claims). If Ticketmaster becomes a mass arbitration, it will follow on the heels
of Oberstein v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 20-cv-03888, 2021 WL 4772885, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2021) (granting the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
regarding antitrust claims and staying proceedings), appeal filed, No. 21-56200 (9th Cir.
Oct. 29, 2021).
See, e.g., Interview with Matthew C. Helland, supra note 40.
Wallender, supra note 9.
Interview with Matthew C. Helland, supra note 40.
See Plaintiff ’s Complaint ¶¶ 8-9, Fam. Dollar, Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, No. 20-cv-00248
(E.D. Va. May 15, 2020), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Family Dollar Complaint] (discussing the
arbitration demands brought against Family Dollar without any reference to a prior
class action).
See, e.g., Fishon v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 336 F.R.D. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (indicating
that, after more than 2,700 Peloton consumers filed individual arbitration demands
with the AAA, Peloton failed to pay its required arbitration fees and instead chose to
defend a class-action suit in federal court); John O’Brien, Peloton Shifts Focus from
Arbitration to Courtroom to Defend Itself, LEGAL NEWSLINE (July 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6UAE-KPY9 (“Peloton first tried to fight the case by pointing to an
arbitration clause in its terms of service, but it appears to prefer defending one class
action instead of dozens of arbitration claims.”).
See supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text (discussing the high costs of advertising
and intake in mass arbitrations relative to class actions and MDL consolidations).
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arbitration, for instance, employees are spread out, isolated, and working from
home.266 Arise has a list of its employees, but unless a court orders that list to
be released, a mass arbitration will be challenging to initiate.267 The same
result is likely when claimant information is in the hands of defendants and
not easily obtainable by others. This is the situation in the potential mass
arbitration against DirecTV.268 Ultimately, the class-list element of mass
arbitration faces an uncertain future. Some courts have begun to disallow the
release of class lists—or disallow notifications to employees regarding their
claims—in cases involving arbitration agreements.269
The up-front costs associated with the preparation of individual
arbitration demands are another financial obstacle to mass arbitration. To
prepare an arbitration demand, attorneys must gather and record all personal
information for each individual: name, age, address, contact information,
employer, employment dates, company customer status, and so on. In some
instances, the attorneys might also have to collect factual documentation to
support each claim: receipts, financial statements, pay stubs or other
employment records, gig-economy driving and/or delivery records, and the
like.270 To be sure, claimants’ attorneys have sought to achieve economies of
scale by submitting something resembling a master complaint (with a
266. Plaintiff ’s Motion for Notice to Be Issued Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), & Suggestions

267.

268.

269.

270.

in Support at 1, Bell v. Arise Virtual Sols., Inc., No. 21-cv-00538, 2022 WL 567841 (W.D.
Mo. Feb. 24, 2022), ECF No. 2.
See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Ariana Tobin, A New Suit Seeks to Turn Arbitrations, a Tool of
Big Corporations, Against a Top Customer Service Provider, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 3, 2021,
5:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/Z8A3-73MF (“Without a court-ordered list, finding
and contacting Arise’s network of customer service agents would present significant
challenges.”).
See Cordoba v. DirecTV, LLC, 801 F. App’x 723, 724-25 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(noting that DirecTV allegedly violated the law when it created and shared a data file
containing customers’ personal information); Alison Frankel, Latest Mass Arbitration
Wrinkle: Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Want Court Permission to Contact DirecTV Customers,
REUTERS (July 6, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://perma.cc/JCM2-9B6B (describing efforts by
plaintiffs’ firms to contact clients based on the data file); Plaintiffs Seek Release of
DirecTV Customer Contact Info Sealed in Earlier Improper Texting Lawsuit, LIEFF CABRASER
HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN (July 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/JM5J-V7QJ (emphasizing that,
without the release of contact information held by DirecTV, “those impacted by the
company’s wrongdoing will never know of privacy right breaches or have the
opportunity to bring their contractually-mandated individual arbitration claims”).
See, e.g., Cordoba v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 15-cv-03755, 2022 WL 575117, at *1-2, *4 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 7, 2022) (refusing to let firms use the data file described in note 268 above for
client outreach); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 497-98, 501 (5th Cir. 2019)
(holding that a district court may not provide notice of FLSA collective-action claims
to employees bound by individual arbitration agreements); Bigger v. Facebook, Inc.,
947 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 2020) (limiting the circumstances under which a court
can authorize FLSA notice when arbitration agreements are present).
See Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
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spreadsheet of individual information linked or attached)271 and by filing
nearly identical complaints for thousands of demands.272 Some defendants
have argued that these “generic” filings are both invalid and abusive;273
Postmates even sued 10,356 of its couriers on these grounds.274 But the AAA
has not deemed such demands—including 1,000 demands in the CenturyLink
mass arbitration and more than 15,000 in the Postmates mass arbitration—
insufficient.275

271. See, e.g., In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec. Litig., No. 17-md-02795, 2020 WL

272.

273.

274.

275.

7129889, at *8 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2020) (“Keller’s pre-arbitration demand consisted of a
generic complaint alleging overcharging and fraud and a list of 9,000 clients with their
names, phone numbers, emails, and addresses.”), appeal dismissed, No. 21-1030, 2021 WL
2792967 (8th Cir. Feb. 23, 2021); Letter from Douglas H. Meal, Partner, Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, to Cory L. Zajdel, Principal Att’y, Z Law, LLC 1 (June 26,
2020) (on file with author) (noting that Z Law compiled a “spreadsheet regarding the
claimants” in the Chegg mass arbitration).
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 7, Postmates
Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2020), 2020 WL 8167433,
ECF No. 61 [hereinafter Postmates Second Amended Complaint] (“[C]ounsel then sent
Postmates a single email that contained a link to 10,356 virtually identical arbitration
demands . . . .”).
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Postmates, Inc. v. 10,356
Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Postmates
Initial Complaint]; Respondent DoorDash, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order at 4, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 19-cv-07545 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 22, 2019), ECF No. 35 [hereinafter DoorDash Opposition to Motion] (referring to
Keller Lenkner’s “mass arbitration scheme” as a “ransom”); see also, e.g., Supplemental
Declaration of Professor Nancy J. Moore ¶¶ 19-24, In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec.
Litig., No. 17-md-2795, 2020 WL 3513547 (D. Minn. June 29, 2020), ECF No. 637
(contending that Keller Lenkner violated its fiduciary duties and ethical
responsibilities); Interview with Jonathan E. Paikin, supra note 42 (noting that, in
arbitration, “there’s really nothing you [the defendant] can do to get to the merits
before you have to pay”).
See Postmates Second Amended Complaint, supra note 272, ¶¶ 2-14. Postmates detailed a
number of potential deficiencies in the couriers’ arbitration demands, including that
some claimants never accepted the relevant arbitration agreement, some never did
work for Postmates, and some had released their claims as part of a separate settlement.
Id. ¶ 7.
For CenturyLink, see In re CenturyLink, 2020 WL 7129889, at *1 (noting that, after
Keller Lenkner “submitted 1,000 simultaneous arbitration demands against
CenturyLink to the AAA,” CenturyLink rather than the AAA attempted to halt
arbitration proceedings). For Postmates, see Postmates Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 272, ¶¶ 6, 8-10 (describing how the AAA handled proceedings for 10,356
“boilerplate” arbitration demands); and Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246,
1250-51 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Postmates refused to pay any fees, claiming that the [5,274]
individual arbitration demands were insufficient . . . to initiate arbitration proceedings.
The AAA, however, indicated that the arbitrations would move forward . . . .” (citation
omitted)), aff ’d, 823 F. App’x 535 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Claim preparation, claim filing, and other tasks involved in mass claiming
typically require a substantial technology apparatus.276 Building out such an
apparatus requires millions of dollars in up-front investment and continued
spending on maintenance and management.277 Z Law and Keller Lenkner
ultimately created their own technology systems to handle mass claiming.278
Independent developers have also built software for handling mass claims and
sold this software to firms.279
Some of the up-front work to prepare individual demands can be
automated, at least with the technology mentioned above.280 But much of it
cannot be. Emails (at least on the intake side) and phone calls with clients are
not automatable, either practically or ethically. And document review is not
fully automatable given legal and ethical strictures.281 For these tasks a firm
needs attorney hours and a fully staffed client-services team282—both of which
come at additional, significant cost.
276. See, e.g., Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40; Interview with Warren Postman,

277.

278.
279.

280.
281.

282.

supra note 40; Interview with Adam T. Klein, supra note 41; Interview with Jonathan
D. Selbin, supra note 41. But cf. Interview with Matthew C. Helland supra note 40
(indicating that existing tools for bringing FLSA collective actions can be repurposed
for mass-arbitration claims); Interview with Jonathan E. Paikin, supra note 42 (noting
that mass-arbitration attorneys can use Facebook and similar technologies to find
potential claimants).
See sources cited supra note 276; CenturyLink Postman Declaration, supra note 248, ¶ 5
(“Keller has invested millions of dollars in proprietary software and infrastructure to
make litigating clients’ claims more efficient . . . .”).
Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40; Interview with Warren Postman, supra
note 40.
Ray Gallo is one of the leaders in this emerging industry. See GALLO LLP,
https://perma.cc/6JUR-C3LL (archived Aug. 8, 2022) (noting that Gallo is “supported
by truly cutting-edge technology” backed by the firm’s “affiliate Gallo Digital and its
software engineering team”); LEVERAGE, https://perma.cc/2TKT-68ER (archived
Aug. 8, 2022) (describing how Leverage, developed by Gallo Digital, can help with
“mass actions and arbitration swarms” (capitalization altered)).
See Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
Cf., e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (noting that an attorney, by presenting a document in
court, certifies that “the [underlying] factual contentions have [valid] evidentiary
support”).
See, e.g., Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40 (describing Keller Lenkner’s
elaborate client-services apparatus, which includes more than one client-services
representative per attorney and “elevation attorneys” dedicated to answering client
questions); u/dant_punk, Keller Lenker Settlement, REDDIT: R/DOORDASH (Sept. 30, 2020,
3:27:50 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/H29F-MHV3 (containing copies of email exchanges
between claimants and Keller Lenkner client-services staff); u/J_Reigns5, Postmates
Keller/KCC Settlement, REDDIT: R/POSTMATES (Aug. 2, 2021, 1:39:57 PM PDT),
https://perma.cc/5FLV-EV94 (sharing the text of email from Keller Lenkner’s support
team updating claimants on the status of settlement payments); see also Interview with
Jonathan D. Selbin, supra note 41 (noting that a “huge” client-services apparatus is
necessary for mass arbitration).
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The investments of capital, time, and other resources needed to launch a
mass arbitration are distinct from those required in other forms of aggregate
claiming in another critical respect: temporal placement in the dispute. The
individualized information required at the outset of a mass arbitration, for
example, is similar (in both type and quantum) to what is required at the
conclusion of a class action.283 This distinction is economically consequential.
For one thing, high startup costs diminish the present value of an asset.
Economic models of litigation bear this out: A party that incurs asymmetric
costs early in the litigation process suffers a devaluation of the underlying
claim.284 For another, when the costs of individualized production are frontloaded (as in mass arbitration) versus back-loaded (as in class actions), those
costs will tend to raise the risk profile of the underlying claims. Back-loaded
costs tend not to affect the risk profile of claims, at least not so substantially,
because an outlay of capital is only required after attorney compensation has
been secured. Those back-loaded costs, in other words, are baked into a deal
that already exists. In mass arbitration, a capital outlay is typically required
prior to any deal being reached.
This distinction also separates mass arbitrations from MDL proceedings,
although to a lesser degree. In mass-tort MDLs, for instance, all claimants
know that their complaints will be consolidated into aggregate proceedings
before a single judge to streamline costs.285 And all attorneys know that they
will either be a part of the MDL leadership (and get paid in that way) or will
not (and will get paid by amassing claims while waiting for a resolution in the
MDL proceedings). Thus, while the MDL still has up-front costs—amassing
claims and claimants, drafting and filing complaints, comporting with ethical
obligations regarding attorney–client representation, and so on—those costs
are incurred against the backdrop of guaranteed cost-effective procedures. In
contrast, for first-mover mass arbitrations and many second-mover mass

283. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 450-51, 460-61 (2016) (discussing

an award-distribution plan for class-action claimants based on the post-verdict
production of hours worked along with statistical modeling to make up for Tyson’s
failure to keep records).
284. Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options
Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1312 (2006) (describing how front-loaded costs tend to
reduce a lawsuit’s settlement value because “a plaintiff must . . . incur larger expenses
before gaining the [bargaining] advantage of the information that is disclosed” later on
in the lawsuit).
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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arbitrations, the up-front investments were made with no guarantee of any
dispute-resolution procedure, cost-effective or otherwise.
* * *
In short, mass arbitration is an expensive and therefore risky proposition.
How, then, did a viable mass-arbitration model emerge? This investigation
reveals several answers, many of which lie in the structure of the massarbitration model. Part III.C below explores these structural answers in more
detail. The investigation also reveals the importance of two developments in
the civil justice landscape—both external to arbitration agreements and to the
plaintiffs’ bar—that emerged or evolved in the 2010s.
The first is the expansion of social media platforming in the late aughts
and early 2010s, relevant here in two respects. One, this expansion brought to
social media a broad group of users, some of whom joined “mass litigation”
groups via online platforms. These groups enabled users to connect with
similarly situated potential plaintiffs.286 That the social media expansion
facilitated access to justice was happenstance: The express purpose of these
platforms had nothing to do with civil justice.287 Nonetheless, the claimant
groups that appeared on social media played a significant role in the massarbitration model. Many of the settlement releases studied here warned
claimants that they would be ineligible for payouts if they shared any
settlement information with others. Some releases even said that claimants
would be ineligible for payouts if they informed other potential claimants of
their legal rights. Whether these draconian provisions are actually enforceable
is beside the point—they are meant to deter information sharing among
would-be claimants, who are likely to remain silent given the prospect of
losing their own benefits. Claimant groups on anonymized social media
platforms have emerged as one of the only ways in which these individuals can
meaningfully communicate.288

286. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 23, 32 & n.144

(2009) (describing the emergence of litigation-centered groups online and noting that
Yahoo! groups were used to achieve coordination among participants in the Merck
settlement).
287. This is merely a descriptive point; it is not to diminish the democratizing effect of
social media platforms on the consumers, employees, and franchisees denied access to
justice by the arbitration revolution. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of
Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 455 (2012) (discussing
how social media can enable participation in mass litigation and bring mass-litigation
proceedings closer to the people actually harmed).
288. See, e.g., u/Glkp, Keller/Lenkner Law Firm, REDDIT: R/POSTMATES (Dec. 23, 2020,
11:01:51 AM PST), https://perma.cc/6936-BRSF (discussing individual claims and
settlement amounts in the Postmates mass arbitration, and crowdsourcing questions
such as whether to provide Social Security numbers to Keller Lenkner).
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Two, as the number of social media platforms grew, increasingly niche
platforms emerged. With interfaces growing more sophisticated and new
options coming to market, companies began to develop technology for the
express purpose of bringing arbitration claimants together. The most
prominent example of this technology is a startup called FairShake, which
seeks to “level[] the playing field” between consumers and big companies.289
FairShake uses an automated system to help individuals initiate arbitration
proceedings in exchange for a cut of any eventual payout.290 FairShake began
by advertising to AT&T and Comcast customers and inviting them to file
claims through its platform. Shortly after its targeted advertising campaign,
FairShake had collected over 1,000 individual interest forms and prepared to
submit those forms as arbitration demands.291 To be clear, FairShake is a
facilitator of individual claiming in arbitration. It does not appear to go any
further, and it has not stepped into the (traditionally legal) role of aggregator
or aggregate litigator.
The second important development in the 2010s was the arrival and
subsequent explosion of third-party litigation funding in the United States.
Third-party litigation funding enables a party with no relationship to a
lawsuit to pay some or all of the litigant’s costs in exchange for a cut of any
ultimate award.292 The viability of third-party funding was not clear at the
time of Concepcion and Italian Colors, and the practice was not permitted in
many states.293 In fact, as of 2010, third-party litigation funding in the United
States was little more than an idea in a law review article.294 Today, it is a
multibillion-dollar industry.295

289. FAIRSHAKE, https://perma.cc/CY6H-PVCD (archived May 19, 2022).
290. Common Questions About FairShake, FAIRSHAKE, https://perma.cc/H8BF-62FT (archived

May 19, 2022).
291. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer and Startup Resort to Mass Filings to Fight Company

292.
293.

294.
295.

Bans on Class Arbitration, ABA J. (Apr. 13, 2020, 10:37 AM CDT), https://perma.cc/
V222-HD5B (“Soon, FairShake had enough consumers to file 1,000 arbitration claims
against companies like AT&T and Comcast.”).
See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275-78 (2011).
See J. Maria Glover, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Limits of the Work-Product
Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 911, 914 (2016) (noting that “alternative litigation finance
is still in its early stages in the United States”); id. at 939 (describing champerty and
maintenance, common law doctrines prohibiting the third-party encouragement and
financial support of a lawsuit, as “more or less colorable defenses”).
See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99
GEO. L.J. 65, 73 (2010).
See, e.g., Bill Tilley, How Litigation Financing Became a Multi-billion Dollar Industry During
the Pandemic, LINKEDIN (Feb. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/FQ8Y-PVGJ. The existence
and details of litigation-funding arrangements are often confidential and therefore
footnote continued on next page
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The emergence of a multibillion-dollar litigation-funding industry is
relevant to the development of mass arbitration in at least three ways. One,
third-party funding may well have enabled a number of mass arbitrations,
especially at the beginning.296 Two, the availability of third-party funding—
nonexistent during the arbitration revolution—made mass arbitration a more
realistic possibility for firms that needed (or wished) to hedge against the
model’s substantial risks. Three, third-party litigation-funding arrangements
are more available for individualized claiming models like mass arbitration
than they are for class-action suits.297
C. Key Elements of the Mass-Arbitration Model
By studying the mass-arbitration model in its real-world context, this
Article shows that mass arbitration is more than just a procedural offensive.
Indeed, mass arbitration is a distinct form of dispute resolution with unique
operational features, strategic elements, benefits, and risks. The four principal
elements of the mass-arbitration model are: (1) leveraging arbitration fees and
fee-shifting provisions in arbitration agreements; (2) arbitrating individual
claims—or credibly threatening to do so—to impose asymmetric costs on the
defendants; (3) selecting higher-threshold-value individual claims (relative to,
say, class-action claims); and (4) generating aggregate settlements (within the
arbitration process, as opposed to other settlement processes defendants might
prefer) from a mass of individual claims.
1.

Leveraging arbitration fees and fee-shifting provisions in
arbitration agreements

A viable procedural offensive—especially one with the up-front costs of
mass arbitration—needs some mechanism to recoup spending and generate a
return on the initial investment. The mass-arbitration model does this, or at
unobtainable. See generally Glover, supra note 293, at 913-14 (finding that many courts
protect litigation-funding arrangements from disclosure during discovery).
296. Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40. Because litigation-funding arrangements
tend to be confidential, it is not possible to determine whether a particular mass
arbitration was funded. See supra note 295.
297. For example, a 2018 New York City ethics opinion held that arrangements between
third-party funders and lawyers violated rules prohibiting fee splitting. Ass’n of the
Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018). The
opinion distinguished these arrangements from arrangements between funders and
clients, which it noted were acceptable. See id. Because firms are inclined to comply
with the opinion, see Interview with Anonymous No. 2, supra note 41, there are
naturally fewer options for third-party funding in class-action suits: These suits
proceed on a representative basis, and absent plaintiffs do not enter into financial
agreements with attorneys.
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least did this in the beginning, by leveraging arbitration fees and fee-shifting
provisions in arbitration agreements to obtain global settlements from
defendants. When successful, this mechanism counters the effects of the
arbitration revolution: Claims that were rendered unmarketable by classaction waivers suddenly become capable of generating settlement pressure
greater than that produced by class certification.
Recall AT&T’s arbitration agreement in Concepcion, which included both a
class-action waiver and provisions requiring AT&T to pay or reimburse
various arbitration fees (including up-front filing fees).298 Recall too that
AT&T included these “friendly” provisions to avoid unconscionability and
effective-vindication rulings and to soften the perceived blow of the classaction waiver.299 The mass-arbitration model exploits the tradeoffs made by
AT&T and other corporate defendants: Plaintiffs’ firms essentially called the
defendants’ bluff by filing demands under their “friendly” agreements and
insisting that courts “‘rigorously enforce’ . . . [those] agreements according to
their terms.”300
The enforcement of arbitration agreements “according to their terms”
would seem to be a foregone conclusion. After all, this was the precise
command of the Supreme Court in Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems.
Yet claimants’ attempts to do exactly that have been met with unrelenting
resistance by defendants desperate to avoid the catastrophic consequences of
taking the Court at its word.
Across the universe of mass-arbitration demands, defendants have
consistently refused, in whole or in part, to pay fees or to participate in
arbitration in any way.301 This inaction has led arbitral fora to close or refuse
to proceed with claims.302 It has also generated an odd, and deeply ironic,
procedural posture in many mass arbitrations: After or alongside decisions in
which courts granted defendants’ motions to compel arbitration of putative
298. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011). The agreements

299.
300.
301.

302.

governing the mass-arbitration claims in this Article generally include similar
provisions. All relevant agreements are on file with the Author.
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quoting Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
See, e.g., Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶ 3 (noting that, as of late 2018,
Uber had only paid the initial filing fee in 296—and the arbitrator’s retainer fee in 6—of
12,501 pending arbitration demands); DoorDash Opposition to Motion, supra note 273,
at 2-3 (explaining DoorDash’s decision not to pay fees as a way of repudiating Keller
Lenkner’s “shakedown scheme” (capitalization altered)).
See, e.g., Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶ 21 (“JAMS has . . . informed
Uber that ‘[u]ntil the Filing Fee is received we will be unable to proceed with the
administration of these matters.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting a JAMS notice to
Uber)).
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class-action claims,303 those same courts were asked to revisit the claims via
new motions to compel arbitration—this time filed by the plaintiffs.304
Corporations’ arguments that their agreements should not be enforced
“according to their terms” have taken myriad forms. Uber, Chegg, and
FanDuel, for example, argued—somewhat oddly—that arbitrators lacked the
authority to decide whether to enforce their arbitration agreements. Uber
made this argument despite having just convinced the Ninth Circuit that
enforceability questions fell to the arbitrator.305 Chegg raised the argument
even though its agreement explicitly stated that an AAA arbitrator, and an
AAA arbitrator alone, would determine whether the agreement was
enforceable.306 And FanDuel made the argument a mere six weeks after
persuading a federal judge that its clause required an arbitrator to resolve all
threshold issues.307 No judge has yet to bless this particular argument.
303. See infra Appendix.
304. See, e.g., infra note 305.
305. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Thus, all of

Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability of [Uber’s newest] arbitration agreement . . .
should have been adjudicated in the first instance by an arbitrator and not in court.”).
After the Ninth Circuit functionally granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration,
Uber drivers filed 12,501 individual demands with JAMS pursuant to the terms of
Uber’s arbitration agreement. Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2-3.
When Uber refused to pay the JAMS-assessed fees in all but six cases, the claimants
filed their own motion to compel arbitration. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 13. In its opposition to the
claimants’ motion, Uber asked the district court to submit the fee dispute to JAMS for
collective resolution. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration at 14, Abadilla v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-07343 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 14, 2019), ECF No. 53. But Uber had earlier argued that every dispute should be
resolved in individual arbitration, and its new position favored judicial intervention
over the individual arbitrator’s authority. See Petitioners’ Reply to Respondent Uber
Technologies, Inc.’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration at 1-2,
Abadilla v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-07343 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2019), ECF No. 66
(criticizing Uber’s “newfound preference for judicial relief ”).
306. Although Chegg argued that its user agreement delegated enforceability questions to
an arbitrator when it moved to compel arbitration in the District of Maryland, it
purported to unilaterally terminate its agreements (stating that mass-arbitration
claimants had asserted “frivolous or improper demands”) after the AAA ordered it to
pay arbitration fees. If accepted, this position would give Chegg—rather than the
arbitrator—the authority to determine whether claims are proper and therefore
enforceable. Alison Frankel, Chegg Tries a New Way to Avert Mass Arbitration: Cancel
Users’ Contracts, REUTERS (July 2, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://perma.cc/V7WH-69ES; see
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration & Dismiss or,
Alternatively, Stay at 16, Lyles v. Chegg, Inc., No. 19-cv-03235, 2020 WL 1985043 (D.
Md. Apr. 27, 2020), 2019 WL 8013607, ECF No. 21-1; Letter from Cory L. Zajdel,
Principal Att’y, Z Law, LLC, to Cathe Stewart, Assistant Vice President, Am. Arb. Ass’n
1-3 (July 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/9V6S-RFVQ.
307. See In re Daily Fantasy Sports Litig., No. 16-md-02677, 2019 WL 6337762, at *1, *10, *13
(D. Mass. Nov. 27, 2019) (agreeing with FanDuel and holding that certain classes of
plaintiffs had “entered into valid agreements to arbitrate their claims, including
footnote continued on next page
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Postmates, on the other hand, argued that its agreements should not be
enforced because the mass filing of related individual demands violates the
FAA. Its basic argument was this: The manner in which the claims were
pressed—all at once, possibly with deficiencies in individual cases—amounted
to “de facto class arbitration” in violation of the parties’ agreed-upon class
waiver.308 Accordingly, allowing the claims to proceed would prevent the
underlying arbitration agreements from being enforced “according to their
terms.” This argument also has yet to succeed.309 It is premature at this
juncture, however, to speculate as to whether courts—and ultimately the
Supreme Court—will find that mass arbitration violates the FAA by treading
too close to class arbitration. So premature, in fact, that even some defense
attorneys have not given the matter much thought.310 But in order for this
argument to prevail, the Supreme Court will need to further expand its
(already expansive) interpretation of the FAA.311
Defendants have also sought to moot mass-arbitration claims, and by
extension the relevant arbitration agreements. In 2016 the Supreme Court
decided Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, a putative class action in which the
defendant tried to moot the class claims by offering to settle with the named
plaintiff.312 In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that “an unaccepted settlement
offer . . . does not moot a plaintiff’s case.”313 Despite this holding, Fitbit tried a
similar strategy in anticipation of mass arbitration. The company argued that
its arbitration agreement—an agreement it had just relied on to achieve the

308.
309.

310.
311.
312.
313.

threshold questions of arbitrability”). After that decision, and after FanDuel users filed
1,000 arbitration demands, the AAA assessed $300,000 in initial filing fees against
FanDuel and FanDuel refused to pay. Verified Petition ¶¶ 2, 18, FanDuel Inc. v. Badii,
No. 650211/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2020) (“FanDuel has not currently paid that
[$300,000] initial filing fee . . . .”). Instead, FanDuel asked a New York trial court to
decide whether the arbitral demands were time-barred—the very type of threshold
enforceability question it had just persuaded the District of Massachusetts must be
decided by an arbitrator. See id. ¶¶ 19-26.
Postmates Initial Complaint, supra note 273, at 2.
Postmates Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783, 2020 WL 1908302, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2020) (“[Postmates’] arguments focus . . . on arguably abusive tactics by [the
drivers’] counsel to seek a settlement, but do not point to anything about . . . [the] claims
themselves that make them ‘class actions.’ ”); see also Daniel Wiessner, Arbitration Bid by
10,000 Postmates Drivers Not a “De Facto Class Action”—Judge, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2020,
4:06 PM), https://perma.cc/99Z8-WCF3.
See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous No. 4, supra note 42.
See supra Parts I.A-.B.
577 U.S. 153, 157-60 (2016).
Id. at 165-66; id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court correctly
concludes that an offer of complete relief on a claim does not render that claim moot.”).
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dismissal of a consumer class action314—no longer applied after it made a
satisfactory settlement offer to the named plaintiff of the putative class.315 In
response to this argument, the judge threatened to hold Fitbit and its attorneys
in contempt.316
Not to be outdone on this score, Chegg argued that arbitral claimants
breached the duty of good faith by filing demands, thereby terminating their
contracts—and thus Chegg’s fee requirements.317 This argument, which
conflates a breach of good faith in the overall contract with a breach of the
arbitration agreement, likely runs counter to Supreme Court jurisprudence
dating back to 1967.318 Chegg, however, continues to raise it.319
Finally, all defendants have argued that the enforcement of their
arbitration agreements according to their terms would be fundamentally
unfair—to them.320 DoorDash described Keller Lenkner’s attempts to enforce
the agreements Doordash wrote as a “shakedown scheme.”321 Postmates also
referred to Keller Lenkner’s filing of arbitration demands as a “shakedown,” a
position it supported by claiming that some of the demands were invalid or
defective.322 And Fitbit stated that enforcing its agreements and requiring it to
pay arbitration fees would offend common sense: After all, “a claim that is
314. McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 16-cv-00036, 2017 WL 4551484, at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11,

2017).
315. See Transcript of Proceedings at 7-11, McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 16-cv-00036, 2018

WL 3549042 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2018), ECF No. 143 [hereinafter Fitbit Transcript].
316. See id. at 12-13; see also McLellan, 2018 WL 3549042, at *6-7 (assessing attorney’s fees and

costs against “Fitbit and its lawyers . . . for their bad-faith litigation tactics”).
317. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Chegg, Inc.’s Motion for

318.

319.

320.
321.
322.

Clarification or Modification of the Court’s April 27, 2020 Order at 20-24, Lyles v.
Chegg, Inc., No. 19-cv-03235 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2020), ECF No. 26-1 (arguing that the
claimants’ bad-faith acts—colluding “to bring frivolous arbitration demands against
Chegg” in order to impose large fees—relieved Chegg “of all obligations under” its
agreements).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967) (finding
that an arbitration clause is severable from the rest of a contract, meaning that “a
federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate,” not issues related to contract formation as a whole).
See, e.g., Respondent Chegg, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of
Motion to Stay the Proceedings at 5-6, 9-10, Theisen v. Chegg, Inc., No. 20CV371775
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2020).
See, e.g., DoorDash Opposition to Motion, supra note 273, at 22-23.
Id. at 2 (capitalization altered).
Respondent Postmates Inc.’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration
at 1, Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-cv-03042),
2019 WL 11093949, ECF No. 112 (“This is a shakedown.”); Postmates Initial Complaint,
supra note 273, at 2. In lawsuits against the AAA, see infra notes 338-55 and
accompanying text, Family Dollar and Uber made similar allegations regarding the
validity of some of the filed demands.
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$162—an individual claim—is not one that any rational litigant would litigate”
given the AAA’s $750 up-front filing fee.323 Fitbit’s argument is not new. A
near-identical point on the economic irrationality of individual arbitration
appeared in Italian Colors—in a brief written by the plaintiff merchants.324
Whatever their precise form, at bottom these arguments are all about
enforceability. Whether it is for the arbitrator, through the relevant arbitral
process, to decide if a demand has merit is a question of whether a given
arbitration agreement—an agreement that assigns that very issue to the
arbitrator—should be enforced. And whether it is for the arbitrator, through
the relevant arbitral process, to decide if the costs of arbitration are so high
relative to claim value as to violate due process325 or common sense is also a
question of enforcement.326
However ironic (or sympathetic) the argument that defendants’ own
arbitration agreements cannot be enforced “according to their terms,” that
argument is entirely rational given the dramatic financial consequences of
enforcement for a defendant. The fees assessed in a mass arbitration are
astounding. In the Uber mass arbitration, for instance, initial filing and the
retention of an arbitrator cost Uber over $1,500 per claim.327 In both the
DoorDash (employment) and Postmates mass arbitrations, initial fees were
$1,900 per demand.328 As of January 2019, Uber faced over $18 million in
arbitration fees alone.329 In October 2019, after DoorDash drivers paid over
323. Fitbit Transcript, supra note 315, at 10, 15.
324. Brief for Respondents at 54, Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013)

(No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025.
325. This could either be due process generally or the due process protocols of the specific

326.

327.
328.

329.

arbitral forum. See generally, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL:
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1998), https://perma.cc/R6JP-AZYV; AM. ARB. ASS’N,
EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), https://perma.cc/3Q3M-RDEL.
Judge John Kane of the District of Colorado recognized that these arguments go to
enforceability in the Chipotle mass arbitration. When Chipotle requested to stay the
individual arbitration proceedings that followed its successful motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration, Judge Kane wrote: “Chipotle challenged whether the Arbitration
Plaintiffs were proper members of the collective, and . . . I agreed and dismissed them
[pursuant to Chipotle’s arbitration agreement]. I refused to interfere with the
arbitration proceedings of individuals who were dismissed from this litigation . . . .”
Turner v. Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., No. 14-cv-02612, 2018 WL 11314702, at *2 (D. Colo.
Nov. 20, 2018) (footnote omitted).
See Abadilla Petition for Arbitration, supra note 5, ¶¶ 18, 21.
Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he AAA
informed Postmates that it had until May 31, 2019, to pay its share of the filing fees . . .
which was $1,900 per claimant . . . .”), aff ’d, 823 F. App’x 535 (9th Cir. 2020);
Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that the
applicable AAA rules required DoorDash to pay $1,900 per filing and claimants $300
per filing).
Frankel, supra note 12.
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$1.2 million in arbitration fees, Doordash refused to pay the $12 million it
owed to the AAA. The AAA accordingly closed over 6,000 demands.330 As of
April 2019, Postmates owed—and refused to pay—$10 million in fees.331 The
Northern District of California declined to relieve Postmates of those fees,332
and Postmates’ potential debt grew as more demands were filed.333 Postmates
continued its refusal to pay and instead tried to settle its mass-arbitration
claims by way of a class action.334 By December 2020, Intuit had paid $13
million to the AAA but still faced $23 million in additional fees.335
Even small-scale mass arbitrations can generate significant up-front fees.
In a confidential mass arbitration waged by Nichols Kaster on behalf of 150
employees with FLSA wage-and-hour claims, for instance, the defendant’s
filing costs alone could have been over $850,000.336 Accordingly, it does not
take many claims for mass arbitration’s fee-leveraging mechanism to begin
generating settlement pressure. If the Chipotle mass arbitration is any
indication, it might only take about 150 cases to generate significant pressure
for all claims.337
330. Abernathy, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.
331. See Adams v. Postmates, Inc., No. 19-cv-03042, 2020 WL 1066980, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,

2020).
332. Id. at *6.
333. Alison Frankel, Beset by Arbitration Demands, Postmates Resorts to Class Action to Settle

334.

335.
336.

337.

Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2019, 3:04 PM), https://perma.cc/Q4SM-2PEC
(reporting that Keller Lenkner told Postmates it was “signing more [claimants] every
day” and that Postmates’ arbitration fees “would exceed $20 million”); see also
Declaration of Dhananjay S. Manthripragada in Support of Postmates’ Opposition to
Cross-Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration ¶ 45, Postmates Inc. v. 10,356
Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783, 2021 WL 540155 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 57
(noting that the AAA assessed over $4 million in filing fees against Postmates for a
different set of arbitration demands).
Alison Frankel, After Postmates Again Balks at Arbitration Fees, Workers Seek Contempt
Order, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://perma.cc/26UZ-75ME (“Postmates came
up with a tactic to short-circuit the mass arbitration campaign: Its counsel . . .
negotiated an $11.5 million class action settlement in California state court that
purports to resolve the claims of all of its California couriers.”); see also Frankel, supra
note 333.
Alison Frankel, Judge Breyer Rejects $40 Million Intuit Class Action Settlement amid
Arbitration Onslaught, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2020, 2:09 PM), https://perma.cc/363Y-U8ME.
Matthew C. Helland, Costs of Defense in Mass Individual Wage-and-Hour Arbitrations: A
Case Study, 3 PLI CURRENT 213, 213, 218-19 (2019) (“The plaintiffs had filed 106
arbitration demands at the time of mediation, meaning the defendant had paid (or
owed) over $626,000 to JAMS just in initial filing costs. If mediation had failed and the
remaining plaintiffs had all filed their claims, the defendant would have owed JAMS
another $226,200 in initial filing fees.”); see also id. at 219 (noting that fully arbitrating
the FLSA claims could have cost the defendant upwards of $3 million).
Following the dismissal of nearly 3,000 Chipotle employees from an FLSA collective
action on the grounds that those employees were required to arbitrate their claims,
footnote continued on next page
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Avoiding the enforcement of arbitration agreements “according to their
terms” is so consequential that both Family Dollar and Uber have sued the
AAA for carrying out their arbitration provisions.338 Filing suit against an
arbitral forum that you yourself selected is a bold and significant move. As
such, these suits warrant brief examination here.
In Family Dollar’s complaint against the AAA, it contended that its
arbitration agreements could not be enforced in the context of a wage-theft
mass arbitration because “[m]ass arbitration . . . with little regard of the claims’
validity is not a proper use of the arbitration system where the arbitration
filing fees may far exceed the merits of the claim.”339 Through this contention
Family Dollar made two arguments. First, it asserted that the claimants’
arbitration filings were “invalid.” This invalidity was largely procedural:
Family Dollar did not dispute the substantive merits of the claimants’ wagetheft allegations.340 Instead, Family Dollar’s “validity” argument was that some
of the individual filings were defective—they were filed in the wrong arbitral
forum, were untimely filed, were not tendered to Family Dollar first, did not
include precise damages amounts, and so on.341 Indeed, as Family Dollar
pointed out, some of the demands were in fact withdrawn as invalid.342 (The

338.

339.
340.

341.

342.

around 150 employees filed individual arbitration demands. Turner v. Chipotle Mex.
Grill, Inc., No. 14-cv-02612, 2018 WL 11314701, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2018); Dave
Jamieson, Chipotle’s Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are Backfiring Spectacularly,
HUFFPOST (updated Dec. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z9QJ-XWV7. Faced with these
demands, Chipotle “squeal[ed] for mercy,” Michael Hiltzik, Chipotle May Have
Outsmarted Itself by Blocking Thousands of Employee Lawsuits over Wage Theft, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM PT), https://perma.cc/N488-3FRB, and asked the district court to
suspend arbitration proceedings lest Chipotle suffer “irreparable harm,” Turner v.
Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., No. 14-cv-02612, 2018 WL 11314702, at *1, *3 (D. Colo.
Nov. 20, 2018). Judge Kane rejected Chipotle’s arguments. Id. at *3.
Family Dollar Complaint, supra note 263; Declaratory Judgment Complaint, Uber
Techs., Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, No. 655549/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 20, 2021) [hereinafter
Uber Complaint].
Family Dollar Complaint, supra note 263, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
Although Family Dollar claimed that it “never employed many of the claimants and
had no arbitration agreement with them,” this does not go to the substance of the
wage-theft claims. See Family Dollar, Inc.’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss
American Arbitration Association, Inc.’s Counterlaim [sic] at 3-4, Fam. Dollar, Inc. v.
Am. Arb. Ass’n, No. 20-cv-00248 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2020), ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Family
Dollar Motion to Dismiss].
See Family Dollar Complaint, supra note 263, ¶¶ 1, 10-12. Among other things, Family
Dollar asserted that (1) many of the agreements enforced by the AAA actually required
claimants to arbitrate before JAMS; (2) some parties to the enforced agreements had
already released their claims through prior settlements or bankruptcies; and (3) some
claimants had not agreed to arbitrate with Family Dollar. Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
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others were unilaterally withdrawn pursuant to a settlement agreement.)343
Because of these withdrawals, Family Dollar argued, it should not be
responsible for a single penny of the more than $2.5 million in filing fees
assessed by the AAA.344
Second, Family Dollar argued that mass arbitration itself was improper
because the filing fees could “far exceed the merits of the claim[s].”345 At a
surface level, this is a new argument in that it comes close to a broadside on
mass arbitration in general. Family Dollar’s assertion that filing arbitration
demands “with little regard of the claims’ validity is not a proper use of
arbitration”346 strongly suggests that mass arbitration is a practice divorced
from the merits. Fundamentally, though, Family Dollar’s argument—that its
filing fees improperly exceeded the value of the underlying demands—is the
same argument that was raised by the plaintiffs in Italian Colors.347 The Eastern
District of Virginia never had the chance to rule on Family Dollar’s arguments;
Family Dollar and the AAA reached a settlement agreement in December
2020.348
In September 2021, Uber moved for a preliminary injunction against the
AAA in New York state court349—and lost.350 In both its complaint and its
motion, Uber argued that the AAA’s assessment of $10 million in initial fees
(and possibly $91 million in total fees) constituted a “ransom” coordinated by
“politically-motivated lawyers” who were filing “baseless claims.”351 After a
343. Id.
344. Id. ¶¶ 1-2; see also Family Dollar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 340, at 1-2 (“Family

345.
346.
347.
348.

349.

350.
351.

Dollar does not owe [the] AAA anything.”). The $2.5 million represents a fee of $2,200
for 1,166 of the roughly 2,000 total claimants. Family Dollar Complaint, supra note 263,
¶¶ 1, 15-16.
Family Dollar Complaint, supra note 263, ¶ 1.
Id.
See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
Settlement Conference Order ¶ 1, Fam. Dollar, Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, No. 20-cv-00248
(E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2020) (scheduling a settlement conference for December 2, 2020);
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Fam. Dollar, Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n,
No. 20-cv-00248 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2020).
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Uber Techs., Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, No. 655549/2021, 2021 WL 4789153
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Uber Motion].
Uber Techs., 2021 WL 4789153, at *2-3, aff ’d, 167 N.Y.S.3d 66 (App. Div. 2022).
Uber Complaint, supra note 338, ¶¶ 1, 5; see Uber Motion, supra note 349, at 1-2. Uber
alleged that the fees were part of an effort by politically conservative D.C. firm
Consovoy McCarthy to “punish Uber for supporting the Black community in the
wake of George Floyd’s murder.” Uber Complaint, supra note 338, ¶¶ 1, 3, 46. The firm
“sought out and acquired clients—tens of thousands of them—and filed boilerplate,
single-sentence arbitration demands against Uber, asserting a type of ‘reverse
discrimination’ claim.” Id. ¶ 3.
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two-day hearing, New York State Supreme Court Justice Robert Reed ruled
that while there may be “a more reasonable path” to handling 31,000 claims
than individual arbitration, Uber’s arbitration agreement did not provide for
such a path, and it was not for the court to rewrite Uber’s contract.352 Justice
Reed seemed persuaded by AAA counsel Theodore Hecht, who “lampooned
Uber’s claim that it was a victim faced with a ransom.”353 If anything, Hecht
noted, Uber was “hostage to [its] own agreement.”354
In the above suits, both Uber and Family Dollar leaned heavily into the
following argument: The assessment of fees pursuant to a valid arbitration
agreement is improper because the claims at issue are meritless. However,
whether claims have merit and what process can decide whether claims have
merit are separate issues. In their contracts with consumers and employees,
Family Dollar and Uber designed the process for litigating claims, including
the process by which the merits of claims would be evaluated.355 The Family
Dollar and Uber complaints took issue with the processes for determining
validity and merit—the very processes Uber and Family Dollar specified.
Effectively, then, the complainants were arguing against themselves.
* * *
In sum, the make-or-break event of a mass arbitration, at least in current
form, is the enforcement (or credibly threatened enforcement) of arbitration
agreements “according to their terms.” This event triggers the fee-leveraging
mechanism of mass arbitration, which can spell financial catastrophe for a
potential defendant.356 While many of the claims studied here appear quite
colorable,357 the fee-leveraging mechanism of the mass-arbitration model
352. Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Robert R. Reed at 136-39, Uber Techs.,

2021 WL 4789153 (No. 655549/2021).
353. Frank G. Runyeon, Uber Has Itself to Blame for $91M Arbitration Bill, Judge Says, LAW360

354.
355.

356.

357.

(Oct. 13, 2021, 7:54 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/9NPK-7WHV (to locate, select “View
the live page”).
Id. (quoting Hecht).
See, e.g., Andrew Strickler, Uber Wrote the Script It Now Attacks in Arbitration Suit,
LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2021, 1:00 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/9TSR-94WL (to locate, select
“View the live page”).
Even when the underlying claims have merit, the fee-leveraging mechanism tends to
extract a settlement premium deriving from the threat of cost imposition. See Glover,
supra note 132, at 1729 (“Economic models of litigation, as well as recent empirical
studies, strongly support the conclusion that litigation costs can significantly affect
settlement outcomes.”).
See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 931-32 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (rejecting a
proposed $12.25 million settlement of Lyft drivers’ misclassification claims because
counsel had underestimated the settlement value); Nandita Bose, U.S. Labor Secretary
Supports Classifying Gig Workers as Employees, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2021, 8:50 AM PDT),
https://perma.cc/JQ97-4Z3Y (noting that Secretary of Labor Marty Walsh believes “[a]
footnote continued on next page
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could impose settlement pressure for more dubious claims—that is to say, it
could impose illegitimate, in terrorem settlement pressure.358 The same has
been said of the class-certification event,359 which is perhaps the closest
analogue to the agreement-enforcement event in mass arbitration.360 But in
terrorem or otherwise, the settlement pressure created by class certification is
no match for the pressure that defendants created through their arbitration
agreements. Against this monster of the defendants’ own making, the class
action may begin to look like a safe harbor.361
2.

Arbitrating claims individually, or credibly threatening to do so

The second distinctive feature of the mass-arbitration model is that its
claims proceed individually rather than being merged into something like a
single class action or MDL consolidation. In other words, mass arbitration
eschews the strategy of class proceedings: the formal aggregation of claims to
make claiming cost-effective for plaintiffs. Mass arbitration instead proceeds
on the premise that plaintiffs can aggregate individual proceedings in a way
that makes the claims economically viable—perhaps even more viable than
class or otherwise consolidated proceedings.
Here, Intuit is illustrative. Claimants in the Intuit mass arbitration had
more valuable claims than similarly situated claimants in class proceedings, in
part because the mass-arbitration claimants could command a “premium to
reflect Intuit’s potential arbitration costs.”362 This premium would not have
existed without attorneys willing and able to arbitrate (or credibly threaten to
arbitrate) a meaningful number of individual cases.

358.

359.
360.

361.

362.

lot of gig workers . . . should be classified as ‘employees’ who deserve work benefits,” a
position that bolsters misclassification claims like Cotter’s).
Some of the attorneys I interviewed for this study indicated that firms have begun to
demand settlements without filing a class complaint or any arbitral demands, and on
the basis of fairly dubious claims. See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous No. 4, supra
note 42.
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 22, at 99 (describing the certification of a putative class as
the make-or-break event that has the power to impose a great deal of settlement
pressure on a defendant); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1298 (making the
same point).
Intuit, for example, attempted to negotiate a class settlement in order to “resolve” the
claims of individuals it had previously compelled to arbitrate. Presumably, Intuit
preferred a single class action to the settlement pressure imposed by the fees and costs
of many individual arbitrations. See Intuit Motion to Intervene, supra note 244, at 1-3,
12-13; see also, e.g., Randazzo, supra note 35.
Intuit Motion to Intervene, supra note 244, at 7 (quoting Declaration of Stephen McG.
Bundy in Support of Intuit’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction ¶ 3.f, Intuit Inc. v. 9,933 Individuals, No. 20STCV22761, 2020 WL 7866018
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2020)); see Glover, supra note 132, at 1729.
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More than any other, this feature of mass arbitration will likely strike
readers as counterintuitive. Conventional wisdom holds that the expense of
individual proceedings can make claims economically irrational to pursue.
Indeed, this wisdom not only bears out empirically but also lies at the core of
the arbitration revolution and the class-action counterrevolution.363 Mass
arbitration challenges the conventional wisdom in two key ways. First, it
challenges the long-standing premise that disaggregation disables claiming.
Second, it challenges the corollary of that premise: that those with negativevalue or low-value claims will fare better, as a matter of economics, in an
aggregated case than they will in a disaggregated one.364
Mass arbitration was able to challenge conventional wisdom regarding
aggregation (typically a claim facilitator) and disaggregation (typically a claim
disabler) for three interrelated reasons. First, as a general matter, litigating
many related claims on an individual basis is more expensive than litigating
many related claims in a single class action or a set of consolidated cases.365
Second, litigating many related claims on an individual basis in arbitration is
more expensive than litigating many related claims on an individual basis in
court, especially given that arbitral organizations impose fee after fee at just
about every stage of the proceedings.366 While defendants have insisted for
decades that arbitration is “cost-effective,”367 cost-effective is not the same as
363. See supra Part I.C.
364. Judges and commentators have long maintained that economy and efficiency are key

benefits of joinder and aggregation. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 28, at 236; Francis E.
McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1989)
(analyzing an asbestos suit and finding that “[t]he cost to the judicial system for the
class action approach in both time and money was substantially less than what an
equivalent number of individual trials would have generated, even taking into account
the supplemental judicial resources devoted to appeals, pre-trial matters, and
settlement negotiations”).
365. For recent commentary on the transaction-cost–leveraging feature of mass arbitration,
see Erin Mulvaney, Mandatory Arbitration at Work Surges Despite Efforts to Curb It,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 28, 2021, 10:01 AM), https://perma.cc/QDZ5-DLB9 (quoting
Cohen Milstein partner Joseph Sellers, who commented that while it is tempting for
companies “to use [arbitration] agreements to avoid class claims,” those companies
“may be forced to incur large amounts of transaction costs to handle multiple claims
that are very similar”).
366. Compare Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 241, at 1-3, and Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs,
supra note 241, with District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/
7QQ7-G2B4 (archived May 19, 2022).
367. For example, defendants argued that because arbitration reduced their spending on
class-action defense, they could pass along their savings to consumers in the form of
lower prices. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89. The argument changed in
and after Concepcion: Arbitration was now easier and less expensive for individuals
than judicial proceedings, particularly where defendants were contractually required
to pay arbitration fees. See, e.g., Concepcion Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 78,
footnote continued on next page
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inexpensive. And arbitration is very, very expensive.368 Third, and perhaps
most importantly, mass-arbitration attorneys have found ways to impose
arbitration’s expenses on defendants asymmetrically, thus driving up the
settlement value of individual claims.369 Simply put, mass arbitration shows
that when it comes to in terrorem effects (the bogeyman of the class-action
counterrevolution), the leverage of a large number of individual arbitrations
can sometimes exceed the leverage created by aggregate proceedings.
This study uncovered a number of ways in which mass-arbitration
attorneys can asymmetrically impose the costs of arbitration on corporate
defendants. First, by filing individual arbitration demands as opposed to a
single class-wide complaint (as required by some arbitration agreements),
mass-arbitration attorneys can harness fee-shifting provisions not just once,
but hundreds or thousands of times. This can quickly drive a defendant’s
arbitration costs into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.370
Second, as much as defendants may wish to remove the fee-shifting
provisions from their arbitration agreements,371 it is not clear to what extent
an adhesion contract requiring arbitration can shift costs to claimants.
California, for instance, restricts how far contracts of adhesion can go in
forcing a claimant to pay arbitration fees.372 Accordingly, although the issue

368.

369.

370.
371.

372.

at 1, 3-4, 12; Brief of Amicus Curiae New England Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioner at 10-11, 15-16, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)
(No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3232489.
In one instance, three arbitrations for wage theft against a Florida construction
company generated over $100,000 in costs to the employer. Hernandez v. Acosta
Tractors Inc., 898 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018); see also, e.g., Helland, supra note 336,
at 217 (“The defendant would certainly spend more than $49,000 in JAMS fees and
defense fees on each individual hearing.”); Michael Corkery, Amazon Ends Use of
Arbitration for Customer Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (updated Sept. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/
99U6-MQZ8 (“Just to hire the arbitrator and to get the process started for a single claim
cost Amazon about $2,900.”).
See generally Glover, supra note 132, at 1729-32, 1729 nn.58-60, 1730 n.63 (tracing how
the credible threat of litigation-cost imposition can either (1) drive settlement values
down if deployed asymmetrically by defendants; or (2) drive settlement values up if
deployed asymmetrically by plaintiffs). This point is critical, as arbitration costs are
not borne by the defendants alone. See, e.g., Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 241, at 1.
See infra Appendix.
Many defendants have already begun to do so. See infra Part IV.C.1 (noting that revised
agreements without fee-shifting provisions are already emerging and characterizing
these agreements as one of the biggest challenges to the sustainability of the massarbitration model).
See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687-89 (Cal. 2000)
(holding that, “when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment,” claimants cannot be required to pay fees unique to arbitration and in
excess of litigation costs). Some courts view Concepcion’s broad preemption holding to
undermine the Armendariz rule. See, e.g., James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020,
1033 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“The general Armendariz rule is in serious doubt following
footnote continued on next page
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will undoubtedly be litigated in the future, mass-arbitration attorneys can
challenge defendants’ efforts to avoid cost asymmetries through revised
contracts.
Third, mass-arbitration attorneys can rely on structural differences to
impose asymmetric costs on defendants.373 Corporate defendants tend to be
represented by large national or multinational firms—often more than one in a
single case—that earn profits by billing their clients by the hour. And do they
ever: These firms often assign many high-billing partners and associates to
each matter.374 Mass-arbitration claimants, on the other hand, are generally
represented by firms that seek to profit via a contingency percentage of any
recovery.375 While this arrangement carries more risk for counsel, claimants
themselves face far fewer litigation costs. In other words, hour by hour and
pound for pound, corporate defendants generally pay more for their lawyers
than mass-arbitration claimants do. Because defendants face high litigation
costs while claimants do not, defendants may be more inclined to settle and
avoid the paying for the litigation itself.376
Fourth, entrepreneurial attorneys pursuing the mass-arbitration model
can specifically select for remedial schemes with fee-shifting provisions and
statutory damages.377 Bringing claims under these schemes can introduce feeleveraging mechanisms beyond those described above, driving up settlement
pressure, settlement values, and individual payouts.
3.

Selecting higher-threshold-value claims

The threshold value required for a claim to be marketable in the massarbitration model is typically higher than the threshold value required for a
class-action or MDL claim. This is true for two reasons. First, the initial

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Concepcion. . . . To the extent Armendariz precludes arbitration in any employment
dispute if the employee is required to bear any type of expense not present in litigation,
it appears preempted . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Mercado v. Drs. Med. Ctr. of Modesto,
Inc., No. F064478, 2013 WL 3892990, at *6-7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2013) (noting that
Concepcion and Italian Colors “cast doubt on the continued validity of . . . Armendariz”).
The law on Armendariz, however, is not settled. See, e.g., Fred W. Alvarez, Enforcement
of California-Based Employment Arbitration Agreements, in ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS:
ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION (2013), Westlaw SU033 ALI-CLE 1279
(cautioning employers to “comply with Armendariz until the law is more settled”). The
Supreme Court has not confronted the Armendariz rule directly. The Court quoted
Armendariz for the basic definition of unconscionability in Concepcion, but it did not
otherwise mention the case. See 563 U.S. at 340.
See Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
See Interview with Anonymous No. 2, supra note 41.
See Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
See Glover, supra note 132, at 1729-32.
See infra Appendix.
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investment required to collect, process, and file claims for a mass arbitration
exceeds that required for a class action or MDL consolidation. Second, the
economies of scale achieved by the class-action device and MDL are not
present to the same degree in mass arbitration.378 These differences are a
significant source of leverage in the mass-arbitration model.379 The price of
that leverage, however, is that mass-arbitration claims must often be worth
more to make economic sense.
Firms often use an individual-recovery threshold to determine whether
mass-arbitration claims are marketable. Although the precise threshold varies
by firm (given risk tolerance) and remedial scheme (given differences in fee
shifting and penalties), it generally starts in the high hundreds for some firms
and rises to a few thousand dollars for others.380 Anything below the highhundred mark would almost certainly not be economically viable in mass
arbitration, even if the firm carefully crafted a flat-fee structure.381
The range above may actually be conservative. Most mass-arbitration
claims arise under remedial schemes that include some combination of
statutory damages, treble damages, and fee shifting.382 And the claims most
suitable for mass arbitration typically require minimal discovery or rely on
uniform proof, thereby enabling claimants to spread evidentiary costs.383
Without these generous remedial schemes and limitations on discovery and
proof, firms’ thresholds could be driven even higher.
The fact that mass-arbitration claims require a higher threshold value to
be deemed marketable is apparent in the potential Fitbit mass arbitration.
Fitbit is an example of what this Article terms a mass-arbitration claimmarketability failure. The case began as a putative class action for consumer
fraud, arising out of allegations that Fitbit’s inaccurate heart-rate monitoring
was misleading and posed serious health and safety risks to consumers.384
These allegations were supported by independent studies, including a study

378. See supra Part III.B.2.
379. See supra Part III.C.2.
380. See, e.g., Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40; Interview with Jonathan D.

381.
382.
383.

384.

Selbin, supra note 41. Note that these figures take current fee-leveraging mechanisms
into account.
Even a 40% flat fee on $60 claims would not be profitable under the mass-arbitration
model.
See infra Appendix.
See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 268 (noting that, in the potential mass arbitration against
DirecTV, the underlying legal question for all claimants is simply whether DirecTV
improperly disclosed a data file).
See McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 16-cv-00036, 2017 WL 4551484, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11,
2017).
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done by the Cleveland Clinic.385 The district court granted Fitbit’s motion to
compel arbitration,386 and the named plaintiff, Kate McLellan, decided to
arbitrate her claim. Lieff Cabraser, counsel for the Fitbit plaintiff class,
subsequently determined that the other claims (which ranged in value from
$20 to $80) were not marketable in a mass arbitration.387 This was so even
though the claims had been marketable in the original class action. While the
details of McLellan’s arbitration proceedings are confidential, both the fact of
the arbitration and the studies mentioned above suggest that the claims had
merit. Accordingly, it is likely accurate to say that Fitbit’s arbitration clause,
and Fitbit’s arbitration clause alone, eliminated the remaining consumer
claims.388
4.

Generating aggregate settlements from individual claims

If settlements in litigation are a black box,389 settlements in arbitration are
a black hole.390 Under nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in many settlement
contracts, claimants may be deemed ineligible for payouts if they share any
information about their claim or the settlement.391 Moreover, for some mass
arbitrations there are no records of the settlement—or even of the claims.
These “secret” or “shadow” mass arbitrations are off the books, either for an
extended period of time or entirely. This typically occurs for one of two
reasons: Either (1) claims are filed in fora that do not keep public records; or
(2) claims are settled prior to the filing of any demands.
Secrecy notwithstanding, this study revealed a number of details about
settlements in mass arbitration. To date, there is no formalized procedural
structure for mass-arbitration settlements. For all the time defendants spent
385. See Robert Wang, Gordon Blackburn, Milind Desai, Dermot Phelan, Lauren Gillinov,

386.
387.
388.

389.

390.
391.

Penny Houghtaling & Marc Gillinov, Research Letter, Accuracy of Wrist-Worn Heart
Rate Monitors, 2 JAMA CARDIOLOGY 104, 104 (2017).
McLellan, 2017 WL 4551484, *5.
Interview with Jonathan D. Selbin, supra note 41.
See id. This findings in this Subpart align with David Horton and Andrea Cann
Chandrasekher’s conclusion that “very few individuals bother to arbitrate minor
grievances” post-Concepcion. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 210, at 116-19. In
this regard our studies reinforce one another: Arbitration—mass or otherwise—does
not tend to capture low-value claims.
See Glover, supra note 132, at 1745-50; see also, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Essay, Law in the
Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957,
974-77 (2010).
See Estlund, supra note 38, at 682.
Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40; see, e.g., u/steezefabreeze, Hey All!: I’ve
Received an Email from Keller Lenkner, REDDIT: R/POSTMATES (June 8, 2021, 5:19:14 PM
PDT), https://perma.cc/V4FL-JJHH; see also Interview with Nancy Erika Smith, supra
note 41 (discussing how NDAs can force information “out of the light of day”).
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designing their arbitration contracts, they spent little time designing or
designating post-dispute settlement structures. That makes sense, of course:
The one-off arbitral demands anticipated by defendants hardly called for a
complex settlement regime. More to the point, given that the goal of the
arbitration revolution was to eliminate claim resolution, spending time on
claim-resolution structures would have seemed irrational.
Yet even without formal structures for settlement, global settlements in
mass arbitrations are happening.392 In some mass arbitrations, the parties
attempt to settle after a number of demands are filed or arbitrated on an
individual basis.393 To the extent that demands are arbitrated, they function
like bellwether trials in mass-tort MDLs: The individual results help create a
global deal aimed at resolving the remaining claims.394 Other mass arbitrations
involve few (if any) filings or individual proceedings prior to settlement; still
others do not get past the threat of mass filings before settlement talks ensue.
Regardless of how many demands are actually filed or arbitrated, massarbitration defendants generally agree to global settlements given claimant fee
leveraging and the expense and risk of claims. This is true even if fees have
already been paid.
Investigation reveals three additional trends. First, even global deals in
mass arbitration must be effectuated on an individual basis. As a de facto
matter, the aggregate-settlement consent requirement of Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8 operates in the background of the mass-arbitration
settlement process.395 Second, global settlements in mass arbitration often
hinge on the participation of a prespecified supermajority of claimants.396
Finally, while the claimants’ firm is ultimately in charge of securing releases

392. See, e.g., Erin Mulvaney, DoorDash Got Its Arbitration Wish, Costing Millions Upfront,

393.

394.
395.

396.

BLOOMBERG L. (updated Feb. 12, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://perma.cc/BN5Y-LK7V
(noting that “mass arbitration leads to settlements” (capitalization altered)).
See, e.g., Arena v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-02546, 2021 WL 834253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2021); see also Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40 (comparing the massarbitration process to a mass-tort process with test cases and global settlements).
See Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that an attorney
“who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate
settlement” unless each client provides informed consent); see Declaration of Richard
Zitrin in Support of Respondent DoorDash, Inc.’s Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order ¶¶ 1, 11-14, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 19cv-07545 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019), ECF No. 35-1 (“My own plaintiffs’ firm clients,
desirous of representing clients in mass action cases, were hamstrung by the hoops
they would have to jump through to do so ethically [as a result of Model Rule 1.8].”);
Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40 (noting that Model Rule 1.8 operates
unofficially in mass arbitration).
Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
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and distributing payouts, firms (at least for distribution) have tended to
contract with settlement administrators.397
The settlement amounts in mass arbitration have so far tended to be
substantial, both relative to class-action settlements for similar claims and on
their own terms. Indeed, some settlements have provided claimants with
awards approximating their actual damages. But while generous settlements
are the norm, there are exceptions. In the Family Dollar mass arbitration, for
instance, the highest settlement amount reported to date is $4,000.398 This is
less than what some employees believe they are owed for “years of poor
working conditions,” including having to sleep on cardboard boxes during
double and triple (unpaid) overtime shifts and having to contend with snakes
and lizards in breakrooms.399 It is worth noting, however, that Family Dollar
is an unusually intransigent litigant in many respects—including with regard
to settlement.400
By January 2021, just over three years after launching its practice, Keller
Lenkner had secured more than $200 million in settlements for claimants.401
(This number is rather astonishing given that mass arbitration only began in
earnest in 2018; one advantage that mass arbitration has over settlements and
trials in court is speed.)402 In the Intuit mass arbitration, claimants obtained
397. See, e.g., u/Majestic-Key2066, Keller Lenkner Settlement, REDDIT: R/POSTMATES (July 21,

398.

399.

400.

401.
402.

2021, 11:49:49 AM PDT), https://perma.cc/5B94-SWCZ (referencing KCC as the
settlement administrator hired by Keller Lenkner).
See Allana Akhtar, Family Dollar Workers Said They Put in 80-Hour Weeks and Slept on
Cardboard to Keep Stores Open, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://perma.cc/
K4FV-CVRE.
Id.; Jack Newsham & Peter Coutu, Family Dollar Forced Employees to Sign Arbitration
Agreements. Here’s What Happened When They Tried to Sue the Company over Unpaid
Wages., BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2021, 6:53 AM), https://perma.cc/F2LF-9QM2 (to locate,
select “View the live page”).
One claimant who spoke with journalists thought that her $400 settlement was low,
but she also reported that Family Dollar initially balked at her claim. Newsham &
Coutu, supra note 399. The claimant, Carrie Boles Lear, stated that she wished she had
fought harder in arbitration, but “Family Dollar took the position that she wasn’t
entitled to anything.” Id. An attorney who represented Family Dollar managers in a
2001 class-action suit noted that Family Dollar was “one of the most arrogant
companies I’ve ever dealt with in my 32 years of practicing law.” Id. (quoting Alabama
plaintiffs’ attorney Mark Petro).
Press Release, Keller Lenkner LLC, Keller Lenkner LLC Celebrates Third Anniversary
(Jan. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/SQ5K-SL8F.
For example, in 2018, 37,000 female managers reached a $45 million settlement with
Family Dollar over gender-discrimination claims. Scott v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc.,
No. 08-cv-00540, 2018 WL 1321048, at *1-2, *5 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2018); Katherine
Peralta, Family Dollar Agrees to Pay $45 Million to Settle Long-Running Gender Bias
Lawsuit, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (updated Mar. 29, 2018, 9:57 AM),
https://perma.cc/PG4A-UUZM (to locate, select “View the live page”) (reporting that
the settlement purported to resolve the claims of 37,000 plaintiffs). That settlement
footnote continued on next page
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settlement offers for 100% of their out-of-pocket damages for each year they
had a claim.403 The only public disclosure of mass-arbitration settlement
specifics—contained in a 2019 free writing prospectus Uber filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—reveals that Uber had reserved
$132 million for anticipated settlements with 60,000 of its drivers who had
filed individual arbitration demands.404 Uber estimated that its ultimate
liability to these drivers would fall somewhere between $146 million and $170
million.405 And although FairShake is (largely) a different model of mass
arbitration,406 it reports similarly high settlement figures: Consumers who
settled with “major corporations” like AT&T and Comcast using FairShake’s
platform received an average of $700.407 Finally, reviewing (confidential)
individual settlement data reinforces the findings in this Subpart and
Part III.C.3 above: The average value of mass-arbitration claim marketability
starts in the high hundreds, and a number mass-arbitration payouts track
claimants’ actual damages.408 That being said, mass arbitration is simply too
new of a practice (involving too few defendants, too few claim types, and too
few firms) and settlement data too difficult to obtain to draw anything more
than tentative conclusions about mass-arbitration settlement amounts.
Given generally high settlement values, it is perhaps not surprising that
defendants have erected a number of hurdles to the distribution of massarbitration settlements. Although the precise details must again be kept
confidential, some generalized examples are illustrative. For one, defendants
often include provisions in arbitration agreements and settlement releases

403.
404.
405.

406.
407.

408.

was the product of ten years of class-wide litigation, Scott, 2018 WL 1321048, at *1, and
the underlying lawsuit dated back to 2002, Peralta, supra. Claimants in the Family
Dollar mass arbitration, in contrast, got checks in under two years. See Newsham &
Coutu, supra note 399.
See Intuit Motion to Intervene, supra note 244, at 6.
Uber Techs., Inc., Free Writing Prospectus (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/L9M6DZAP.
Id. DoorDash did not disclose specific numbers in its 2021 SEC registration statement,
but it nonetheless warned that mass-arbitration settlements posed a financial risk to
the company. See DoorDash, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 54 (Nov. 13,
2020), https://perma.cc/3XSU-D4S3 (“It is possible that a resolution of one or more
such [arbitration] proceedings could result in substantial . . . settlement costs . . . that
could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”).
See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
Alison DeNisco Rayome, Overcharged by a Tech Company? New Service Could Help Get
Your Money Back, CNET (Mar. 3, 2020, 7:00 AM PT), https://perma.cc/H5KT-WV3J
(“The FairShake platform uses AI to resolve customer claims with major corporations
within two months, with a typical settlement of $700.”); see also Weiss, supra note 291
(discussing FairShake settlements in the context of Comcast and AT&T); Corkery &
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 34 (same).
Individual settlement data is on file with the Author.
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warning claimants that they will forfeit their payouts if they share any
information about the settlement.409 For another, defendants have sought to
impose various artificial conditions on settlement payouts. In one case, a
defendant mailed claimants a nondescript postcard containing a unique
“settlement ID” and then insisted that claimants present this ID in order to
resolve their claims. If a claimant could not locate her ID—even if she could
provide other proof of settlement eligibility—her claim would be forfeited.410
Similarly, some defendants have tried to require wet signatures for all
settlement documents; others have insisted that those wet signatures be
tendered in person. Still others have demanded that all signatures be wet and
sometimes even notarized.411
Finally, many defendants have tried to avoid mass-arbitration settlement
altogether. In November 2019, Postmates (unsuccessfully) attempted to settle
its wage-theft litigation for $11.5 million in California court; the settlement
purported to resolve all claims by Postmates’ California couriers, many of
whom were already in arbitration.412 In February 2020, DoorDash offered to
resolve all wage-theft claims brought by its drivers through a $39.5 million
state-court class-action settlement.413 Northern District of California Judge
William Alsup declined to stay federal proceedings pending the settlement’s
approval, stating that he would not bless DoorDash’s “hypocrisy” regarding

409. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
410. See Interview with Travis Lenkner & Warren Postman, supra note 40; Interview with

Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
411. See Interview with Travis Lenkner & Warren Postman, supra note 40; Interview with

Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40. But cf. Interview with Jonathan E. Paikin, supra note 42
(indicating that some of these formalities may be necessary to vet the underlying
claims).
412. See Frankel, supra note 334. In August 2021, San Francisco County Superior Court
Judge Suzanne Bolanos granted preliminary approval to a revised settlement that
increased the deal to $32 million and included new opt-out procedures for couriers.
Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2, Postmates
Classification Cases, No. CJC-20-005068 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2021); see Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised
Class Action Settlement at 3-5, Rimler v. Postmates, Inc., No. CGC-18-567868 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2020) (laying out the revised settlement terms).
413. “DoorDash never expected that so many would actually seek arbitration. Instead, in
irony upon irony, DoorDash now wishes to resort to a class-wide lawsuit, the very
device it denied to the workers, to avoid its duty to arbitrate.” Abernathy v. DoorDash,
Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Alison Frankel, “This Hypocrisy Will Not
Be Blessed”: Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Feb. 11,
2020, 4:10 PM), https://perma.cc/7LRR-B2L9 (reporting that “[i]nstead of paying the
requisite AAA fees” of $12 million, DoorDash tried to use a pending state-court class
action—“a case in which [it had] once attempted to compel arbitration”—to settle its
couriers’ claims for $39.5 million).
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arbitration.414 And in November 2020, Intuit agreed to a $40 million class
settlement that purported to settle all claims against it, including those that
were in arbitration.415 Northern District of California Judge Charles Breyer
refused to approve the settlement.416 Intuit, Judge Breyer noted, was being
“hoisted by [its] own petard.”417
IV. Contemporaneous and Future Developments
Part III showed that mass arbitration is a distinct business model and a
distinct form of aggregate dispute resolution. A mass-arbitration model, if you
can keep it.418
This Part examines three significant ways in which the mass-arbitration
model must adapt. First, mass arbitration will require smaller firms to scale up,
rapidly and exponentially, both to comply with the ethical obligations of
individual representation and to cope with the increasing demands of mass
individual claiming. Second, mass arbitration will likely require scaled-up
arbitral fora to handle growing claim volume. Third, mass arbitration must
cope with and adapt to revised arbitration agreements—and where necessary,
challenge the legality of those revised contracts.
A. Scaled-Up Mass-Arbitration Firms
A viable aggregate dispute resolution practice must be able to retain its
clients. Ouster of counsel based on firm rivalries has long been a feature of
aggregate dispute resolution given the vast sums of money at stake;419 mass
414. Abernathy, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1067-68 (“This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by

this order.”).
415. See Arena v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-02546, 2021 WL 834253, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
416.
417.

418.

419.

2021).
Id. at *1.
Transcript of Proceedings at 10, Intuit, 2021 WL 834253 (No. 19-cv-02546), ECF No. 206
(“I did think when I looked at this, and saw that, really, that this was a way to avoid or
otherwise circumscribe arbitration, that it seemed to be that Intuit was . . . hoisted by
[its] own petard.”).
With regards (and apologies) to Benjamin Franklin. As delegates left Independence
Hall in 1787 following the Constitutional Convention, Franklin was asked: “Doctor,
what have we got? A republic or a monarchy?” “A republic,” Franklin supposedly
replied, “if you can keep it.” See Gillian Brockell, “A Republic, if You Can Keep It”: Did Ben
Franklin Really Say Impeachment Day’s Favorite Quote?, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2019,
6:36 PM EST), https://perma.cc/RK86-WMQJ.
For example, the adequacy objection that helped destroy the settlement class in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607-08, 625-28 (1997), was brought by
Fred Baron, a plaintiffs’ attorney whose asbestos-heavy portfolio would have been
eliminated by the Amchem settlement. See Linda S. Mullenix, Standing and Other
Dispositive Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of “Logically Antecedent”
footnote continued on next page
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arbitration is not meaningfully different in this regard. This dynamic was at
play, for instance, during Intuit’s attempt to settle mass-arbitration claims out
from under mass-arbitration counsel by way of a class that purported to
include the arbitration claimants.420 Indeed, the Intuit story is just as much
about Intuit trying to cripple a mass arbitration as it is about rival plaintiffs’
firms trying to collect hefty fees for themselves by engineering a reverseauction class settlement.421
It is defense-initiated attempts to oust counsel, however, that have so far
dominated the mass-arbitration landscape. A number of defendants have tried
to disqualify mass-arbitration firms—especially Keller Lenkner—from
representing clients in mass-arbitration proceedings. Importantly, defendants
have sought to disqualify these firms based on key features of the massarbitration model.
For example, some defendants have argued that Keller Lenkner’s
representation of many individual claimants violates ethical constraints on
group representation, particularly given the firm’s small size.422 Keller
Lenkner has responded to this concern by disclosing its relationships with
other law firms, including Quinn Emanuel and Troxel Law.423 And while
courts have recognized the concern in a few mass-arbitration rulings, it
generally has not been sufficient to warrant disqualification.424 Nonetheless,

420.
421.

422.
423.
424.

Inquiries, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 703, 713 (observing that the Amchem objectors were
represented by Baron’s firm); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part
II: Litigation and Legitimacy 1981-1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1823-24 (2018) (noting
that asbestos class actions “jeopardized fee-generating relationships individual tort
lawyers had with their clients,” and describing Baron as “[i]mplacably and bitterly
opposed to an asbestos class action”—so much so that he “spent $4.5 million fighting
major asbestos class settlements”).
See supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
The notion of a reverse-auction class settlement is well understood and well traced in
the scholarly literature and in class-action jurisprudence. A reverse-auction class
settlement is one that is results when a defendant harnesses the competition among
plaintiffs’ firms for control of the class litigation (and, by extension, associated
attorney’s fees), with the lowest bidder among the firms “winning” the right to settle
with the defendant. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1995) (explaining the reverse-auction
phenomenon); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282-83, 289 (7th Cir.
2002) (reversing the district court’s approval of a class settlement in part because the
settlement could have been the product of a reverse auction).
See, e.g., Intuit Opposition to Motion, supra note 246, at 1-2, 6-7.
See CenturyLink Postman Declaration, supra note 248, ¶ 7.
See, e.g., In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec. Litig., No. 17-md-02795, 2020 WL
3513547, at *7-8, *10-11 (D. Minn. June 29, 2020); see also, e.g., Arena v. Intuit Inc.,
No. 19-cv-02546, 2021 WL 834253, at *4, *7-11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021) (noting that
Keller Lenkner may not be “looking out for its clients’ best interests” but rejecting a
proposed settlement on other grounds).
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Keller Lenkner has reacted to the defendants’ arguments by scaling up—and
scaling up fast. The firm now has more than 100 employees, a full clientservices department, and an advanced technology apparatus.425 And at least
according to its attorneys, the firm is willing and able to litigate as many
arbitration demands as possible, as quickly as possible.426 Although defense
attorneys still believe Keller Lenkner lacks the staffing necessary to pursue
thousands of individual demands,427 it is clear that mass arbitration will
require large, well-resourced firms going forward.
It may also require many different firms. In addition to size-related
concerns, defendants have tried to leverage procedural posture—recall that
mass arbitrations often follow the stay (or dismissal) of a class or collective
action428—to disqualify counsel. Chipotle, for instance, said that law firms
representing plaintiffs dismissed from a wage-and-hour collective action
should not be allowed to represent those plaintiffs in arbitration.429 By
encouraging claimants to (initially) pursue their claims in court, Chipotle
argued, the firms had compromised their clients’ interests.430 The District of
Colorado rejected this argument.431 But had Chipotle succeeded, new firms
would have needed to step in and fill the gap.
Disqualification motions are not just a tactic in mass arbitration; they are
common across the aggregate dispute resolution landscape.432 Accordingly,
defendants will almost certainly file these motions against mass-arbitration
firms in the future. Firms can fend off disqualification, at least in part, by
scaling up. And in the meantime, having many mass-arbitration firms will
allow claims to continue even if disqualification motions succeed.
B. Scaled-Up Arbitral Fora
The sustainability of the mass-arbitration model also depends on arbitral
fora that can expeditiously handle a large volume of claims. The ability to
arbitrate claims individually (or credibly threaten to do so) is not just a
425. See CenturyLink Postman Declaration, supra note 248, ¶ 5; Interview with Warren

Postman, supra note 40.
See, e.g., Interview with Warren Postman, supra note 40.
See Interview with Anonymous No. 4, supra note 42.
See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs Bound by Chipotle’s
Arbitration Agreement at 21-23, Turner v. Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., No. 14-cv-02612,
2018 WL 11314701 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2018), ECF No. 172.
430. See id. at 22-23.
431. Turner, 2018 WL 11314701, at *7.
432. See, e.g., Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-05546, 2019 WL 144589, at
*1-2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019).
426.
427.
428.
429.

1362

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

function of a firm’s economic wherewithal; it is also a function of the
designated forum’s demand-processing capabilities. In more concrete terms,
arbitration fees are assessed as the proceeding progresses: There are unique
costs associated with filing, arbitrator retention, preliminary review, and so
on. If a defendant knows that arbitration proceedings will not realistically
move forward, a plaintiffs’ firm—even one with the means to bring thousands
of claims—will not be able to leverage fees.433
Arbitral fora, then, must also scale up. The speed at which these fora
operate is not suitable for mass arbitration today. In the Postmates mass
arbitration, for example, assigning arbitrators to fifty individual cases took
over three months.434 As Postmates put it, the “AAA is [just not] equipped to
handle that many arbitrations at the same time.”435
An individual mass-claiming model could never function in the taxpayerfunded, resource-strapped court system. The AAA or JAMS, however, could
easily handle $50 million worth of claims across a large set of individual
proceedings.436 Scaling up these fora, then, is largely a matter of logistics.437
But the fora must also have an incentive to grow, and that incentive likely
depends on whether mass arbitrations will stay in front of AAA and JAMS
arbitrators. This is significant, as both the AAA and JAMS have reason to
suspect mass arbitrations could go elsewhere.
Because mass arbitration depends on the ability to actually litigate (or
threaten to litigate) claims, defendants might move arbitration proceedings
from heavily capitalized, large fora like the AAA and JAMS to small outfits
incapable of processing more than a few claims a year. Changes along these
lines would not only deter the AAA and JAMS from scaling up; they would
also hamstring mass arbitration’s settlement power in cases sent to smaller
fora. Corporate strategy here would most likely look similar to AT&T’s
strategy in Concepcion: point to the presumably “friendly” rules of the new
forum in hopes that the court will not notice (or care) that the forum is

433. See supra Parts III.C.1-.2.
434. Postmates Initial Complaint, supra note 273, ¶ 49 (“Although Postmates paid filing fees

for fifty arbitrations in December 2019, as of March 25, 2020, only 21 arbitrators had
been confirmed and only two arbitrators had conducted individual hearings.”).
435. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 43, Postmates Inc. v.
10,356 Individuals, No. 20-cv-02783 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020), ECF No. 7.
436. Because these private fora obtain funding through fees, they do not rely on taxpayer
dollars and are not subject to statutory resource limitations. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying note 351 (noting that a set of arbitration proceedings before the AAA
could cost Uber more than $90 million).
437. Indeed, both the AAA and JAMS have gotten better at handling mass arbitrations in
recent years. See Interview with Matthew C. Helland, supra note 40.
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literally incapable of processing claims.438 To date, corporations have not
taken this approach. Yet as the next Subpart explains, corporations have
attempted to achieve similar results by specifying defendant-friendly fora in
their revised agreements.
C. Revised Agreements
With their “friendly” arbitration agreements, corporate defendants may
well have been hoisted by their own petards.439 But defendants still have the
power: They drafted the agreements, which means they can change them. 440
Live by the sword, die by the sword.
Indeed, perhaps the most significant challenge to the future of mass
arbitration is revised arbitration agreements. This Subpart focuses on three
types of revisions with which the mass-arbitration model must cope: (1) the
elimination of fee-shifting provisions; (2) the insertion of “batching”
provisions; and (3) the insertion of provisions that move mass-arbitration
claims to defendant-friendly arbitral fora.
1.

Eliminating fee provisions

One judge has referred to mass arbitration’s leveraging of fee-shifting
provisions as “poetic justice.”441 Some take the view, however, that the price
tag of this particular justice—whatever its poetic force—might be a bit
excessive. Across the arbitration-services industry, organizations have
scrambled to adapt their protocols to mass arbitration. The AAA recently
adopted a sliding-scale fee schedule that reduces up-front filing fees as more
related claims are filed.442 And new arbitration outlets are engaged in fierce
competition with one another (not to mention the AAA) to cash in on what
they see as a mass-arbitration business opportunity. Some small arbitration
services—for instance, New Era ADR and FedArb—openly court businesses
with promises of cost savings by way of virtual platforms (New Era)443 or
438. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 103, at 800

439.
440.
441.

442.
443.

(noting that arbitration agreements like the one in Concepcion “typically offered a wide
variety of goodies to customers”).
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See Glover, supra note 75, at 3059; Fitzpatrick, supra note 152, at 176-79.
Transcript of Proceedings at 27, Abernathy v. Doordash, Inc., No. 19-cv-07545 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), ECF No. 67; see also, e.g., Michael E. McCarthy, Jeff E. Scott &
Robert J. Herrington, Stemming the Tide of Mass Arbitration, GREENBERG TRAURIG
(June 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/F3SK-LU9M.
See Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 244, at 1-3.
See Press Release, New Era ADR, Tech Startup New Era ADR Aims to Disrupt
Traditional Litigation and Dispute Resolution with New Business Platform (Apr. 20,
footnote continued on next page
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protocols designed to ease the burdens of mass arbitration (FedArb).444 In
October 2021, National Arbitration and Mediation issued a “customized fee
structure to address issues that have arisen as a result of mass filings of
arbitration demands in the Employment and Consumer arenas.”445
Whatever arbitral fora do with their fee schedules, many fee-shifting
provisions in arbitration contracts are not long for this world. In May 2021,
Gibson Dunn recommended that defendants rethink provisions committing
them to paying arbitration fees.446 Gibson Dunn further suggested that
companies add new fee-shifting provisions—this time shifting fees to the
plaintiffs—for claims deemed by an arbitrator to be frivolous.447 Scores of
companies have already changed their arbitration agreements to avoid
undesirable fee shifting.448 And some companies have gone even further,
battling to get their revised agreements applied retroactively.449
Mass-arbitration attorneys no doubt anticipated the removal of at least
some fee-shifting provisions. Fee leveraging at the current scale was always
going to be a one-time opportunity—essentially a chance to short sell on a
market error. As companies remove fee-shifting provisions and claimant
leverage begins to decrease, the mass-arbitration model will almost certainly

444.

445.

446.

447.
448.

449.

2021), https://perma.cc/GMC5-MCLB; see also Digital Arbitration, NEW ERA ADR,
https://perma.cc/YA8K-W4ZL (archived Aug. 23, 2022) (“[W]e made the entire
[arbitration] process fully digital and fully virtual so you can tell your story to an
experienced arbitrator from anywhere in the world.”).
FedArb promises a structure that “backends the administrative costs, . . . adjudicate[s]
the claims on a fixed cost basis[,] and . . . [uses] an MDL type procedure to deal with
common issues.” Alison Frankel, Another Arbitration Service—FedArb—Establishes
New Mass Arbitration Protocol 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/7CHS-YJK5 (quoting an
email statement from FedArb CEO Ken Hagen).
Press Release, Nat’l Arb. & Mediation, NAM Introduces a Customized Fee Structure for
Mass Arbitration Filings in the Employment and Consumer ADR Arenas (Oct. 20,
2021), https://perma.cc/HR8L-VJUL.
See Michael Holecek, As Mass Arbitrations Proliferate, Companies Have Deployed Strategies
for Deterring and Defending Against Them, GIBSON DUNN (May 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/WH45-7NLZ.
Id.
See Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40. Compare, e.g., Terms of Use ¶ 17,
TICKETMASTER, https://perma.cc/5MMJ-Y7V8 (archived May 19, 2022) [hereinafter
Ticketmaster 2022 Terms] (“If you commence an arbitration in accordance with the
Terms, you will be required to pay New Era ADR’s $300 filing fee.”), with Terms of Use,
TICKETMASTER (archived Oct. 1, 2013) (“We will reimburse [JAMS] fees for claims
totaling less than $10,000 . . . .”), reprinted in Exhibit 51 to Declaration of Kimberly
Tobias in Support of Defendants’ Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration,
Oberstein v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., No. 20-cv-03888, 2021 WL 4772885 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2021), ECF No. 85-51.
See Interview with Cory L. Zajdel, supra note 40.
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become less attractive to firms and third-party funders. Are the agreements
above, then, the death knell for mass arbitration?
Likely not. For one, individual arbitration is expensive even without fee
shifting. Defendants incur substantial arbitration costs beyond filing fees;
multiplied by 1,000 or 10,000, these costs are still sufficient to generate
significant settlement pressure.450 For another, established mass-arbitration
firms will not always need to front the filing fees for tens of thousands of
demands. In mass arbitration’s infancy, the fronting of fees was no doubt
necessary for firms to show that their threats were not empty. In 2018, a
defendant corporation may well have laughed at a new firm’s threat to file
12,500 demands and to advance 12,500 filing fees. Today, less so. For yet
another, current law imposes limits on the arbitration fees defendants can
force claimants to pay.451 Accordingly, companies trying to contract around
their fee obligations will likely find their agreements struck down on
unconscionability or effective-vindication grounds.452
Further, not all corporate defendants will remove fee-shifting provisions
from their arbitration agreements. Corporations with fewer resources, less
legal sophistication, or less flexibility (or some combination of the three) will
likely be less able to adapt. Companies that cannot quickly revise their
agreements—agreements essentially copied and pasted from AT&T (or a
450. See, e.g., Helland, supra note 336, at 217, 222; Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 241, at 2-3:

Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs, supra note 241; see also, e.g., Interview with
Anonymous No. 4, supra note 42 (noting that mass arbitration relies on the general
leveraging of arbitration fees); Interview with Travis Lenkner & Warren Postman,
supra note 40 (observing that, beyond just up-front fees, defendants have created an
expensive dispute-resolution process filled with transaction costs).
451. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687-89 (Cal. 2000); see
also supra note 372 and accompanying text. It is possible that the Supreme Court will
modify or reject the Armendariz rule; the rule’s validity has been central to recent
certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1-3, Winston & Strawn
LLP v. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 108 (2019) (No. 18-1437), 2019 WL 2140500.
452. Indeed, courts have already struck down agreements that improperly shift costs to
arbitration claimants. See, e.g., Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 687-89; Tillman v. Com. Credit
Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 368-73 (N.C. 2008) (holding an arbitration agreement
unconscionable in part because of its “loser pays” provision); Delta Funding Corp. v.
Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111-13 (N.J. 2006) (finding a provision allowing an arbitrator
“unfettered discretion to allocate the entire cost of arbitration to a consumer”
unconscionable under New Jersey law); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714
N.W.2d 155, 175-76, 175 n.62 (Wis. 2006) (citing Armendariz and invalidating an
arbitration provision that required short-term, high-interest loan recipients to pay a
filing fee of $125); see also Rizzio v. Surpass Senior Living LLC, 492 P.3d 1031, 1035
(Ariz. 2021) (noting that the “financial costs of arbitration [can] prohibit a plaintiff
from vindicating her rights,” particularly when the plaintiff cannot pay and the
arbitration agreement contains no hardship provision); S. 707, 2019 Leg. (Cal. 2019)
(affirming the Armendariz decision and imposing penalties on companies that do not
pay their arbitration fees).
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similar corporate entity) pursuant to general legal advice453—will almost
certainly be mass-arbitration defendants soon enough. The future of mass
arbitration will likely involve fewer claims against the biggest and most
sophisticated national corporations and more claims against less nimble
regional and local outfits. For these outfits, after all, the full range of feeleveraging mechanisms will remain available.
Of course, changes to fee schedules and the removal of fee-shifting
provisions will still be consequential. These shifts will force claimants and
firms to rely more on mass arbitration’s other features, including the
imposition of asymmetric costs through individual arbitration proceedings.
But even these other features are not safe: As the next Subpart explains,
defendants are also targeting asymmetric cost imposition.
2.

Inserting “batching” provisions

To reduce the settlement pressure imposed by the asymmetric costs of
individual arbitration proceedings,454 defendants have inserted “batching”
provisions into their agreements.455 In addition, arbitration outfits have
adopted mass-arbitration protocols that include batching.456 While precise
details vary across agreements and fora, the basic idea is that after a certain
number of legally and factually related demands are filed, those demands are
“batched” into a group for resolution in one proceeding.457 The “batch” then
gets assigned to an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, and it triggers a single
filing fee.458 Notably, some batching provisions exist alongside contractual
class-action waivers.459
Batching provisions may diminish the attractiveness of the massarbitration model by reducing its ability to use individual claiming to the
plaintiff’s advantage. Indeed, FedArb markets its batching protocol—under
which a panel of arbitrators conducts a single proceeding to resolve, in a
binding fashion, common pretrial issues—along these lines: “[T]here will be
453. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 103, at 820 n. 123.
454. See supra Part III.C.2.
455. See Holecek, supra note 446.
456. See infra notes 460, 464-66, 471 and accompanying text.
457. This resolution could be a general determination regarding common issues, or it could

be a set of decisions on the merits for a small group of test cases.
458. Holecek, supra note 446.
459. See, e.g., Terms of Use: Dispute Resolution ¶¶ III, VII, GRUBHUB, https://perma.cc/8RXHXL7M (archived May 19, 2022) (containing both a class-action waiver and a batching
provision, and stating that the batching provision “shall in no way be interpreted as
authorizing class arbitration of any kind”); Terms of Service (U.S.) ¶ 19(c), (g), DRIZLY,
https://perma.cc/6JWB-7YQ4 (archived May 19, 2022) (same).
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little need for individual arbitrations, thereby expediting payment and greatly
reducing costs—including the elimination of millions in arbitration fees.”460
Batching could accordingly put pressure on other parts of the massarbitration model, particularly the claim-value threshold.461 Batching ensures
that only easy-to-prove, near–slam-dunk cases will be economically attractive
for firms to pursue.462 As a result, claims of racial discrimination and sexual
harassment—which are typically of nominal value and present challenges
regarding proof—could be left out of the mass-arbitration equation.463
Despite the increase in batching provisions and protocols, it is not clear
that batching will be desirable in the long run. Batching is not guaranteed to
create efficiency or reduce costs, and batching provisions could ultimately
disadvantage both claimants and defendants in mass-arbitration proceedings.
By way of example, consider the CPR’s batching protocol. When more
than thirty employment demands of a “nearly identical nature” come before
the CPR, the CPR randomly selects ten demands to proceed as test cases.464
After the test cases have concluded, both sides enter into a mediation
process.465 If mediation does not produce a global resolution, the remaining
demands move forward either in arbitration or in court.466 The threat of
individual proceedings on the back end of mediation may incentivize both
parties to reach a global settlement based on the test cases—at least to the
extent those cases generated uniform results.467 This would be an efficient
outcome.
But this potentially desirable outcome is not required, and it does not
appear particularly inevitable given that the test cases are not binding or
precedential. Nonbinding bellwethers are not well poised to guard against
strategic holdout, where a party threatens inefficiency or delay to change the
460. Kennen D. Hagen, Mass Arbitrations, TODAY’S GEN. COUNS., Sept. 2021, at 12, 13. Hagen is

the CEO and president of FedArb. Id.
461. See supra Part III.C.3.
462. Because batching makes fee leveraging more challenging, the claims that are filed are

463.

464.
465.
466.
467.

more likely to move forward. The merits of those claims will therefore be more
important, and firms will be more selective in which claims they take on.
See Glover, supra note 132, at 1772 & n.221 (noting that “employment discrimination
cases often concern low-value claims held by low-wage earners”); infra notes 524-25
and accompanying text.
INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., WHAT IS THE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED
MASS CLAIMS PROTOCOL? 2-3 (2019), https://perma.cc/9ZDN-DVLN.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 1, 6-7.
Cf., e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 979-80 (1993) (noting that the
Bendectin mass-tort litigation “dwindled away” after a bellwether jury ruled against
the plaintiffs on causation).
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price of settlement.468 Even if the first ten claimants lost, for example, the
eleventh claimant could threaten to reject the defendant’s offer and proceed
with arbitration to drive up the settlement price.469 And even if those ten
claimants won, the defendant could still threaten to sabotage mediation and
opt out of arbitration to drive the settlement price down.470 These results
benefit neither party.
Even binding test cases may not solve the problem—at least not under
existing protocols. Unlike the CPR, New Era ADR provides for three
bellwether trials, the results of which are precedential in cases involving
common issues of law and fact.471 Three binding bellwethers could usher in a
global settlement without the challenges described above. But two additional
things must be true for this to occur, and neither seems particularly likely
under the New Era protocol. First, the findings and outcomes of the three
bellwethers must be in accord with one another. Each side selects one of the
bellwethers,472 however, meaning that the results could easily differ. Second,
the selected bellwethers must actually represent the mass of claims.473 With
only three bellwethers (two of which are selected by the parties), this seems
improbable at best.
More fundamentally, to the extent batching protocols shift the massarbitration model into a class-action or MDL model, it is not clear that this
shift would be preferable for either defendants or claimants. All else equal, if
defendants are stuck with an arbitration that looks like a class action or an
MDL consolidation, they would probably prefer to be in court. Indeed, court
proceedings are less expensive, provide for substantial judicial review, and

468. See, e.g., Alain Frécon, Delaying Tactics in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2004/Jan.

469.
470.
471.
472.

473.

2005, at 40, 46 (“Sometimes, a party seeks to delay arbitration . . . in the hope that the
other side will be forced to abandon the proceedings or agree to a settlement.”).
See INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., supra note 464, at 7.
See id. at 6-7.
Rules and Procedures ¶¶ 2(x)-(y), 6(b)(iii), NEW ERA ADR, https://perma.cc/FF5P-XNRA
(last updated Mar. 2, 2022).
Id. ¶ 6(b)(iii)(3)(b) (“Claimant(s), collectively on the one hand, and Respondent(s),
collectively on the other hand, will each select one ‘Bellwether Case’ from all the cases
that were filed.”).
That is, they must not offend long-standing notions of due process. See, e.g., In re
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the trial
court’s plan to use bellwether cases for settlement purposes, finding that the cases
“lack[ed] the requisite level of representativeness so that the results could permit a
court to draw sufficiently reliable inferences about the whole”). While the Chevron
court was “sympathetic to the efforts of the [trial] court to control its docket and to
move this case along,” its “sympathies . . . [did] not outweigh . . . due process concerns.”
Id. at 1021.
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generally present defendants with favorable doctrine.474 And for plaintiffs’
attorneys, batching transforms the lucrative mass-arbitration model into a
more expensive version of a class action or an MDL.
3.

Provisions that change the arbitral forum

In response to mass arbitration, some defendants have sought to change
the arbitral forum—either by designating a new forum or designing new
procedures for the forum, or both. Defendants have already begun using
contractual revisions to move arbitration proceedings from neutral fora like
the AAA or JAMS to more defendant-friendly outfits. In 2019, for instance,
DoorDash found itself “dissatisfied with the AAA’s due process protocol
requirements and [its] requirements for . . . filing fees” in light of massarbitration demands.475 In response, Gibson Dunn reached out to the CPR to
request protocols “created for DoorDash, at DoorDash’s request, and with the
input of DoorDash and its lawyers.”476 The CPR agreed to create these
protocols,477 at which point DoorDash sent its drivers revised agreements
474. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Maria Glover, Zombie Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8,

2011, 10:16 AM), https://perma.cc/J6Y6-KZG9. The favorable-doctrine point might
help explain Amazon’s recent retreat to the class action. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. Facing a host of novel strict-liability claims arising under state
law, see, e.g., Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 605 (Ct. App. 2020)
(“Under established principles of strict liability, Amazon should be held liable if a
product sold through its website turns out to be defective.”); Loomis v. Amazon.com
LLC, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 779 (Ct. App. 2021) (“[W]e are persuaded that Amazon’s own
business practices make it a direct link in the vertical chain of distribution under
California’s strict liability doctrine.”), Amazon issued new contracts requiring all
claims against the company to be brought in its home state of Washington, Robert,
supra note 35. Washington does not have case law resembling Bolger or Loomis;
accordingly, Amazon could have removed its arbitration provision (in part) to obtain
favorable precedent in the state. See Will Amazon Be Liable for Defective Products in
Washington?, RUSSELL & HILL, PLLC: BLOG (Aug. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/3FZYCPB4 (“Right now, there is no consensus [in Washington] as to whether . . . Amazon
should be considered only a neutral middle-man distributor of products or if they
should be held legally liable for injuries . . . .”); Todd Bishop, Landmark Product Liability
Ruling Puts Amazon’s Third-Party Marketplace in a New Legal Pinch, GEEKWIRE (updated
Aug. 14, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://perma.cc/6DYK-55TZ (noting Amazon’s hostility to
the Bolger decision). Amazon would not have been able to obtain similar precedent
through private arbitration.
475. [Unredacted] Declaration of Aaron Zigler in Support of Petitioners’ Reply in Support
of Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration ¶¶ 11-12, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438
F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 19-cv-07545), ECF No. 180-3 (quoting a CPR email
describing a conversation with Gibson Dunn attorney Michael Holecek).
476. Id. ¶¶ 8-14.
477. Id. ¶ 9; see Declaration of Joshua Lipshutz in Support of Respondent DoorDash, Inc.’s
Opposition to Petitioners’ Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration at 414, Abernathy,
438 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (No. 19-cv-07545), ECF No. 157-5.
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designating the CPR as its arbitral forum.478 Emails reveal that the CPR saw
DoorDash’s request as a lucrative business opportunity, especially given
Gibson Dunn’s “large book” of clients.479 Claimants challenged the new
agreement, but Northern District of California Judge Edward Chen was not
persuaded there had been any “catering or favoritism” or that the protocols
were “so biased that [they] negate[d] the agreement to arbitrate.”480 For its part,
the CPR said that it did not draft its new protocols to “woo employers.”481
Other defendants are following DoorDash’s lead. Ticketmaster, for
example, changed its arbitral forum to New Era ADR shortly before a court
granted its motion to compel arbitration on antitrust claims.482 This timing
does not seem coincidental: New Era bills itself as cheaper for businesses than
other arbitral fora.483 The new Ticketmaster agreement also provides that
consumers must pay attorney’s fees, not to mention the $300 New Era filing
fee.484
In the short term, these sorts of revisions are unlikely to meet with much
resistance. Arbitral fora are businesses, after all, and corporations can decide
which organizations get their business. Market pressure may lead smaller
478. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 7, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 19-

479.

480.

481.

482.

483.
484.

cv-07545 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2019), ECF No. 10 (noting that DoorDash “began imposing
a new arbitration agreement . . . provid[ing] for arbitration governed by” CPR rules a
mere three days after the CPR issued its new protocols); see, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Inst.
for Conflict Prevention & Resol., CPR Launches New Mass Claims Protocol and
Procedure (Nov. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/2DSS-B5BV.
Alison Frankel, The Problem with Outsourcing Justice to Mass Arbitration Services, REUTERS
(Feb. 27, 2020, 5:21 PM) (quoting an email from CPR vice president Helena Erickson),
https://perma.cc/E94Q-QXGL.
McGrath v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 19-cv-05279, 2020 WL 6526129, at *9-11 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 5, 2020) (noting, however, that “Gibson Dunn’s involvement in the development
of the [protocols] may raise some concern”).
Frankel, supra note 479 (quoting a CPR statement). More recently, the CPR created an
“employment-related mass claims task force” comprised of attorneys from various
plaintiffs’ and defense firms “in an effort to continue to improve its procedures.” See
Employment-Related Mass Claims Task Force, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOL. (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/7C93-26MZ (archived May 19, 2022).
In 2021 DoorDash changed its arbitral forum once again, this time selecting ADR
Services. See Terms and Conditions—United States: DoorDash Consumers ¶ 12(c),
DOORDASH, https://perma.cc/2NQZ-Z4FK (archived May 19, 2022) (to locate, select
“View the live page”); Terms of Service—United States: DoorDash Merchants ¶ 13.2,
DOORDASH, https://perma.cc/4RUC-G57T (archived May 19, 2022) (to locate, select
“View the live page”). For more on ADR Services, see About ADR Services, Inc., ADR
SERVS., INC., https://perma.cc/76CS-AZWJ (archived May 19, 2022).
Complaint, supra note 238, ¶¶ 1-2, 6; Oberstein v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., No. 20-cv03888, 2021 WL 4772885, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2021), appeal filed, No. 21-56200 (9th
Cir. Oct. 29, 2021); see also supra note 448.
See, e.g., Press Release, New Era ADR, supra note 443.
Ticketmaster 2022 Terms, supra note 448, ¶ 17.
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outfits to develop defendant-friendly protocols,485 but defendants are free to
forum shop so long as everything seems “fair and impartial.”486
Long term, though, there may be limits to how far defendants can go in
revising their agreements to select new and friendly fora. Revisions that
provide for unfair procedures or specify a forum with unfair procedures (or
both)487 may collide with state unconscionability and effective-vindication
limitations. Indeed, these sorts of revisions would look like the arbitration
provisions defendants tried in the days before “friendly” agreements and
Concepcion.488 Contracts that specify wholly defendant-created arbitration
procedures are not contracts for alternative dispute resolution permitted by
the FAA; they are contracts designed to ensure defendant-friendly outcomes
and eliminate claims.
But drawing the line is challenging. Defendants are smart, and they are
unlikely to embrace blatantly unfair provisions or fora. This is true not just
because unfair revisions could meet with resistance in the courts, but also
because subtler and more effective revisions are possible. Consider a revision
providing for an arbitral forum that is functionally incapable of processing
more than a few claims each year. Perhaps this revision would fail (say, for
contractual impossibility489). But it is ostensibly neutral, and there is always
the risk that courts will be unwilling to peek behind the curtain.
That said, some revisions push dispute resolution beyond the traditional
bounds of arbitration more clearly than others. The Supreme Court, for
example, has defined arbitration to involve bilateral proceedings;490 revisions
related to fees would likely be acceptable under this definition, but revisions
involving batching could be suspect. Although the Court has not fully

485. See, e.g., supra notes 475-79 and accompanying text.
486. See McGrath v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 19-cv-05279, 2020 WL 6526129, at *9-11 (N.D. Cal.

487.

488.
489.
490.

Nov. 5, 2020). Of course, “fair and impartial” does not mean “as neutral or claimant
friendly as established outfits like JAMS and the AAA.”
Cf. Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L.
REV. 129, 132-35 (2015) (describing the dangers of corporate “settlement mills,” which
“private parties may exclusively design, operate, and . . . oversee”).
See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (noting that arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347-48 (2011); Am. Express
Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013); see also supra notes 81-89 and
accompanying text.
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examined the FAA’s outer limits,491 it has made clear that the Act has
boundaries492 and that its terms have independent meaning.493
For decades, private parties’ authority to select arbitration has been
premised on the idea that the FAA “places arbitration agreements on equal
footing with all other contracts.”494 But it is difficult to put arbitration
agreements on equal footing if “arbitration” is meaningless. Could a process
that indefinitely drags out the resolution of claims be fairly described as
“arbitration”? What about a process that only adjudicates bellwether claims,
five at a time, until the claimants agree to a global deal? The selection of a
forum that, as a functional matter, can only hear one or two claims yearly?
Mass arbitration’s future hinges in no small part on these fundamental
questions of statutory interpretation.
The same is true of mass arbitration’s potential to upend the class-action
counterrevolution. From a defendant’s perspective, a class action may well be
preferable to a mass arbitration—but nothing would be more preferable than a
private dispute-resolution system of the defendant’s own design. If courts
allow “adjudication by defendant” or permit dispute resolution that looks
nothing like traditional arbitration, then mass arbitration will have made
consumers and employees better off in the short term, but worse off in the
long term.
V. Case-Study Findings and Limitations
A. Mass-Arbitration Taxonomy
The previous Parts uncovered and distilled the principal features of the
mass-arbitration model and revealed what the future of the model may look
like. This Subpart synthesizes the Article’s findings and develops the first
working taxonomy of the mass-arbitration model. It also situates mass
arbitration—as a distinct model of aggregate dispute resolution—within the
broader landscape of complex procedure.
491. See, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014)

(finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement that, inter alia, gave the defendant
“near-unfettered” control over arbitrator selection and required claimants to pay a
filing fee of $2,600), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015), and cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 1539
(2016).
492. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578-81, 585-88 (2008) (holding that a
contract for de novo review of arbitral decisions was foreclosed by the FAA, which
provides the terms for judicial review of arbitration).
493. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536, 538-41, 543-44 (2019) (holding that the
term “employment” in the FAA has a historical meaning separate from and unalterable
by private contracts).
494. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).

1373

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

Table 1 below taxonomizes what I term “Mass Arbitration 1.0,” which is
the mass-arbitration model as it originated (and still exists for thousands of
claims). It also taxonomizes what I term “Mass Arbitration 2.0 (Projected),”
which draws from the findings in this study to predict the future of mass
arbitration. Table 1 presents these two models alongside the two most
established forms of aggregate dispute resolution: class action and MDL
consolidation.
Table 1
Aggregate Dispute Resolution Taxonomy
Mass
Arbitration 1.0

Mass
Arbitration 2.0
(Projected)

Class Action

MDL
Consolidation

Procedural
Posture

Dismissal of
antecedent class
action; motion to
compel arbitration

Antecedent class
actions possible
(DirecTV,
Ticketmaster);
direct filings

Class complaint
filed

JPML transfer to
MDL judge

Creation of
the “Mass”

Attorneys retain
all individuals as
clients

Attorneys retain
all individuals as
clients

Class definition in
class complaint

Consolidation for
pretrial
proceedings (28
U.S.C. § 1407)

Review of the
“Mass”

Sufficiency of
demands
determined by
arbitrator

Filing threat alone
in some cases; in
others, sufficiency
of demands
determined by
(potentially) new
arbitrators in new
contracts

Class certification
analysis under
Rule 23(a), (b), (c)(4)

Motions to dismiss;
motions for
summary
judgment;
settlement
eligibility criteria

Claim-Value
Threshold

Minimum: High
hundreds to
> $2,000

Likely minimum:
~$1,000 to ~$3,000

Minimum: Low
($20 for Fitbit) or
individually
unmarketable

Low range or
individually
marketable

Claim Filing

Individual demand
and high filing fee

Individual demand
and group
arbitration fee; fee
schedules

Single class
complaint and low
(or waived) filing
fee

Individual
complaints to start;
master complaint
in MDL

Claim
Management

Significant: Ethical
rules regarding
individual
representation
(intake/outflow)

Significant: Ethical
rules regarding
individual
representation
(intake/outflow)

Minimal: Absent
class members do
not need to (or do
not) participate

Minimal: Cases
stayed pending
consolidated
pretrial
proceedings
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Mass
Arbitration 1.0

Mass
Arbitration 2.0
(Projected)

Class Action

MDL
Consolidation

Claim
Litigation

Individual
proceedings

Individual
proceedings;
possible batches
with test-case sets

Common question
of law and fact
determined on
class-wide basis

Consolidated
pretrial
proceedings;
handful of
bellwether trials

Settlement
Leverage
(Global)

Claimant mass;
statutory remedial
schemes;
leveraging of
significant upfront fees and
arbitration fees;
transaction-cost
imposition (or
threat thereof)

Claimant mass;
statutory remedial
schemes; “slamdunk” claims;
leveraging of
nonwaivable
arbitration fees and
costs

Claimant mass;
certification of
class; publicity
(maybe)

Consolidated mass;
managerial
judging; publicity
(maybe)

Settlement
Structure
(Global)

Similar to masstort grids

Potential for
lowball settlements
and reverse
auctions with
defendants’
potential classaction optionality

Settlement grids

Settlement grids or
mass-tort grids

Settlement
Distribution
(Global)

Individual;
contractually
imposed
procedural hurdles;
administration by
counsel and
counsel-hired
settlement
administrator

Individual;
contractually
imposed
procedural hurdles;
administration by
counsel and
counsel-hired
settlement
administrator

Class-wide notice
(cost shared);
court-appointed
(typically)
settlement
administrator

Settlement notice
(cost shared);
court-appointed
(typically)
settlement
administrator

Settlement
Review
(Global)

Little to no judicial
review; Model
Rule 1.8

Little to no judicial
review; Model
Rule 1.8

Rule 23(e); judge as
class fiduciary;
appeal

Quasi–class-action
authority; judge as
fiduciary;
applicable ethical
rules

Forum Rules

Arbitral forum’s
rules, except as
amended by
contract or allowed
under the FAA

Forum rules
developed with
(potentially
significant)
defendant input or
by defendant’s
design in contract

Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or
state equivalent

Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure

Firm Profile

Well capitalized
(or sacrificial);
entrepreneurial;
risk seeking

Well established,
big firms; more
repeat players

Class counsel
dominated by
repeat players

Plaintiffs’ steering
committee
dominated by
repeat players
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B. Study Limitations
This Subpart briefly discusses the limitations of the Article’s study. Two
limitations in particular are worth noting. First, mass arbitration is a rapidly
evolving phenomenon. Although this study captures the mass-arbitration
model at a critical moment in time, it is still only a single moment; future
developments will require future investigation. Second, the private nature of
arbitration means that the study does not cover the full universe of arbitration
demands. Some information is, and will remain, unobtainable.495
These limitations shed light on several important points. Three bear
emphasis here. One, because some mass arbitrations do not appear in any
arbitral records, the precise size and scope of mass arbitration is a somewhat
open question. The arbitration market is comprised of both institutional and
ad hoc fora, and moves to ad hoc organizations will undoubtedly increase in
the coming years.496 Together, the ad hoc market and the rise in direct-toarbitration filings (as opposed to filings that follow a class or collective action)
mean that some mass arbitrations will proceed entirely in secret—if they do
not do so already.
Two, with the exception of confirmed arbitration decisions,497 it is an
open question whether (and how far) a given arbitral demand proceeded.498
Relatedly, it is an open question for a given demand what (if anything) was
litigated and what (if anything) was decided.
Three, because arbitrator decisions on fees are confidential, it is not
entirely clear to what extent claimants, defendants, or both were granted fee
waivers. Many of the claimants in this investigation were eligible for fee
waivers—particularly for economic hardship—but information regarding
which claimants obtained those waivers is not available. Therefore, it is
impossible to pin down with precision the exact fee burdens in a given mass
arbitration.
The above limitations and the points that they raise would be (and are)
present in any study of arbitration.499 Indeed, these shortcomings and issues
stem from features, not bugs, of the arbitration model. Arbitral proceedings
495. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 38, at 684-86; Resnik, supra note 256, at 799.
496. See supra Part IV.C.3.
497. See, e.g., Simpson v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 20-cv-07630, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

125416, at *1-3, *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021).
498. I have, however, been able to uncover general data on this “known unknown.” In the
gig-economy mass arbitrations, proceedings have occurred to some degree in over 100
cases per defendant (close to 1,000 cases total). In the Amazon mass arbitration,
hundreds of demands have proceeded in some manner in the arbitral forum.
499. For another arbitration case study discussing similar limitations, see Horton &
Chandrasekher, supra note 33, at 476-78.
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and decisions are confidential. Settlements are confidential, and defendants
threaten to deny payouts to individuals who discuss them. Defendants have
even attempted to make legal rights confidential by threatening to deny
payouts to individuals who mention those rights to others. Many individuals
do not understand the nature of their legal rights. Many defendants use
arbitration to keep it that way.
C. Study Takeaways
The discussion above reveals that mass arbitration is a new and distinct
model of dispute resolution. But it is more than that: It is also the first (and
only) meaningful response to the arbitration revolution and the class-action
counterrevolution. In its current form, however, mass arbitration’s half-life
may be short. Defendants—especially sophisticated, nimble, well-resourced
ones—are already adapting in ways that suggest Mass Arbitration 1.0 is not
long for this world. Importantly, though, defendants are not adapting by
abandoning arbitration. Instead, it seems like defendants are leaning into a
renewed campaign to “take back the revolution.”500 If webinars, continuing
legal education (CLE) programs, conferences, podcasts, and the like are any
indication, all parties are seeking to adjust to the new landscape—of which
mass arbitration will certainly be a part.501
That said, it is possible that mass arbitration will eventually be its own
undoing. Whether this is for ill or for good depends on the form that the
undoing takes. On the one hand, mass arbitration could help create an even
bleaker civil justice landscape for large swaths of the American public. This is
possible if the defense coalition manages to (1) prevent the passage of broad

500. See, e.g., supra note 164 and accompanying text (describing efforts by the Chamber of

Commerce to oppose the FAIR Act); supra notes 475-84 and accompanying text (noting
that DoorDash and Ticketmaster were able to change arbitral fora to their advantage).
501. See, e.g., Mitigating Mass Arbitration: Revising Arbitration Clauses and Rethinking Defense
Strategies, STRAFFORD, https://perma.cc/FF64-33EN (archived May 19, 2022); CLE
Speaker Series: Arbitration 360—What Companies Need to Know About International,
Domestic and Consumer Mass Arbitration, COOLEY, https://perma.cc/93K6-JEG2
(archived Aug. 18, 2022); The New Mass Arbitration: Just Deserts or Just Another Abuse?,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://perma.cc/CUP7-HKCN (archived Aug. 26, 2022) (featuring
the Author, Brian Fitzpatrick, and Daniel Fisher); Miami Law Class Action & Complex
Litigation Forum, UNIV. MIA. SCH. L., https://perma.cc/3UYM-NPJ7 (archived May 19,
2022) (featuring a panel on arbitration comprised of the Author, Judge Roy Altman,
Rachel Furst, Lawrence Silverman, and Tal Lifshitz); Consumer Fin. Monitor, A Deep
Dive into Mass Arbitration: Part II, BALLARD SPAHR (Feb. 24, 2022), https://perma.cc/
47PL-6YBG (featuring the Author and Alan Kaplinsky); Program Details: What Does the
Future Hold for Mass Arbitration?, W. LEGALEDCENTER, https://perma.cc/4JJZ-49HR
(archived May 19, 2021) (featuring a lecture by the Author hosted by Celesq
AttorneysEd Center).
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reform bills like the FAIR Act (rather likely as things stand now502); and
(2) convince courts, especially the Supreme Court, to bless new, draconian
arbitration agreements (less likely, but not inconceivable503).
On the other hand, mass arbitration could catalyze much-needed reform.
Mass arbitration has challenged both the arbitration revolution and the classaction counterrevolution, and in doing so it has helped to make civil justice
work again—especially for the most disadvantaged members of our society.
Indeed, the movement has already started a counter-counterrevolution:
Corporate giants like Amazon have fled arbitration,504 and others will likely
follow if mass arbitration persists. And unlike the arbitration revolution,
which barely registered outside of academic circles,505 mass arbitration has
captured significant national attention.506 Accordingly, public pressure for
reform has never been greater. If mass arbitration continues on its current
path, its greatest trick may not just be to upend the defense coalition’s push
toward arbitration, but to reverse it.
VI. Applications, Expansions, and Implications
Mass arbitration is a transformational phenomenon in civil justice.
Following the arbitration revolution and the class-action counterrevolution,
defendants had two clear options: either litigate a class action in court (quite
undesirable) or use arbitration agreements with class-action waivers to
502. See, e.g., LaSusa, supra note 166.
503. See supra Part IV.C.3.
504. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
505. In October 2015, the New York Times published an article entitled “Arbitration

Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice.” See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://perma.cc/BS9P-7XWL. By that time, the Supreme Court had already decided
Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and Italian Colors. Myriam Gilles and Jean Sternlight’s
pathbreaking articles, which sounded the alarm about mandatory arbitration
agreements, had been in print for around a decade. See generally Gilles, supra note 47
(describing how class-action waivers in arbitration agreements pose a threat to the
availability of mass relief); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005) (discussing the proliferation of mandatory arbitration
agreements and arguing that mandatory arbitration is unjust). Even if the public had
wanted to do something about the arbitration revolution at that point—and that is
assuming a single article in the New York Times would have been sufficient to inform
and galvanize them—it was too late.
506. See, e.g., Scott Medintz, How Consumers Are Using Mass Arbitration to Fight Amazon,
Intuit, and Other Corporate Giants, CONSUMER REPS. (Aug. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/
SMT3-KQQB (featuring this Article’s study); Alison Frankel, Postmates Brings Mass
Arbitration to SCOTUS, Sort Of, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2021, 5:02 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/
LNX6-W5UH (same); Armstrong & Tobin, supra note 267; Corkery & SilverGreenberg, supra note 34; Randazzo, supra note 35.
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virtually eliminate claims (the obvious choice). With the advent of mass
arbitration, however, the calculus changed: Defendants could now either
litigate a class action in court (quite undesirable) or drown in a sea of
arbitration demands (more undesirable still). Faced with this second set of
choices, it is no wonder that corporate defendants are seeking refuge in the
class-action device. After more than forty years, defendants are on the
defensive.
Even if Mass Arbitration 1.0 is fleeting—indeed, even if mass arbitration
writ large is somehow fleeting507—mass arbitration has already taught us a
number of lessons about aggregate dispute resolution and civil justice. This
Part explores three. It first examines the civil justice issues laid bare by mass
arbitration, particularly those issues concerning access to justice and the
resolution of claims on the merits. Next, this Part situates mass arbitration
within the larger universe of aggregate dispute resolution. Far from being
tethered to the world of arbitration, the mass-arbitration model is relevant
across the universe of individual adjudication. This includes areas of dispute
resolution that defendants cannot unilaterally change. The Part concludes by
discussing, in the context of mass arbitration, a central critique of our civil
justice system: that its fundamental commitments have been abandoned
through outsourcing to moneyed corporate interests.
A. Claim Facilitation and Merits-Based Claim Resolution
Mass arbitration reveals profound shortcomings in the aggregate dispute
resolution landscape. To be sure, it is laudable that many mass-arbitration
claimants have recovered close to their actual damages. And the fact that
claimants were able to achieve these outcomes through private procedural
innovation speaks to the value of adversarialism in civil justice.508 Yet these
507. As of this writing, mass arbitration, while still rare, appears to be growing—and of

growing concern to defendants. See, e.g., supra note 501 (listing numerous CLE
offerings, podcasts, and conferences devoted to the rise of mass arbitration in civil
justice); supra note 250 (discussing Labaton Sucharow’s targeted outreach to potential
mass-arbitration clients); Margaret M. Clark, Mass Arbitration Strains Employers,
SHRM: HR MAG. (Nov. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/UYR6-HQZF; Charles Balmain,
Matthew Devine, Sonja Hoffmann & Sheldon Philp, Class and Group Actions Laws and
Regulations: Developments and Trends in Collective Actions 2022, ICLG.COM (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/H4KV-5R65 (describing mass arbitration as a new development with
which defendants must cope); Alison Frankel, Lieff Cabraser’s Gambit: Contacting
Potential 9,100 Clients Despite Protective Order, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2022, 2:03 PM PST),
https://perma.cc/8XS3-4YZ8 (discussing Lieff Cabraser’s continued outreach efforts in
the potential DirecTV mass arbitration).
508. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2d ed. 2019) (discussing the virtues of adversarial legalism and describing how it can
empower citizens to challenge unlawful conduct).
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results are also lamentable, at least to the extent they stem from in terrorem
settlement pressure imposed by mass-arbitration fee leveraging.
If we care about poetic justice in aggregate dispute resolution, mass
arbitration fits the bill. If we care about settlement outcomes driven by the
merits of claims, mass arbitration is also acceptable (although somewhat by
happenstance). But if we care about a functional infrastructure designed to
vindicate meritorious but low-value claims, mass arbitration shows that no
such infrastructure exists—at least not judicially.
Mass arbitration is, in large part, a response to the Supreme Court’s
destruction of that infrastructure.509 The mass-arbitration model operates on
its ability to impose significant in terrorem settlement pressure; without the
class action or other means of aggregate dispute resolution, this pressure is
necessary to access any sort of justice. So far, many mass-arbitration claims
have proved meritorious and been successful. Absent mass arbitration, these
claims may not have received awards anywhere close to actual damages—or
may not have been heard in the first place. In other words, mass arbitration
may well impose in terrorem settlement pressure. But that is because
corporations left mass-arbitration claimants, many of whom are frontline
workers, with no alternative but to upend the contractual provisions that
eliminated their claims.
That individuals with meritorious but low-value claims have so little
access to justice (to say nothing about access to systems capable of ensuring
adequate recovery) is as unfortunate as it is unsurprising. The civil justice
system has been under concerted attack for over forty years. Corporate
interests have waged a methodical and relentless campaign to characterize
small claims as frivolous and eliminate them. Many of the claims in mass
arbitration, though, are not frivolous. They are claims by some of the most
vulnerable members of our society, brought against the corporations that
exploited them secure in the knowledge that there was no real way to fight
back. Enterprising lawyers identified a glitch in the matrix, and mass
arbitration was born.
Properly understood and properly contextualized, mass arbitration does
not create civil justice problems so much as it exposes them.
B. Informal Aggregate Dispute Resolution
Mass arbitration is both a new mode of dispute resolution and a new
method of individualized aggregate claiming. Although the mass-arbitration
509. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Glover, supra note 15, at 1160-75 (detailing various efforts

to curtail mechanisms of private enforcement); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 15, at
62-64 (“We anticipate that the Court will continue as the institutional leader in the
project to retrench private enforcement in the near future . . . .”).
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model owes its origins to the world of arbitration created by the arbitration
revolution, it is hardly constrained by that world. As such, this Subpart
examines mass arbitration in other contexts.
Commentators have long offered accounts of lawyers, organizers, and
corporations privately aggregating claims to achieve economies of scale.
Samuel Issacharoff and John Fabian Witt, for instance, have noted that
translators historically acted as intermediaries for groups of workers with
claims against their employers.510 Nora Freeman Engstrom has shown that
some personal-injury firms (“settlement mills”) collect and file automobile
claims in high volume.511 And on the defense side, Dana Remus and Adam
Zimmerman have detailed how corporations informally aggregate claims in
their own high-volume settlement operations.512
Each of the above investigations reveals a model of aggregate dispute
resolution distinct from the formal mechanisms for mass claiming (like the
class action or the MDL consolidation). Each also reveals that the traditional
“poles” of litigation—individual on the one hand, formally aggregated on the
other—are somewhat mythical.513 The world of mass litigation is more of a
spectrum, with various models designed to aggregate claims using a mix of
public and private tools. Mass arbitration is simply a new addition to that
spectrum.
Mass arbitration is at once individualized (it centers around one-on-one
arbitration) and collective (it relies on venture capital, technology, firm
expertise, and mass claiming to enable and resolve disputes). As such, mass
arbitration can be situated alongside the informal modes of aggregation
described above. Although detailed comparisons among these modes are
necessarily the subject of other work,514 a few important distinctions are
worth noting here. Unlike the informal aggregation process described by
Issacharoff and Witt, mass arbitration involves the formal representation of
claimants by firms. And while mass arbitration involves individual claims
against a single defendant for a common course of conduct, Engstrom’s
“settlement mills” principally deal with individual claims arising out of

510. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 175, at 1631 (listing “translators in immigrant factory

communities” as a “historical example[] of aggregation”).
511. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 816-23

(2011).
512. Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 487, at 136-37.
513. Accord, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class

Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 179, 181-82, 189-91
(2001).
514. See J. Maria Glover, Informal Aggregation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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different events and against different drivers—even if insurers are present as
repeat players.
Situating mass arbitration on the spectrum of informal aggregation
illuminates the model’s importance in the civil justice landscape. One could
imagine a similar model in small-claims court, with claimants’ attorneys
formally out of view but functionally performing the same role as massarbitration attorneys. One could also imagine a similar model for common
disputes before administrative agencies.515 It is also conceivable that key
elements of the mass-arbitration model could be used for claims that cannot be
certified in a class or consolidated for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407.516 And a mass-arbitration–type model (albeit a flipped one) is already
emerging outside of arbitration: Corporate plaintiffs are filing thousands of
small-dollar claims against unrepresented individuals in state courts.517
To be sure, mass arbitration’s effects on the aggregate dispute resolution
landscape are still unclear.518 It is unlikely, though, that the pre–arbitration
revolution or the post–Italian Colors status quos will be restored. Instead, the
mass-arbitration model (or some structural analogue) will likely remain a
distinct option for aggregate dispute resolution going forward. In this new
status quo, defendants will not be able to eliminate low-value claims arising
from aggregate harm.519 They will instead have to resolve at least a subset of
those claims through informal aggregate models—models that will look a lot
like mass arbitration.
C. Mass Arbitration and the Civil Justice System
Mass arbitration is not just a distinct form of dispute resolution; it is a
potentially preferable form of dispute resolution for both consumers and
employees. This is true for at least three reasons. One, mass-arbitration
settlement payouts have tended to be higher than settlement payouts in
515. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126

516.

517.
518.
519.

YALE L.J. 1634, 1658-63 (2017) (noting that very few agencies formally aggregate
claims).
See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post–Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation, 5 J. TORT
L. 3, 9 (2012); Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW. U. L.
REV. 1649, 1702-03, 1713 (2021).
See Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiffs, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1704, 1707-09
(2022).
This lack of clarity stems in large part from mass arbitration’s uncertain future. See
supra Part IV.
See generally D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement, 50
GA. L. REV. 475 (2016) (describing how class-action waivers, whether ex ante or ex post,
can leave claimants with no chance to vindicate their substantive rights).
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parallel class actions.520 Two, mass arbitration is often more efficient. Wellcapitalized arbitral fora have greater resources with which to effectively
resolve claims than their judicial counterparts; what is a Roach Motel in an
MDL consolidation521 could be a relatively short stay in a mass arbitration.
Three, mass arbitration provides more opportunities for participation and
attorney interaction.522 (Nothing approaching the level of participation in
one-on-one litigation, of course, but certainly greater than the level of
participation typical in a class action.)
But even if mass arbitration were always preferable, it would not (and
could not) be a panacea for the class-action counterrevolution. In its current
form, there are some claims that mass arbitration simply cannot reach. For
one, a number of meritorious claims will still cost more to litigate than their
individual values. The threshold value for claim marketability is higher in a
mass arbitration than it is in a class action,523 and that value will tend to
increase as mass arbitration adapts to the defense bar’s counteroffensives. For
another, to the extent that mass arbitration can facilitate claims, it facilitates
those that benefit from aggregation as an economic matter. Claims that stem
from discrimination, sexual harassment, sexual assault, and other civil rights
violations depend on aggregation to obtain company-wide data or class-wide
proof. As I explore in other work,524 mass arbitration generally cannot help
these claims.525
Further, that the mass-arbitration model is potentially preferable for
consumers and employees does not mean that mass arbitration is preferable
from a regulatory standpoint. Although mass arbitration can help patch the
holes of a regulatory apparatus damaged by decades of procedural warfare,
520. See supra Part III.C.4.
521. See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405 n.16 (D. Mass. 2008)

522.

523.
524.
525.

(borrowing Issacharoff ’s comparison of an MDL to a Roach Motel: Cases “check in—
but they don’t check out” (quoting a Roach Motel ad)).
See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011
(2010) (discussing the importance of participation in the broader context of procedural
rights).
See supra Part III.C.3.
See J. Maria Glover, Disaggregated Proof, Dismantled Rights (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
This is true because, as a general matter, the whole of the evidence gathered across
individual cases is not greater than the sum of its parts. Consider employmentdiscrimination cases, which typically require proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination. See, e.g., Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105-06 (10th
Cir. 2001) (distinguishing aggregate “pattern-or-practice” cases from cases “involving
one or more claims of individualized discrimination”). The data generated in each case
is distorted because there is no company-wide view, and limitations on obtaining
company-wide data (such as cost) could mean that no such data is available to any
claimant. It is hard to prove a pattern or practice using only a single perspective.
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mass arbitrations are still smaller than class actions. This size difference (as
measured by the total number of claimants) is likely a feature of the massarbitration model: Mass arbitration’s ability to grow is constrained by the
expense of arbitral proceedings, the necessity of up-front production, the
challenge of filing individual demands, and a host of ethical constraints
regarding representation. As such, mass arbitrations may not hold the same
promise as class actions for achieving deterrence and changing defendant
behavior.526 And at least to the extent mass arbitration continues to occur in
arbitration, the private, secretive nature of arbitral proceedings means less
public precedent, less publicity, less public outcry, and less pressure on
defendants to abandon harmful practices.
In sum, mass arbitration cannot restore all the claims eliminated by the
arbitration revolution and the class-action counterrevolution. But it can
restore some of those claims, and it can do so to the claimants’ advantage. A
happy ending, at least in part? Not quite. Corporate defendants are in the
claim-elimination business, and to the extent that mass arbitration interferes
with claim elimination, defendants will take their procedural war machine
elsewhere. Amazon may be a harbinger of what is to come.527
Some might say that mass arbitration is merely the latest and most
consequential offensive in an otherwise moribund theater of procedural
warfare. And they are right, to a degree. But mass arbitration is much more
than that. It is also a phenomenon that sheds a harsh light on the sad state of
American civil justice. Our current system has become, at Congress and the
Supreme Court’s behest, the product of (and the battlefield for) a mutually
destructive private procedural arms race. It is a system that is increasingly
indifferent to systemic injustices faced by minorities, women, the working
poor, and other marginalized groups—injustices created and perpetuated by
that arms race. A system that destroyed its infrastructure for vindicating
meritorious claims, only to criticize the in terrorem settlement pressure that
necessarily arose in the vacuum. A system that refuses to distinguish between
low-value claims that matter to real people and claims that matter only to
attorneys, thereby abrogating its responsibility to hear the former and push
out the latter. A system that shirks its constitutional countermajoritarian
commitments528 and outsources the allocation of justice to the moneyed
corporate majority.
526. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE CLASS ACTION

EFFECT 181, 194-95 (Catherine Piché ed., 2018) (“[T]he theory of general deterrence is
sound. We still have every reason to think that lawsuits—including class action
lawsuits—deter corporate misconduct.”).
527. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
528. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew Heins, Premodern Constitutionalism, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1825, 1834-35 (2016).
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What can be done? Discussions of procedural reform often incorporate
both public and private procedural ordering,529 but that combination offers
little purchase here. For more than forty years, public procedural ordering
produced nothing that could meaningfully counterbalance the arbitration
revolution or the class-action counterrevolution. Instead, it was the private
response to those movements that harnessed the economic potential in
defendants’ arbitration agreements. That response stopped the arbitration
revolution in its tracks, and it seems to be our best hope going forward—at
least until the wind changes.
But civil justice—and almost coterminously, social justice—that is so
deeply dependent on shifts in the political and economic winds is likely to be
little justice at all.
Conclusion
This Article is the first to study mass arbitration, which has upended the
defense bar’s forty-year campaign to eliminate claims through forced
arbitration and class-action waivers. Whatever mass arbitration’s future, that
is quite a lot for a day’s work. But mass arbitration is more than a response to
the arbitration revolution and the class-action counterrevolution. Mass
arbitration has vital implications for broad questions about aggregate dispute
resolution, the regulatory apparatus for low-value claims in the United States,
and for civil justice—its conceptions, its ideals, and its failures. And our own.

529. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 45, at 724-31; Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93

YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-78 (1984) (criticizing both public and private efforts to encourage
settlement); Resnik, supra note 75, at 2806-17; Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 487, at
134-35 (“Corporate settlement mills thus raise the question of how far policymakers
should be permitted to go to privatize our public . . . process of adjudication.”);
Engstrom, supra note 511, at 829-33. Some commentators have argued that public
procedural ordering is at least more democratically legitimate. See, e.g., Glover, supra
note 75, at 3076-83; Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation–Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the
Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1077 (2011) (“The central argument against
class waivers is they purport to do something that public legislation may do but that
private contracts may not . . . .”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit
Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 172-75 (2006); Nagareda, supra note 132, at
1902; David Horton, The Arbitration Rules: Procedural Rulemaking by Arbitration
Providers, 105 MINN. L. REV. 619, 646 (2020); David L. Noll & Luke Norris, Federal Rules
of Private Enforcement 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (deriving its
title from Glover, supra note 132). One can debate whether and to what extent public
procedural ordering better aligns with democratic values. But even if public procedural
ordering offers greater democratic legitimacy than private procedural ordering, it is
unclear what functional good that legitimacy has done for the scores of claimants
whose rights were erased by the defense coalition.

1385

Mass Arbitration
74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

Appendix
Table 2 summarizes the mass arbitrations included in this Article’s study.
The study took place from January 2019 to December 2021; the data below is
from that time period unless otherwise noted. For purposes of Table 2, I
estimated up-front fee obligations based on the best available data (estimate
disclosures in public filings, agreement terms, fee schedules for arbitral fora,
and so on).530
Table 2
Mass Arbitrations

Table 2 begins on the following page.

530. It is worth noting that arbitrators have some discretion to adjust fee assessments.
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Principal
Claims

Privacy
action based
on Amazon
Alexa devices
secretly
recording
minors
Consumer
action based
on fraudulent
CenturyLink
billing
practices
Breach of
consumer
data

Wage-theft
action based
on unpaid
overtime

Mass
Arbitration

Amazon

CenturyLink

Chegg

1387

Chipotle
Fair Labor
Standards
Act, Colorado
labor law

California
Civil Code
section
1798.80 et seq.

Various
consumerfraud statutes

California
Invasion of
Privacy Act

Underlying
Law

Kent
Williams,
Williams
Law Group

Z Law

Keller
Lenkner

Keller
Lenkner

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

Messner
Reeves

Orrick

Cooley

Fenwick &
West

Defense
Counsel

~150 filed,
~3,000
inventory

~15,000 filed

~1,000 filed,
~20,000
inventory

~75,000 filed

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

Restitution
(back pay),
liquidated
damages, prejudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees

Actual,
compensatory,
and punitive
damages,
attorney’s fees

All legal and
equitable
remedies
allowed by law

Statutory
damages of $100
to $750 per
violation

Damages
Available

~$260,000 to
~$5 million

~$7.5 million
(used to be
$56 million)

~$1.5 million
to ~$30
million

~$127 million

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

~$60,000 to
~$1.125
million

~$3,021,400

~$200,000 to
~$4 million

$15 million

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

JAMS

AAA

AAA

AAA

Arbitral
Forum

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Prior
Class
Action?
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New York
General
Business Law
sections 349
to 350, state
consumerprotection
statutes

Consumerfraud action
based on
skimming
tips

Wage-andhour action
based on
classification
of employees
as
independent
contractors
Consumerfraud action,
fraudulent
advertising

DoorDash
(consumer)

DoorDash
(employment)

DraftKings,
FanDuel
New York
General
Business Law
sections 349
to 350

Fair Labor
Standards
Act,
California
labor law

Fair Labor
Standards
Act, state
wage-andhour laws

Wage theft

Dollar Tree
(Family Dollar)

Underlying
Law

Principal
Claims

Mass
Arbitration

Keller
Lenkner

Keller
Lenkner

Z Law

Keller
Lenkner

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

ZwillGen

Gibson
Dunn

Gibson
Dunn

Hunton
Andrews
Kurth

Defense
Counsel

Actual,
compensatory,
punitive, and
statutory
damages, prejudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees
General
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees,
injunctive relief

Actual and
punitive
damages,
injunctive relief,
attorney’s fees

~6,000 filed

~1,000 filed,
~17,000
inventory

General
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees,
injunctive relief

Damages
Available

Unknown

~2,000 filed

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

~$300,000 to
~$5 million

~$12 million

Unknown

~$2.5 million

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

~$200,000 to
~$3 million

~$1.5 million

$250 per
claim

Not enough
data to
provide an
estimate

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

AAA

AAA, CPR

Unknown

AAA (though
Family Dollar
asserted that
some
demands
were for
JAMS)

Arbitral
Forum

Yes

Yes

No

No

Prior
Class
Action?
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Principal
Claims

Consumerfraud action
based on
advertising
that steered
consumers to
paid tax
services

Wage-andhour action
based on
classification
of employees
as
independent
contractors

False
advertising

Mass
Arbitration

Intuit
(TurboTax)

Lyft

Peloton

1389
New York
and Michigan
consumerprotection
laws
(Michigan
plaintiffs
dropped out
July 2021)

Fair Labor
Standards
Act,
California
labor law

California,
New York,
and
Pennsylvania
consumerprotection
laws

Underlying
Law

DiCello
Levitt, Keller
Lenkner

Keller
Lenkner

Keller
Lenkner

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

Hueston
Hennigan,
Beys Liston
& Mobargha

Keker, Van
Nest &
Peters

Wilmer
Cutler
Pickering
Hale and
Dorr

Defense
Counsel

~2,700 filed

~3,500 filed

~16,000 filed

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

Actual and
statutory
damages,
restitution,
injunctive relief,
attorney’s fees,
pre- and postjudgement
interest

Declaratory
judgement,
equitable relief,
restitution (back
pay), statutory,
general, and
punitive
damages,
attorney’s fees

Nominal, actual,
compensatory,
consequential,
punitive, and
statutory
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees

Damages
Available

~$2.1 million

~$9 million

Up to ~$36
million

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

Unknown

~$1 million

~$8 million

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

JAMS

AAA

AAA

Arbitral
Forum

No, but
class
action
followed
demands

Yes

Yes

Prior
Class
Action?

74 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2022)

Mass Arbitration

Challenge to
Uber’s waiver
of certain
delivery fees
in 2020

Wage-andhour action
based on
classification
of employees
as
independent
contractors

Uber
(employment)

Wage-andhour action
based on
classification
of employees
as
independent
contractors

Postmates

Uber (race)
(data updated
April 2022)

Principal
Claims

Mass
Arbitration

1390
Fair Labor
Standards
Act,
California
and other
state labor
laws

42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 et seq.,
Unruh Civil
Rights Act

Fair Labor
Standards
Act,
California
labor law

Underlying
Law

Kaplan
Hecker &
Fink

Gibson
Dunn

Larson

Gibson
Dunn

Defense
Counsel

Consovoy
McCarthy

Keller
Lenkner

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

~12,500 filed,
~60,000
inventory

~31,000 filed

~15,000 filed

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

Equitable relief,
restitution (back
pay), statutory,
general, and
punitive
damages,
attorney’s fees

Compensatory,
punitive, and
statutory
damages (of
$4,000 per
violation)

General
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees,
injunctive relief

Damages
Available

~$18 million
to ~$90
million

~$91 million

Up to ~$20
million

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

~$5 million
to ~$24
million

Unknown

~$100,000

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

No

Yes

JAMS

Yes

Prior
Class
Action?

AAA

AAA

Arbitral
Forum
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Principal
Claims

Underlying
Law

1391
Wage theft

Improper
disclosure of
consumer
information

Arise (pending
release of class
list)

DirecTV
(pending
release of class
list)
Telephone
Consumer
Protection
Act, Satellite
Television
Extension
and Localism
Act

Fair Labor
Standards Act

Fair Labor
Standards
Act,
California
labor law

Wage theft,
overtime,
employee
classification

Undisclosed

Potential Mass Arbitrations

Fair Labor
Standards
Act, state
wage-andhour laws

Wage theft

Prospect
Mortgage

Prior Small-Scale Mass Arbitrations

Mass
Arbitration

Lieff
Cabraser

Lichten &
Liss-Riordan

Nichols
Kaster

Nichols
Kaster

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

~70,000
inventory

At least
~9,100
inventory

Mayer
Brown

150 filed

~180
(Aguilera) and
~50 (Aldrich)
filed

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

Tucker Ellis

Unknown

Seyfarth
Shaw

Defense
Counsel

Statutory
damages of $500
per violation,
trebled if
knowing
violation

Liquidated
damages (unpaid
compensation),
attorney’s fees

Unknown

General
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
attorney’s fees,
injunctive relief

Damages
Available

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

Unknown

~$870,000

$396,000

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

AAA

N/A

JAMS

AAA or
JAMS,
depending on
agreement

Arbitral
Forum

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Prior
Class
Action?
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Consumer
antitrust
claims

Ticketmaster,
Live Nation
(pending
release of class
list)

1392

Fitbit

Consumerfraud action
based on
incorrect user
heart-rate
calculations

Claim-Marketability Failures

Principal
Claims

Mass
Arbitration

California
Consumer
Legal
Remedies Act

Sherman Act

Underlying
Law

Lieff
Cabraser

Quinn
Emanuel,
Keller
Lenkner

Lead
Plaintiffs’
Counsel

Morrison &
Foerster

Latham &
Watkins

Defense
Counsel

N/A

Unknown

Demands
Filed,
Inventory

Disgorgement,
restitution for
cost of purchase,
compensatory,
punitive, and
statutory
damages,
injunctive relief,
notification as
to defect,
attorney’s fees

Treble and
punitive
damages, preand postjudgement
interest,
injunctive relief,
attorney’s fees

Damages
Available

N/A

Unknown

Up-front
Fees:
Defendants

N/A

Unknown

Up-front
Fees:
Plaintiffs

AAA

N/A

Arbitral
Forum

Yes

Yes

Prior
Class
Action?
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